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It is a commonplace of the Anglo-American legal system that the law
of nuisance protects a landowner's enjoyment of an interest in land' as
well as the public's exercise of common rights to health, safety, comfort,
and morality.2 In contrast, the regulation of popular protest activity has
1. The essence of private nuisance has traditionally been interference with an
owner's or occupier's use and enjoyment of land. See, e.g., CLERK & LINDSELL ON
TORTS 24-01 (16th ed. 1989); W.V.H. ROGERS, WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ ON TORT 372-
73 (11th ed. 1979); F.H. Newark, The Boundaries of Nuisance, 65 LAW Q. REV. 480,
482 (1949); J.R. Spencer, Public Nuisance-A Critical Examination, 48 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
55, 57.
2. In the nineteenth century Sir James Fitzjames Stephen defined public nuisance
as "an act not warranted by law, or an omission to discharge a legal duty, that obstructed
or inconvenienced the public in the exercise of rights common to all Her Majesty's
subjects." JAMES F. STEPHEN, A DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 105 (London,
MacMillan 1877) [hereinafter STEPHEN, DIGEST]. He enumerated four varieties of public
nuisance: 1) interference with public health or comfort, 2) acts dangerous to public
safety, 3) acts against public morality, and 4) interference with public rights of passage.
JAMES F. STEPHEN, 4 COMMErARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 150-51 (C.H.S. Fifoot
ed., 19th ed. 1928). The definition of public nuisance is similar today. See, e.g.,
ARCHBOLD: PLEADING, EVIDENCE & PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES § 3821 (Stephen
Mitchell ed., 39th ed. 1976) (stating that a person is guilty of public nuisance who does
922
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seemingly been entrusted to the traditional criminal law governing public
order.3 This dichotomy, however, presents an incomplete and mislead-
ing picture of the historical role of nuisance law, which during the past
two centuries has served a critical function in controlling outdoor
political activity. The central inquiry of this Article is to explore why,
given the availability of specifically tailored public order offenses, the
authorities nevertheless relied extensively on nuisance to regulate street
assemblies during major periods of domestic disturbance in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. A related undertaking is to unfold
the consequences of the political uses of nuisance law for both evolving
legal doctrine and popular attitudes toward the right of public assembly.
A study of the political applications of nuisance leads ineluctably to
the concept of the "right to passage." Residing at the core of nuisance
doctrine in the public order context, it is arguably the only positive right
recognized in English common law. Since the Middle Ages, the
English legal system has been preoccupied with easing and facilitating
movement along the "highway."' A vast network of nuisance offenses
developed to preserve travel against obstruction, and for the past two
centuries the right to passage has featured prominently in political and
legal discourse.6 It was a curious right-literal, physical, indeed in all
an act not warranted by law or omits to discharge a legal duty, "if the effect of the act
or omission is to endanger the life, health, property, morals, or comfort of the public, or
to obstruct the public in the exercise or enjoyment of rights common to all Her
Majesty's subjects").
3. The criminal law governing public order includes the common law offenses of
riot, rout, unlawful assembly, affray, sedition, and public mischief as well as numerous
statutory violations. See generally A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE
CONSTIrUrION (8th ed. 193 1); LEON RADzINOwlCz, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRuvNAL
LAw AND ITS ADMInSTRATION FROM 1750 (4 vols., 1948); MICHAEL SUPPERSTONE,
BROwNLE's LAW OF PUBLIC ORDER AND NATIONAL SECURITY (2d ed. 1981); DAVID
WILLIAMS, KEEPING THE PEACE (1967).
4. See, e.g., SuPPERSTONE, supra note 3; PETER THORNTON, PUBLIC ORDER LAW
89 (1987). Other English positive rights are statutory. For a discussion of the
constitutional status of the right to assemble, see infra notes 67-72 and accompanying
text.
5. The term "highway" encompassed roads, streets, pavements, footpaths,
churchways, alleys, lanes, carriageways, cartways, bridlepaths, rivers, bridges and
tunnels, and the modes of protected passage included travel by foot, horse, wagon,
carriage and (eventually) automobile. See Highways Act, 1835, 5 & 6 Will. 4, ch. 50,
§ 5; HAROLD PARRISH & GERALD PONSONBY, PRATT AND MACKENZIE'S LAW OF
HIGHVAYS 3-14 (20th ed. 1962) [hereinafter PRATT AND MAcKENzIE].
6. As an example of the importance of the subject, the basic treatise on highways
law, Pratt and MacKenzie's Law of Highways, underwent 21 editions between 1836 and
senses pedestrian-that simply protected travellers from annoyance,
injury, inconvenience, or delay caused by physical impediments in the
street. The right was, however, restricted to passing and repassing "for
the purpose of legitimate travel' 7 in accordance with "reasonable and
ordinary use, ' concepts that underwent considerable permutation and
reinterpretation in response to changing historical circumstances.
Obviously, a right implicating permissible uses of the streets could be
critical to the regulation of popular protest activity, and beginning in the
mid-nineteenth century outdoor meetings and processions became
increasingly important forms of political expression. If applied
restrictively, nuisance doctrines defining street demonstrations as
"obstructions" to passage could easily become devices for inhibiting
freedom of assembly. This Article will argue that although the
authorities generally tolerated outdoor meetings, in five critical
periods--the 1880s, the early twentieth century, the 1930s, the 1960s,
and the 1980s-they significantly enhanced their public order powers by
selectively invoking doctrines of highway obstruction against particular
religious and political movements.
The political uses of obstruction law, however, informed developing
legal doctrine itself. In the early nineteenth century, the emergence of
an inchoate distinction between meetings and processions conferred on
moving demonstrations a more favorable legal status than stationary
assemblies. This distinction flowed partly from formalistic and literal
notions inherent in the concept of passage-most notably, the fact that
marches, unlike stationary meetings, actually "passed" along the street.
However, the literal interpretation of processions as "passage," though
plausible, was hardly the result of inexorable logical command.
Processions could be wholly obstructive and, when serving as vehicles
for concerted political expression, arguably did not promote purposes of
"legitimate passage" at all. Nonetheless, in the 1880s this tentative
distinction crystallized in the face of concurrent but quite divergent
challenges to social order posed by the Salvation Army and the
socialists. The two movements emphasized different tactics---the
Salvationists relied primarily on street processions, whereas the socialists
organized mass street meetings-and the law responded by solidifying
a distinction that preserved the relatively benign activities of the former
while suppressing the more threatening conduct of the latter. The
privileged status of processions then rigidified as a matter of legal
1967.
7. Harrison v. Duke of Rutland, [1893] 1 Q.B. 142, 154 (C.A.).
8. Id. at 147.
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theory, and by the turn of the century it had become a fundamental and
"quasi-autonomous" feature of nuisance law.
This doctrinal framework, treating meetings with rigor and marches
with leniency, remained congruent with political exigencies through the
early twentieth century and enabled the government to deal effectively
with stationary picketing activity by the suffragettes. In the 1930s,
however, the framework became increasingly anomalous and dysfunc-
tional as marches and countermarches by Communists and Fascists
emerged as the major threats to public order. The history of the "right
to passage" after the depression era largely concerned the differing
strategies adopted by the government and the courts to counter the
constraints of formal doctrine. By the 1980s the judicial and political
authorities had subtly but significantly transformed the doctrinal
resolution of the 1880s even as they continued to affirm its formal
vitality.
Two major conclusions emerge from this study. First, nuisance law
historically played a critical and as yet insufficiently appreciated role in
securing public order. The reliability, elasticity, and seeming neutrality
of the law of highway obstruction permitted interferences with civil
liberties in periods of domestic crisis in a manner that more finely tuned
public order doctrines could not. Second, the evolution of the "right to
passage" can only be understood as the product of both external
historical pressures and internal doctrinal constraints. On the one hand,
historical events powerfully influenced the development of the doctrine
of highway obstruction; on the other, the independent force of legal rules
produced unintended formalistic results, necessitating political and legal
adjustments that respected the integrity of established doctrine while
altering its content. The history of the right to pass thus illustrates the
complex interplay between the formal law and the pressures generated
by specific threats to domestic order.9
This exploration of the historical fortunes of the "right to passage" and
its corollary, the nuisance doctrine of "obstruction of the highway,"
comprises six main sections. Part I traces the origins of the "right to
9. The focus of this Article is on political meetings and processions and the
distinct issues that they raise regarding the constitutional status of "freedom of assembly"
in England. Nuisance doctrines predicated on the "right to pass" were, however,
ubiquitous in English law, appearing in circumstances of industrial picketing, popular
recreations, commercial activity, and personal injury. The author is also exploring the
use of obstruction doctrine in those areas.
passage," identifies its essential components, and examines the diverse
methods of its enforcement. Part II discusses doctrinal and societal
changes occurring in the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century,
including the earliest articulations of passage law in the public order
context and the emerging social phenomenon of outdoor public meetings.
Part HI examines two critical periods, the 1880s and the early twentieth
century, when the doctrinal distinction between meetings and processions
was consonant with government policy toward the Salvation Army, the
socialists, and the suffragettes. Part IV analyzes the use of obstruction
in three later periods of domestic turbulence, when the right to passage
was adapted and ultimately reconceived to cope with street activity by
Communists, Fascists, and a variety of other political demonstrators in
the 1930s, the 1960s, and the 1980s. Turning from periods of disorder
to more tranquil periods, Part V considers the consequences of the
general practice of tolerating strict obstructions for emerging concepts
of "freedom of assembly." It argues that the general pattern of
underenforcing obstruction law paradoxically nourished a popular belief
in a right to assemble that was inconsistent with the formal legal status
of meetings, and it suggests that popular perceptions of rights were
shaped to a greater extent by de facto enforcement patterns of the police
than de jure pronouncements of legal authorities. Finally, Part VI
provides a general assessment of historical and doctrinal developments
relating to the right to passage. The fortunes of obstruction law over the
past two centuries, both in its use and disuse, sharply illuminate the
complex and equivocal relationship between formal legal doctrine and
its instrumental applications."0
10. This Article attempts to provide a broad interpretive analysis of nuisance law
over two centuries. It is based primarily on printed sources such as case reports, legal
treatises, journals, newspapers, parliamentary reports and debates, and autobiographies
and memoirs. For the larger historical context, it relies on secondary studies by
historians in specialized areas. The analysis in this Article points to the need for more
detailed empirical studies that will identify more specifically the ways and extent to
which both formal obstruction law and informal mechanisms of social control (such as
threats of nuisance prosecutions) were used in different localities, in different periods,
and against different groups.
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I. THE RIGHT TO PASSAGE IN ENGLISH LAW"
A. Origins of the Right
The right to passage originated in the Middle Ages and was predicated
on two somewhat unusual but resilient features of the English highway.
First, a highway was legally conceptualized not as a road, but as a right.
Second, highways were private property even though they might be
"owned" by a governmental entity rather than a private party.2 Both
characteristics significantly affected the legality of all forms of street
activity.
From at least the early medieval period, a highway was conceived not
as a strip of land with definite boundaries but as a legal and customary
"right of passage in the sovereign, for himself and his subjects, over
another's land."' 3 A road was legally not a corporeal entity, but an
easement or right of way over a customary private course. 14  The
11. To clarify the terminology used in this Article: "right to passage," "ight of
passage," and "right to pass" were used synonymously in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, and this Article follows that usage; "obstruction law" and "highways law" are
similarly interchangeable. The terms "assembly" and "demonstration" include both
stationary meetings and processions.
12. All land in England was-and still is-private property vesting within a legal
person or entity with either a legal estate or statutory powers of control; thus, technically
there have never been any "public" highways, streets, or pavements. After 1875 all
highways "maintainable at the public expense," by that time most roads in England,
vested in fee simple in the local highway authority. See Public Health Act, 1875, 38 &
39 Vict., ch. 55, § 149. Those remaining in private hands were owned by the adjacent
landowners, each to the midpoint of the road. See R.F.V. HEUSTON & R.S. CHAMBERS,
SALMOND AND HEUSTON ON THE LAW OF TORTS (18th ed. 1981) § 25 [hereinafter
SALMOND AND HEUSTON]; SUPPERSTONE, supra note 3; J.F. Garner, Rights in a
Highway, 24 THE CONVEYANCER 454, 454 (1960).
13. See SIDNEY & BEATRICE WEBB, ENGLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT. THE STORY
OF THE KING'S HIGVAY 5 (1913). The word "road," which some scholars believe
derives from the Anglo-Saxon "ridan," to ride, may actually be connected with the verb
"to rid," meaning to be cleared of obstruction. Id. at 6.
14. See id. at 5. The easement was created, except in the case of highways
authorized by statute, by the express or presumed dedication by an owner of land of a
right of passage to the public at large and the acceptance of that right by the public.
PRATT AND MACKENZIE, supra note 5, at 16. Whereas the ownership of a highway was
subject to the public's easement of passage, other open spaces such as parks, commons,
and beaches-which also were "privately" owned, generally by the Crown or local
authorities-did not confer such an easement and could be entirely closed to travellers.
See, e.g., Blundell v. Blundell, 5 B. & Ald. 533, 106 Eng. Rep. 1286 (K.B. 1821)
easement first attached to the "King's Highways,"'5 which in the eighth
or ninth century comprised only four great arteries remaining from the
Roman period.16 By the end of the eleventh century, however, most
major roads were denominated "King's Highways" and conferred an
easement of passage. 7 Although in the eighteenth century the term
"highway" came to denote the land as well as the easement, the notion
that a road conveyed a positive right persisted in modem jurisprudence.
To the present day, in fact, the definition of a "highway" continues to
embody the concept of a "right to passage."' 8
In the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, cases began to appear
in which travellers or the Crown brought nuisance suits against persons
or entities obstructing the right to passage. The cases usually involved
interferences with commercial activity, for example, where obstacles
such as ditches, gates, or hedges prevented the transportation of crops or
coal. 9 By the early nineteenth century, concomitant with the accelerat-
(beaches); Bailey v. Williamson, 8 L.R.-Q.B. 118 (1873) (parks); De Morgan v. Metro.
Bd. of Works, 5 Q.B.D. 155 (1880) (commons).
15. The phrase "King's Highway" is obscure, but it apparently referred to a place
embraced by "the King's Peace" or criminal jurisdiction; persons using these particular
roads were guaranteed the king's protection. 2 FREDERIC POLLOCK & FREDERIC
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 44-45 (Cambridge, 2d ed. 1898). Interest-
ingly, personal security was itself linked to the idea of unobstructed passage. The first
English statute governing the highways, the Statute of Winchester, ordered that highways
be enlarged and cleared of bushes and woods so that a man not "lurk to do hurt" to
someone on the way. Statute of Winchester, 1285, 13 Edw. 3, ch. 5; see SIDNEY &
BEATRICE WEBB, supra note 13, at 7.
16. See, e.g., SIDNEY & BEATRICE WEBB, supra note 13, at 10; J.A. Simpson, The
King's Highway, 4 PROCEEDINGS AND TRANSACTIONS OF THE WOODFORD AND DIsTRICT
ANTIQUARIAN SOCIETY 3 (1937).
17. See SIDNEY & BEATRICE WEBB, supra note 13, at 10; F.M. Stenton, The Road
System of Medieval England, 7 ECON. HIST. REv. 1, 3 (1936).
18. See, e.g., 20 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES 2 (4th ed.
1992) (declaring that "a highway is a way over which members of the public have the
right to pass and re-pass"); PRATT AND MACKENZIE, supra note 5, at 3 (stating that the
right of the public in a highway "is an easement of passage only-a right of passing and
repassing"); AVROM SHERR, FREEDOM OF PROTEST, PUBLIC ORDER AND THE LAW 61(1989) (defining a highway as "a way over which all members of the public are entitled
to pass and re-pass").
19. See, e.g., Maynall v. Saltmarsh, 1 Keb. 847, 83 Eng. Rep. 1278 (K.B. 1664)
(poles in the road prevented a farmer from carrying corn from his field to his home);
Hart v. Basset, T. Jones 156, 84 Eng. Rep. 1194 (K.B. 1681) (ditch and gate on the
highway forced a farmer to carry goods a more difficult way); Iveson v. Moore, 1 Ld.
Raym. 486, 91 Eng. Rep. 1224 (K.B. 1697) (rival colliery interfered with the transport
of coal); R. v. Leech, 6 Mod. 145, 87 Eng. Rep. 904 (K.B. 1704) (shipowner brought
a 300-ton ship into a dock designed for small ships); Chichester v. Lethbridge, Willes
71, 125 Eng. Rep. 1061 (C.P. 1738) (ditches, hedges, and gates impeded the plaintiffs
travel by coach); Hubert v. Groves, 1 Esp. 148, 170 Eng. Rep. 308 (N.P. 1794) (rubbish
on the road prevented a coal and timber merchant from transporting his goods in the
usual way); see also 2 JAMES OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS 894-97, 899-907,
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ing pace of industrialization, there was a dramatic increase in litigation
involving obstructions to commercial travellers.2° Before exploring the
use of highways law in the public order context, it is useful to delineate
its basic doctrinal characteristics as elaborated in the commercial cases.
The formal rules governing the "right to passage," whatever the vagaries
of their interpretation or application, have remained remarkably
consistent over the past two centuries.
B. Doctrinal Content of the Right
From its inception the right to unobstructed passage along the highway
was universal, perpetual, inalienable, and inextinguishable. It was
common to all the king's subjects, did not lapse upon the public's disuse
of a road, and precluded even the owner from interfering with a
highway's fitness for passage.21 As an easement, however, the right of
passage was also limited. It did not affect the ownership of the land
over which it was exercised, and it extended to passage and passage
alone.'
914 (1992).
20. See, e.g., R. v. Russell, 6 East 427, 102 Eng. Rep. 1350 (K.B. 1805) (wagoner
blocked up the street by leaving large wagons in front of his warehouse); R. v. Cross,
3 Camp. 224, 170 Eng. Rep. 1362 (N.P. 1812) (stage coach proprietor committed a
public nuisance by placing coaches in the road for an unreasonable time); R. v. Jones,
3 Camp. 230, 170 Eng. Rep. 1364 (N.P. 1812) (timber merchant sawed logs in the
street); Rose v. Miles, 4 M. & S. 101, 105 Eng. Rep. 773 (K.B. 1815) (barge obstructed
navigation on a creek, forcing the plaintiff to convey his goods over land at considerable
expense); Greasly v. Codling, 2 Bing. 263, 130 Eng. Rep. 307 (C.P. 1824) (gate across
the highway forced a coal higgler to take a circuitous route); Bateman v. Burge, 6 C. &
P. 391, 172 Eng. Rep. 1290 (N.P. 1834) (landowner replaced a two-foot stile across the
footway with a five-foot bar); Wilkes v. Hungerford Market Company, 2 Bing. N.C. 281,
132 Eng. Rep. 110 (C.P. 1835) (closure of adjoining roads to build a market diverted a
bookseller's customers from his store); Rose v. Groves, 5 M. & G. 613, 134 Eng. Rep.
705 (C.P. 1843) (adjoining business placed beams in the water and hindered the access
of customers to a riverbank pub).
21. See, e.g., WILLIAM RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS
472 (London, Stevens & Sons, 4th ed. 1865); Simpson, supra note 16, at 2. An
unauthorized obstruction of a highway was a nuisance that passage of time could not
legitimate. See THOMAS BAKER, THE LAW OF HIGHWAYS IN ENGLAND AND WALES 70
(London, Stevens & Sons 1880). Even a local authority that owned a road could not
license an obstruction. See REGINALD RYVES, THE KING'S HIGHWAY 20 (1908).
22. According to a popular adage whose origins are obscure, "[t]he King has
nothing but the passage for himself and his people; but the freehold and all profits
belong to the owner of the soil." PRATr AND MACKENZIE, supra note 5, at 53 (quoting
1 Roll. Abr. 392); see, e.g., JAMES B. BIRD, THE LAWS RESPECTING HIGHWAYS AND
The concept of passage embraced two further notions, "reasonable
use" and "obstruction": any use of the street that was both unreasonable
and obstructive constituted illegitimate passage and infringed the public
right. The Court of Appeal explicated the notion of "reasonable use" in
two late-Victorian cases, Harrison v. Duke of Rutland23 and Hiclman
v. Maisey.24 As authoritative pronouncements on the scope of permissi-
ble activity on the highway, the decisions indicated both the importance
of the right to passage and the narrow range of conduct that it embraced.
In Duke of Rutland, a neighbor of the Duke deliberately interfered
with a grouse shoot by walking back and forth on a highway that
traversed the Duke's land, opening and closing his umbrella and waving
his pocket handkerchief in'an effort to frighten birds away from the
awaiting shooters. The Court of Appeal, viewing the case as one "of
great importance, ' concluded that Harrison was a trespasser because
he had used the road in an improper fashion and had exceeded the
conditions of the easement.26 According to Lord Esher, Master of the
Rolls, the highway had not been used "in its reasonable and usual mode"
for purposes of passage, but only out of a "perverted" desire to interfere
with the shooting.27
Eight years later the Court of Appeal considered the situation of
Maisey, the proprietor of a racing publication, who paced up and down
a fifteen-yard strip of highway to observe with binoculars the training of
horses on Hickman's adjacent land. Reaffirming the importance of the
"right to pass and repass," the court again limited its exercise to the
"legitimate" use of a highway as a highway, which did not include
TURNPIKE ROADS 3 (London, W. Clarke, 4th ed. 1819) ("And if a man make a street
upon his own ground, it is a dedication to the public, so far as the public has occasion
for it, which is only for a right of passage; but it never was understood to be a transfer
of the absolute property in the soil.").
23. [1893] 1 Q.B. 142 (C.A.).
24. [1900] 1 Q.B. 752 (C.A.).
25. Duke of Rutland, [1893] 1 Q.B. at 149.
26. A landowner, whether an adjacent owner or the local authority, could bring a
trespass action against any person who used the highway for a purpose other than
passage. Id. at 152; see R. v. Pratt, 4 El. & BI. 860, 868-69, 119 Eng. Rep. 319, 322
(Q.B. 1855) ("If a man use the land over which there is a right of way for any purpose,
lawful or unlawful, other than that of passing and repassing, he is a trespasser."); PRATr
AND MACKENZIE, supra note 5, at 4. In Duke of Rutland, the Duke's keepers forcibly
restrained Harrison, who brought a pro se action for assault and to "defend the public
right." [1893] 1 Q.B. at 160. The Duke successfully counterclaimed in trespass.
27. Duke of Rutland, [1893] 1 Q.B. at 143, 146. Though finding for the Duke,
Lord Esher sought "to express the reasons for our judgment so carefully that we may
not, in upholding the legal right of the owner of the land, interfere with the largest
possible rights of the public to the enjoyment of the highway as such." Id. at 144.
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carrying on business as a "racing tout."'28 Invoking Duke of Rutland,
the court acknowledged that "modem times" might require adaptations
of the right to pass, but it insisted that any "reasonable extensions" must
not be "inconsistent with the maintenance of the paramount idea that the
right of the public is that of passage." '29 The two cases thus confirmed
and reinforced the principle that the criterion of legitimate passage was
"reasonableness" and that this concept was narrowly limited to activities
that were "incidental to passage. "30
The second core element of the right to passage was "obstruction," an
exceedingly wide notion that encompassed virtually every activity in the
street. Its breadth was the result of several specialized rules. First, an
obstruction was actionable even if it only partially blocked the road and
could be easily avoided by passers-by. In the rather astonishing case of
28. Hickman, [1900] 1 Q.B. at 759. Two additional features of the decisions are
worth noting. First, in balancing the right of the public to pass against the right of an
adjacent landowner, the Court of Appeal was solicitous of private property rights, an
orientation that consistently influenced the scope of public passage rights. Second,
although the judges interpreted "reasonable use" narrowly when forced to decide a case,
they were impatient with claims of mere technical obstruction. As Mr. Justice Kay
noted in Duke of Rutland, many violations of the easement were simply too trivial to
justify an action. For example, "no one in his senses" would bring an action against an
artist for making a sketch by the side of the highway, although the artist might
technically be a trespasser. Duke of Rutland, [1893] 1 Q.B. at 156. These
themes-concern for private property owners and annoyance with technical prosecu-
tions-appeared repeatedly in cases involving political street activity.
29. Hickman, [1900] 1 Q.B. at 758.
30. The stringency of the reasonableness test was reflected in the limited number
of obstructions that the courts recognized as reasonable-often only in dicta--in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For examples of reasonable use, see R. v. Cross, 3
Camp. 224, 170 Eng. Rep. 1362 (N.P. 1812) (dictum) (stage coach stopping briefly to
pick up passengers); R. v. Jones, 3 Camp. 230, 170 Eng. Rep. 1364 (N.P. 1812) (dictum)
(deliveries and repairs); R. v. Ward, 4 Ad. & E. 384, 111 Eng. Rep. 832 (K.B. 1836)
(dictum) (temporary scaffolding to secure safety for passengers); R. v. U. K. Elec. Tel.
Co., Ltd., 31 L.J. (M.C.) 166, 176 Eng. Rep. 33 (Q.B. 1862) (telegraph posts); R. v.
Lepine, 15 L.T.R. (n.s.) 158 (Sup. 1866) (portion of a chapel encroaching on the
highway); Harrold v. Watney, [1898] 2 Q.B. 320 (person leaning against a fence by the
side of the road); Hickman, [1900] 1 Q.B. 752 (dictum) (artist making a sketch by the
roadside); Dunn v. Holt, 20 T.L.R. 297 (K.B. 1904) (cleaning truck parked outside a
customer's residence); L v. Bartholomew, [1908] 1 K.B. 554 (coffee stall operated by
Church of England temperance society); Gill v. Carson & Nield, [1917] 2 K.B. 674
(wagon left in the street for five minutes while the drivers watered their horses and took
tea after a journey); Harper v. G.N. Haden & Sons, Ltd., [1933] Ch. 298 (scaffolding);
Dwyer v. Mansfield, [1946] 1 K.B. 437 (queue to buy potatoes during a food shortage);
Trevett v. Lee, [1955] 1 W.L.R. 113 (C.A.) (small water pipe laid on the road by a
householder during a drought).
R. v. United Kingdom Electric Telegraph Co., Ltd.,3 1 for example, the
court held that telegraph poles at the side of the road constituted a
nuisance because it was impermissible to withdraw any part of the
highway from the general purposes of traffic.32 Second, an obstruction
could be merely potential, that is, it was sufficient to establish circum-
stances suggesting that "persons may be obstructed" even though no
actual obstruction had occurred.33 Following from this rule, it was not
a defense that an obstacle was on a portion of the highway not habitually
used for traffic.3" Third, an obstruction did not even have to be located
in the street. Conduct on adjacent private land-for example, activity
that attracted a crowd of spectators to the sidewalk-was actionable if
calculated to cause an obstruction that might impede the passing
public.35
The concept of the "right to passage" was thus at the same time
exceptionally specific and exceedingly vague. On the one hand, it was
suffused with concreteness and physicality, directed toward protecting
the basic and elemental activity of moving along the street. On the other
hand, owing to the absence of any requirement of actual blockage or
injury, it was curiously intangible and elusive. The almost metaphysical
nature of "obstruction," combined with the exceedingly restrictive
interpretation of "reasonable use," meant that virtually any activity in the
street-certainly activity of a stationary nature-was a nuisance that
infringed the "right of passage."
C. Enforcement of the Right
The importance of the "right to passage" was reflected in the
formidable legal arsenal that developed to enforce it, consisting of
31. 31 L.J. (M.C.) 166, 176 Eng. Rep. 33 (Q.B. 1862).
32. Id. at 34; see also R. v. Train, 2 B. & S. 640, 121 Eng. Rep. 1209 (Q.B. 1862)
(holding that a tramway, despite being on the whole a public convenience to passengers,
was a nuisance because it withdrew part of the highway from its ordinary use); R. v.
Matthias, 2 F. & F. 570, 175 Eng. Rep. 1191 (N.P. 1861) (allowing a jury to determine
whether a baby carriage on wheels was a public nuisance); 16 HALSBURY's LAws OF
ENGLAND 355 (2d ed. 1935) (stating that it was no defense to the Highways Act that
sufficient space was left for passengers).
33. Gill v. Carson and Nield, [1917] 2 K.B. 674, 677-78. As The Law Times
observed in 1878, an obstruction could be "purely theoretical." The Consequences of
an Obstruction of the Highway, 65 LAw TIMES 76, 77 (Nov. 30, 1878).
34. See, e.g., Harvey v. Truro Rural Dist. Council, [1903] 2 Ch. 638; PRATr AND
MACKENZIE, supra note 5, at 108.
35. See, e.g., R. v. Carlile, 6 C. & P. 636, 172 Eng. Rep. 1397 (Cent. Crim. Ct.
1834) (collecting a crowd of spectators to the sidewalk to view a window display was
a public nuisance); Back v. Holmes, 56 L.T.R. (n.s.) 713 (Q.B. 1887) (religious meeting
on private front yard attracting crowd on highway was actionable).
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actions that were both civil and criminal, private and public, common
law and statutory. Although landowners such as the Duke of Rutland
and Hickman occasionally brought civil trespass actions,36 enforcement
more commonly took the form of nuisance suits. Nuisance law from its
origins was linked to highway obstruction; in fact, after the thirteenth
century the prototypical nuisance was the "stopping up of a way."37
Adjacent owners or occupiers could institute a civil action in private
nuisance for obstruction of access to their premises,38 and the Crown
could bring a criminal public nuisance prosecution for interference with
the right of the travelling public39 or a civil action on behalf of the
public for an injunction.4° A person who suffered "particular damage"
from an interference with travellers-for example, a shopkeeper deprived
of customers by a street obstruction-also had standing to bring a public
nuisance suit, thereby transforming the criminal offense into a tort action
for damages or injunctive relief.41 The substantive illegality, causing
36. The right to a civil trespass action passed to the local authority when it gained
ownership of a road-as it did over most roads after 1875-but local bodies rarely
bothered to exercise this power because they did not suffer much loss and could recover
only nominal damages. See Peter Wallington, Injunctions and the "Right to Demon-
strate," 1976 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 82, 96. Trespass, unlike private nuisance, involved a
direct rather than indirect interference with the plaintiff's land and was actionable
without proof of special damages. C.D. BAKER, TORT 177 (3d. ed. 1981); CLERK &
LINDSELL ON TORTS, supra note 1, 24-22.
37. See, e.g., Newark, supra note 1, at 482; Spencer, supra note 1, at 58-59.
38. See, e.g., PRATt AND MACKENZIE, supra note 5, at 56 (right of access of
adjoining landowner was a private right, distinct from the right to use the highway as
one of the public, and the owner could sue whether or not the obstruction also
constituted a public nuisance); CLERK & LINDSELL ON TORTS, supra note 1, 24-67;
WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ ON TORT, supra note 1, at 390; Wallington, supra note 36, at 98.
39. See CLERK & LINDSELL ON TORTS, supra note 1, 24-02; SALMOND AND
HEUSTON, supra note 12, § 26. Theoretically, the common law crime of public nuisance
by obstruction was punishable, as were all common law misdemeanors, by a fine or up
to life imprisonment at the discretion of the court. R.F.V. HEUSTON, ESSAYS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 124-25 (1961).
40. See, e.g., OLDHAM, supra note 19, at 893; WINFIELD & JOLOwIcz ON TORT,
supra note 1, at 354; Spencer, supra note 1, at 66-73. The main difference between
public and private nuisance was that the latter was an ordinary tort actionable by anyone
with an interest in land, whereas public nuisance was both a common law crime and a
tort actionable by the Attorney General or someone who suffered particular damage. See
Wallington, supra note 36, at 98.
41. See, e.g., J.W. EHRLICH, EHRLICH'S BLACKSTONE 583-84 (1959); SALMOND
AND HEUSTON, supra note 12, § 26; Gilbert Kodilinye, Public Nuisance and Particular
Damage in the Modem Law, 6 LEGAL STUD. 182, 184-89 (1986); Spencer, supra note
1, at 73-76.
an obstruction of the highway by an activity not reasonably related to
passage, was the same in all instances.
In addition to common law offenses, numerous statutes and local
regulations prohibited the nuisance of street obstruction. A series of
national Highways Acts, for example, established the crime of "wilfully
obstructing the free passage along a highway without lawful authority or
excuse."42 The Metropolitan Police Act 1839, a critical statute in the
history of public order, contained broad prohibitions on street obstruc-
tions in the capital.43 Moreover, by the late nineteenth century
numerous municipal authorities had promulgated local bylaws against
obstruction and other nuisances.44  These statutory and regulatory
offenses paralleled the common law actions in their substantive
requirements, but they offered enforcement advantages such as summary
trials before magistrates and police authority to arrest without warrant.
4
The law thus directed an extensive battery of weapons at the specific
offense of obstructing passage along the street. This phenomenon
provokes the intriguing question why the legal arsenal was so formidably
stocked against such a seemingly insignificant problem. Although the
42. Highways Act, 1835, 5 & 6 Will. 4, ch. 50, § 72. The penalty was a sum not
exceeding forty shillings in addition to the damages caused. This section was
substantially reenacted as section 121 of the Highways Act 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, ch. 25,
and section 137 of the Highways Act 1980, ch. 66. Prosecutions under the Highways
Act increased enormously in the course of the nineteenth century. Although the
available statistics do not reveal the particular type of highways offense charged, the
numbers are suggestive. In 1864, for example, 8176 persons were prosecuted under the
Act, rising to 26,143 in 1895 and to 64,900 in 1913. In the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries the statistics included a special category of "obstruction and
nuisance" cases, instances of which increased from 13,886 in 1893 to 23,023 in 1913.
BRIT. PARL. PAPERS, JUDIcIAL STATisncs (ENG. & WALES), 1865, LII; 1895, CVIII;
1914-16, LXXXII.
43. 2 & 3 Vict., ch. 47, §§ 52, 54. Section 52 authorized the police commissioner
"from time to time, and as occasion shall require, to make regulations for the route to
be observed by all carts, carriages, horses, and persons, and for preventing obstruction
of the streets and thoroughfares within the metropolitan police district, in all times of
public processions, public rejoicings, or illuminations, and also to give directions to the
constables for keeping order and for preventing any obstruction of the thoroughfares in
the immediate neighbourhood of her Majesty's palaces and the public offices, the High
Court of Parliament, the courts of law and equity, the police courts, the theatres, and
other places of public resort, and in any case when the streets or thoroughfares may be
thronged or may be liable to be obstructed." Section 54 imposed penalties on persons
who committed a nuisance in the thoroughfare by various means, including anyone who
"by means of any cart, carriage, sledge, truck, or barrow, or any horse or other animal"
wilfully caused any obstruction in the thoroughfare. An analogue to the Metropolitan
Police Act, the Town Police Clauses Act, 1847, 10 & 11 Vict., ch. 89, §§ 21, 28, gave
urban authorities outside London similar powers to regulate street obstruction.
44. See infra notes 138-142 and accompanying text.
45. See Highways Act, 1835, 5 & 6 Will. 4, ch. 50, § 79(2); Highways Act, 1959,
7 & 8 Eliz. 2, ch. 25, § 121(2); Highways Act, 1980, ch. 66, § 137(2).
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increasing complexity of traffic control was doubtless a factor, it cannot
alone explain the plethora of available remedies. The answer lies, rather,
in the fact that obstruction doctrine facilitated the discretionary,
decentralized, and effective regulation of many divergent forms of street
activity. "Unreasonable obstruction" was a highly malleable concept,
encompassing objects on or off the road, buildings, signs, animals,
vehicles, individuals, and groups of all kinds. Further, in any particular
circumstance plaintiffs and prosecutors could choose from a variety of
attractive legal options, all imposing the same meager evidentiary
requirements. Finally, obstruction prosecutions enabled the authorities
to claim with at least some credibility that they were not discriminating
against particular forms of conduct but rather were vindicating a
significant public right. As wielded by the state, landowners, and
employers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the law on highway
obstruction became a powerful tool for achieving specific social and
political objectives. It was particularly effective in securing public order.
II. HIGHWAY OBSTRUCTION AND THE LAW OF PUBLIC ORDER IN
THE EARLY AND MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY
The first three quarters of the nineteenth century established three
necessary preconditions for widespread use of obstruction law in the
public order context. First, a few early cases, particularly R. v.
Carlile,4 6 experimented with political uses of obstruction and adumbrat-
ed an approach that would be exploited and refined in later judicial
decisions. Second, outdoor political meetings became an important form
of popular political expression, creating an inviting target for the
application of highways law. Finally, judges and scholars clarified the
constitutional status of street meetings, uniformly declaring that English
law recognized no positive right of public assembly to balance against
the "right of passage."
46. 6 C. & P. 636, 172 Eng. Rep. 1397 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1834).
A. Early Doctrinal Development: R. v. Carlile
The first reported decision to address the use of obstruction against
protest activity was the 1834 case of R. v. Carlile.47 In this initial and
tentative application of nuisance, the court displayed no particular self-
consciousness about transferring general obstruction rules to the wholly
novel situation of political expression. Yet in the guise of applying
settled rules, the court in fact created new law, and Carlile became a
major precedent for later cases involving political obstructions on the
highway.
Richard Carlile was a secularist bookseller in Fleet Street whose shop
windows in October 1834 displayed various anti-clerical effigies, most
notoriously an Anglican bishop linking arms with the devil. For several
days the exhibit drew a continuous crowd of about forty people to the
sidewalk, forcing "old persons and females" into the street and injuring
the trade of neighboring shops. 48  The government had previously
prosecuted Carlile on several occasions for blasphemous and seditious
libel.49 Finally, it adopted a new approach and successfully indicted
him on a common law charge of public nuisance for obstructing the
highway.
During his trial at the Old Bailey, Carlile argued pro se that he was
the victim of political persecution. "[II]is Majesty never goes to the
theatre, or to open the Parliament," he charged, "without a much greater
crowd than ever were at my shop."50 Lord Mayor's Day, Bartholomew
Fair, and more mundane activities, Carlile pointed out, also collected a
crowd: "Illuminations attract a crowd; so do military movements; so do
the learned Judges when they go in state to St. Paul's, and even the
people coming from the churches on a Sunday morning sometimes are
so numerous as to oblige persons to walk in the carriage way."51 His
defense elicited only a cursory response from the court. Mr. Justice Park
charged the jury that the other events were not analogous and that in any
case the failure to prosecute others similarly situated was irrelevant.
"[I]f there were 500 other nuisances," the judge declared, "they will not
47. Carlile was one of the few reported cases in the early nineteenth century where
obstruction was used against political activity. This does not represent the extent of its
use, however, because throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the vast
majority of obstruction prosecutions, largely adjudicated in magistrates' courts, went
unreported. Moreover, most instances of obstruction did not lead to arrests but simply
provided a basis for police dispersal of street activity. See infra note 464.
48. Id. at 640-42, 172 Eng. Rep. at 1400-01.
49. Spencer, supra note 1, at 79.
50. Carlile, 6 C. & P. at 644, 172 Eng. Rep. at 1401.
51. Id. at 645, 172 Eng. Rep. at 1402.
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justify this. '52 In the view of the court, the issue had nothing to do
with the content of the display but only with whether the "defendant
caused the footway of Fleet Street to be obstructed, so that the public
could not pass as they ought to do."53 Carlile was convicted, fined, and
required to post the exorbitant sum of £200 to guarantee his good
behavior for the next three years. The decision thus validated the
innovative governmental strategy of relying on an ostensibly neutral
charge of highway obstruction to conceal a prosecution obviously
prompted by other motives.
The opinion was also significant for articulating a crude distinction
between stationary and moving crowds. Mr. Justice Park distinguished
the judges' procession from Carlile's conduct on the ground that "in that
case, the crowd who look at the procession move on with it, and do not
stand obstructing the street, as they have done in this case."54 The
judge did not underscore the distinction, and his remarks probably
reflected a spontaneous desire to exempt customary processions from the
force of obstruction law rather than a calculated attempt to create a
formal dichotomy between two types of assembly. In the late nineteenth
century, however, preferential treatment of processions emerged as a
fundamental characteristic of highways doctrine, and Carlile's holding
that street obstructions were unlawful came to be limited to stationary
assemblies.
Another salient feature of the opinion was its emphasis on the nature
of the obstructive crowd, which apparently consisted in part of "idle,
loose and disorderly people."55  Three members of the crowd were
arrested during the display for picking pockets, 56 and Mr. Justice Park
found this circumstance troubling. Although he was "not prepared to
say that it was necessary to shew [sic] that they were disorderly
persons," he nevertheless reminded the jury that a defense witness had
testified that he "never saw such a set of fellows in his life, both for
52. Id. at 650, 172 Eng. Rep. at 1404. The court noted that Lord Mayor's day was
only one day in the year (if it were longer, the judge observed, it would indeed be a
nuisance) and that Bartholomew Fair probably was in fact a nuisance. Id. at 649, 172
Eng. Rep. at 1403.
53. Id. at 647, 172 Eng. Rep. at 1403.
54. Id. at 649, 172 Eng. Rep. at 1403.
55. Id. at 637, 172 Eng. Rep. at 1398. One witness described the crowd as "the
lowest of the low." Id. at 643, 172 Eng. Rep. at 1401.
56. Id. at 642, 172 Eng. Rep. at 1401.
behaviour and conversation."57 The assumption that obstructive street
demonstrations would inevitably attract unruly criminal elements
subsequently became an important justification for nuisance prosecu-
tions."S
In adapting general obstruction law to the political context, R. v.
Carlile established a number of enduring propositions: that a person on
private premises could be liable for obstruction merely by drawing
spectators to the pavement; that a stationary political obstruction was not
a reasonable use of the street; that the government's failure to prosecute
similar nuisances was legally irrelevant; and that obstruction prosecutions
were warranted by the tendency of street crowds to promote crime. The
case further demonstrated how an obstruction charge could confer an
aura of neutrality on a prosecution that was politically motivated.
Through the mid-nineteenth century, however, Carlile remained a
relatively isolated reported instance of the political use of obstruction.
The doctrine did not emerge into prominence until the latter half of the
nineteenth century, when public meetings became an increasingly
important form of political expression.
B. The Emerging "Habit of Public Meeting"
The modem phenomenon of public meetings, originating in the
eighteenth century, became widespread in the mid-Victorian period.59
57. Id. at 649-50, 172 Eng. Rep. at 1403-04.
58. Other early nineteenth-century cases also made the connection between
obstruction by crowds and disorderly or criminal conduct. In Cohen v. Huskisson, 2 M.
& W. 477, 150 Eng. Rep. 845 (Ex. 1837), for example, a customer protested a baker's
alleged overcharge by making a "great disturbance" in the street that attracted a crowd
of one hundred persons. The court concluded that collecting a mob to obstruct the
highway would inevitably produce a breach of the peace: "[Sjuch acts tend to excite the
passions of the crowd, and to endanger the person or house of the party so abused." Id.
at 484, 150 Eng. Rep. at 848. Similarly, in Webster v. Watts, 11 Q.B. 311, 116 Eng.
Rep. 492 (1847), when Webster's unruly behavior in a tavern drew a disorderly crowd
to the adjoining highway, the court linked highway obstruction with inciting a crowd to
disturbance and riot. Id. at 323, 116 Eng. Rep. at 497. On the assumed connection
between street crowds and "ruffians" who would commit crimes and breach the peace,
see R. v. Moore, 3 B. & Ad. 184 (K.B. 1832) (pigeon shooting range was a nuisance
because idle persons collected in nearby streets); R. v. Hagan, 8 C. & P. 167 (N.P. 1837)
(bagpipe playing in the street collected a crowd of dissolute persons including prostitutes
and thieves); Walker v. Brewster, 5 L.R.-Eq. 25 (Ch. 1867) (fete was a public nuisance
because it attracted idlers to Waterloo Road); Wise v. Dunning, [1902] 1 K.B. 167 (large
meetings blocking the street were likely to cause potential breaches of the peace); Slee
v. Meadows, 75 J.P. 246, 247 (K.B. 1911) ("meetings held in certain crowded places
may not only tend but be extremely likely to produce disorder and bad conduct").
59. The origins of the practice of holding public meetings lay in the late
eighteenth-century movement to petition Parliament. It was further encouraged by repeal
of the repressive legislation enacted after the French Revolution and the movement for
938
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The term "demonstration" as a description of a political meeting first
entered the English vocabulary in the 1860s,60 and by 1872 The Times
was complaining that organizing such events had become "a recognized
branch of industry in this country."61 In the following decade Henry
Matthews, the Home Secretary, characterized the popularity of outdoor
meetings as a "national mania."'62 Groups lacking community accep-
tance or financial resources often could not obtain private facilities for
meetings, and they viewed streets and other open spaces as critical
locations for their activities.6' Outdoor public meetings became a
significant feature of Victorian community life-almost a form of
entertainment-as the populace surged onto streets, parks, and commons
to participate in rallies or listen to public lecturers and preachers. Hyde
Park and Trafalgar Square were especially popular sites of public
meetings and soon established themselves as the customary locations for
large demonstrations.
64
For the most part, this increase in political street activity was not
accompanied by either escalating disorder or governmental interference.
After mid-century, owing to such factors as widespread absorption of
middle-class values and the development of local police forces, English
franchise reform in the 1820s and 1830s. Other factors combined in the early nineteenth
century to intensify political awareness and activity: the urbanization that accompanied
the industrial revolution, the incipient trade union movement, the formation of "modern"
political parties following the Reform Act of 1832, improvements in education and the
spread of literacy, and a widening dissemination of political views through newspapers
and other publications. These developments coalesced in an explosion of public
meetings after mid-century. See, e.g., 10 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 702 (6th ed. 1938); DONALD RICHTER, RIOTOUS VICTORIANS 87 (1981);
E.C.S. WADE & A.W. BRADLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 556 (7th ed. 1965); Robin
Handley, Public Order, Petitioning and Freedom of Assembly, 7 J. LEGAL HsT. 123,
126-30 (1986); Colin Leys, Petitioning in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, 3
POL. STUD. 451 (1955).
60. See RICHTER, supra note 59, at 87.
61. Editorial, TIMES (London), Aug. 9, 1872, at 7.
62. See RICHTER, supra note 59, at 87.
63. See, e.g., 314 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 1764-66 (May 12, 1887); Glenn
Abernathy, Assemblies in Public Streets, 5 S.C.L.Q. 384, 389 (1953). London had a
chronic shortage of indoor meeting facilities. See, e.g., 314 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.)
1746 (May 12, 1887) ("There is no town in England so badly off in regard to facilities
for the holding of public meetings as London."); see also id. at 1758-59, 1766.
64. See, e.g., 333 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 995 (Mar. 5, 1889); RICHTER, supra
note 59, at 51-61, 133-62; WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 73-74.
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society was increasingly law abiding.65 Despite episodic turbulence,
the Victorian governing classes displayed little fear of revolution or
sustained rioting and, especially between the 1850s and the 1870s, left
most meetings undisturbed.66 This relaxed official attitude abruptly
disappeared in the 1880s, however, when acute political and social
pressures induced the authorities to refine the inchoate notions in Carlile
and employ obstruction systematically as a political tool.
C. The Legal Status of Street Meetings
The clarification of the constitutional status of street activity in the late
nineteenth century, a development prompted by the proliferation of
public meetings, rendered outdoor meetings exceedingly vulnerable to
the law of nuisance. By the 1880s it was settled law that there was no
positive constitutional, statutory, or common law right to "freedom of
assembly." 67  Lacking the constitutional guarantees of the American
legal system, liberty in England lay (and lies) only in the interstices of
the law, in the latitude provided by the absence of specific prohibitions.
"The liberty of the subject," the Queen's Bench Divisional Court
declared in 1884, "always consists in doing something a man is not
65. See, e.g., CLIvE EMSLEY, POLICING AND ITS CONTEXT 123 (1984); PHILLIP
SMITH, POLICING VICTORIAN LONDON 10-12 (1985); Robert D. Storch, Police Control
of Street Prostitution in Victorian London, in POLICE AND SOCIETY 50 (David H. Bayley
ed., 1977). Crime statistics, for example, slowed or leveled during the second half of
the century. See EMSLEY, supra.
66. Major episodes of disorder between the ebb of Chartism in 1848 and the civil
unrest of the 1880s included the Sunday-trading riots of 1855, demonstrations on behalf
of parliamentary reform in Hyde Park in 1866-67, periodic disturbances in Wales,
Ireland and Scotland, and occasional rioting at elections. See, e.g., CLIVE EMSLEY, THE
ENGLISH POLICE: A POLITICAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY 62-63 (1991); RICHTER, supra
note 59, at 163; WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 14. Historians are generally in agreement
that the periodic rioting did not pose a revolutionary threat. See, e.g., RICHTER, supra
note 59, at 164-65; Victor Bailey, The Metropolitan Police, the Home Office and the
Threat of Outcast London, in POLICING AND PUNISHMENT IN NINETEENTH CENTURY
BRITAIN 94, 94-95 (Victor Bailey ed., 1981). Home secretaries allowed local
governments and police forces considerable autonomy in dealing with public order,
partly because this was traditionally a local function but also because the sporadic
disorder did not pose a general societal danger. Parliament retreated from enacting
national public order legislation, passing few such statutes between the Seditious
Meetings Act 1817 and the Public Order Act 1936. See, e.g., EMSLEY, supra, at 65;
F.C. MATHER, PUBLIC ORDER IN THE AGE OF THE CHARTISTS 29-33 (1967).
67. The fact that there is no positive right to assemble explains why the law
relating to public meetings and demonstrations, which Americans refer to as the law
governing "freedom of assembly," is generally referred to in England as the law of
"public order." Insofar as the right to assemble was discussed, it was usually referred
to as the "right of public meeting."
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forbidden to do."68 A few years later A.V. Dicey set forth the classic
individualist statement on the right of public meeting. "English law does
not recognize," he stated, "any special right of public meeting either for
a political or for any other purpose."
There is no special principle of law allowing A, B, and C to meet together in
the open air or under cover for the sake of discussion. But the right of A to go
where he pleases so that he does not commit a trespass, and to say what he
likes so that his talk is not libellous or seditious, and the right of B to do the
like, and the existence of similar rights on the part of C, D, E, &c., and so on
ad infinitum, leads to the consequence that A, B, C and ten thousand others
may (as a general rule, and so that they do not create a nuisance) assemble
together in any place where they have each a right to be for a lawful purpose
and in a lawful manner.69
This pronouncement was somewhat misleading, as the qualification that
people may only assemble "so that they do not create a nuisance" was
hardly as trivial as the parenthetical reference suggests. Indeed, although
the requirement that a meeting be "lawful" appears unexceptionable, the
rigid contours of highway obstruction reduced the "right" of public
assembly to a nullity.
This result followed inexorably from the general rules on obstruction
and passage, which converted virtually every street meeting into a
technical nuisance. As has been shown, the expansive notion of
"obstruction" inevitably encompassed a collection of persons in the
street. Although an exception existed for obstructions that constituted
a "reasonable use" of the highway, such uses had to be incidental to
passage and political meetings were necessarily excluded. Moreover, the
absence of a legal right to assemble meant that participants in street
gatherings enjoyed no countervailing positive right assertable against the
public's right to passage. Hence, the simple fact that an assembly took
up space in the street-regardless of its purpose or disposition-rendered
it defenseless against obstruction charges. Dicey himself acknowledged
that meetings could not lawfully be held in public streets. "A crowd
68. Gay v. Powell, 51 L.T.R. (n.s.) 91, 94 (Q.B. 1884); see, e.g., Entick v.
Carrington, 19 St. Tr. 1030, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765).
69. A.V. Dicey, On the Right of Public Meeting, 1889 CONTEMP. REV. 508, 508;
see also DICEY, supra note 3, at 266-67. In a similar vein he noted: "English law no
more favours or provides for the holding of political meetings than for the giving of
public concerts. A man has a right to hear an orator as he has a right to hear a band,
or to eat a bun. But each right must be exercised subject to the laws against trespass,
against the creation of nuisances, against theft." Dicey, supra, at 511.
blocking up a highway will probably be a nuisance in the legal, no less
than in the popular, sense of the term," he explained, "for they interfere
with the ordinary citizen's right to use the locality in the way permitted
to him by law."'7 Although highways were dedicated to the public use,
"they must be used for passing and going along them," and the law
"negatives the claim of politicians to use a highway as a forum.... ."'
An important factor, however, mitigated the apparent harshness and
rigidity of the formal law. The police had wide discretion in enforcing
the rules against obstruction, and prior to the 1880s they generally
wielded their power lightly, having neither the capacity nor will to
enforce obstruction laws rigorously. The absence of official action
created a significant amount of freedom of assembly as a cultural and
historical fact, if not as a legal right.72 Obstruction, however, was
always readily available as a form of discretionary social control, and in
the 1880s the police effectively deployed it for this purpose--the
combined result of the broad scope of highways law, the absence of a
right to assemble, and the newly turbulent circumstances of the decade.
H. SOCIETAL CONFLICT AND THE FORGING OF LEGAL DOCTRINE:
THE SALVATION ARMY, THE SOCIALISTS, AND THE SUFFRAGETTES
The placid picture of official toleration, especially true in mid-century,
abruptly shattered in the 1880s when Salvationism and socialism
emerged as concurrent challenges to governmental authority. The
movements were similar in recruiting working-class adherents, engaging
in controversial street conduct, and offending the "respectable" classes
by attracting disreputable elements as participants, antagonists, and
spectators. There were, however, critical differences between them.
First, they emphasized different tactics, the Salvation Army relying
primarily on open-air processions and the socialists on massive organized
demonstrations in Trafalgar Square. Second, the socialist mobilization
of radical unemployed workers in the heart of London posed a far
greater threat to the central government and the larger society than the
comparatively innocuous efforts of the Salvation Army to convert souls
in the scattered resort towns of southern England. The authorities'
response to these disparate but contemporaneous threats illustrated both
the political efficacy of obstruction law and the formative influence of
70. Dicey, supra note 69, at 511.
71. Id. As a result, the "crowd who collect, and the persons who cause a crowd,
for whatever purpose, to collect in a street, create a nuisance." Id. See generally Eric
Barendt, Dicey and Civil Liberties, 1985 PuB. L. 596 (1985).
72. See infra Part V.
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historical contingencies on the evolution of legal rules. By the end of
the decade, highways law had proved itself a practical method of
controlling street assemblies, and a critical distinction between meetings
and processions had emerged as a permanent feature of obstruction
doctrine.
A. Obstruction and Salvation
The Salvation Army, founded in 1878 by "General" William Booth,
was an evangelistic religious movement seeking to rescue urban working
people from the clutches of the brewer, the publican, and the music hall
proprietor.73 Its militant tactics, consisting of hymn-singing processions
and open-air meetings, severely tested the patience of local authorities
in provincial areas. Inhabitants of fashionable resort towns in southern
England viewed the Army's recruitment efforts with abhorrence,
especially the robust Sunday parades conducted to the raucous accompa-
niment of tambourines and concertinas.74 In addition to offending
residents in general, the Army incurred special hostility from particular
segments of society. Merchants worried about possible disruptions to
the tourist trade; publicans and members of the working classes resented
the Army's stem judgments on alcohol consumption and popular
recreations; and the police and special constables disliked working on
Sundays to protect the marchers."5
The Army soon provoked organized opposition in the form of the so-
called "Skeleton Army," a disreputable group allegedly financed by
publicans and brewers.76 The Skeletons marched alongside the
Salvationists on parade, banging on pots and pelting Salvation Army
members with lime dust, coals, tar, rotten eggs, rocks, clods of mud,
73. See Victor Bailey, Salvation Army Riots, the 'Skeleton Army,' and Legal
Authority in the Provincial Town, in SOCIAL CONTROL IN NINETEENTH CENTURY
BRITAIN 231, 236-37 (A.P. Donajgrodzki ed., 1977).
74. See RICHTER, supra note 59, at 74-75; WILLIAIS, supra note 3, at 49-53.
75. See 267 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 990 (Mar. 16, 1882) ("special constables,
with their best clothes on ready for going to church, did not want to fight with the mob
on Sunday"); I PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 1023, 1219 (Feb. 25, 1892) (Mayor of
Eastboume complaining that practically the whole strength of the police force was
engaged on Sundays in protecting the Salvation Army and was unfairly deprived of its
Sunday rest); RICHTER, supra note 59, at 75; Bailey, supra note 73, at 238-43; Colin
Munro, Having a Riot at Weston-super-Mare, 141 NEW L.J. 762, 762 (1991).
76. See, e.g., RICHARD COLLIER, THE GENERAL NEXT TO GOD 109-10 (1965);
Bailey, supra note 73, at 233, 238-39.
dead rats, and household refuse." Altercations between the two groups
frequently led to violence. In 1882 alone, 86 Salvationists were
imprisoned, 669 were allegedly assaulted, and 56 Army buildings were
seriously damaged; the victims included 251 women and 23 children
under the age of fifteen.7" George Lansbury, a leader of the Labour
Party, recalled that as a child he had seen William Booth and his
followers so mishandled by mobs in Whitechapel that he "used to
wonder whether they would come out alive."'79 Between 1878 and
1891 serious disturbances involving the Salvation Army occurred in
more than sixty towns and cities.8 ' This alarming situation provoked
a vigorous reaction from the provincial authorities. The police, town
officials, and magistracy embarked on a calculated campaign to harass
the Army while turning a blind eye to the behavior of its opponents,8'
and they systematically employed highway obstruction law to this end.
1. The Suppression of Salvationist Street Meetings
R. v. Carlile, largely ignored for half a century, was revived in the
1880s as a relevant authority for prosecuting participants in Salvationist
street meetings. Although the Army utilized processions as its major
recruiting device, it also held open-air street meetings; obviously
unrelated to passage, these meetings bore the full brunt of obstruction
law. As a contemporary observed, under Carlile the Salvationists could
be successfully indicted if they "stand and hold their services upon the
highway. 82 The authorities' reliance on this particular offense rested
on its numerous procedural and substantive advantages. Obstruction
charges usually involved summary trial before a magistrate, a procedure
that was expeditious and generally assured the authorities a sympathetic
77. See BRAMWELL BOOTH, ECHOES AND MEMORIES 28-29 (2d ed. 1926);
COLLIER, supra note 76, at 104-06 (1965); Bailey, supra note 73, at 234.
78. See 2 HAROLD BEGBIE, THE LIFE OF GENERAL WILLIAM BOOTH 4 (1920); 2
ROBERT SANDALL, THE HISTORY OF THE SALVATION ARMY 181 (4 vols., 1947-1964);
S. CARRosso GAUNTLETr, SOCIAL EVILS THE ARMY HAS CHALLENGED 10 (1954).
79. See 1 SANDALL, supra note 78, at 121.
80. See Bailey, supra note 73, at 234; Munro, supra note 75, at 762.
81. See, e.g., BOOTH, supra note 77, at 28-29; 2 SANDALL, supra note 78, at 170-
83; Bailey, supra note 73, at 243-44. As early as 1879 Booth wrote to his son that "the
constables openly encourage the roughs to resist.... ." I BEGBIE, supra note 78, at 441.
82. Note, The Salvation Army, 48 J.P. 658, 659 (1884). The author recommended
other highways remedies against the Salvationists in addition to public nuisance
prosecutions, including civil suits for injunctions and prosecutions under the Highways
Act, the Town Police Clauses Act 1847, and local bylaws. He observed that although
neither of the national statutes had yet been applied to an obstruction caused by persons
passing along a street in procession, there was little doubt that both acts applied to
persons standing upon a highway. Id. at 660.
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factfinder. In terms of substantive law, street meetings invariably
satisfied the requirements of both "obstruction" and "unreasonableness."
The highway was inevitably obstructed by either members of the
organization or the onlookers that they collected, and the meetings were
necessarily unreasonable because they were not incidental to passage.
Moreover, whereas common law crimes required an actual or potential
breach of the peace, even an entirely peaceful obstruction was unlawful
provided only that it took up space in the street. In addition, obstruction
required no meaningful inquiry into a speaker's intentions or even
whether the defendant had actually interfered with passage. The utility
of the rules on intent and partial obstruction was illustrated by Homer
v. Cadman,3 which upheld the conviction of a street preacher--most
likely a Salvationist--under the Highways Act 1835. Homer obstruct-
ed the "Bull Ring" at Sedgley, a triangle on the highway where six roads
converged, by standing on a chair near a lamppost and addressing a
crowd of 150 to 200 people. Although part of the audience extended
onto the highway, there was ample room for pedestrians and vehicles to
make their way. The defendant argued that he did not intend to obstruct,
that he was not responsible for the actions of his audience, and that in
any event the obstruction was only partial. The court summarily rejected
his defenses, finding him liable for the collection of the crowd regardless
of his lack of intent to obstruct and further holding that even a partial
obstruction was unlawful because it rendered the highway "less
convenient and commodious to the public."85
In addition to its reliability, highway obstruction law also allowed the
authorities to maintain the appearance of political neutrality. The
83. 16 Cox C.C. 51 (Q.B. 1886).
84. This is suggested by the case report, which stated that Homer had "marched
into the said Bull Ring at the head of a band." Id. at 52. He was not prosecuted in
connection with the procession, but only when a part of the crowd extended onto the
highway to hear his sermon.
85. Id. at 53. If Homer reaffirmed the rule on partial obstruction, the following
year Back v. Holmes, 56 L.T.R. (n.s.) 713 (Q.B. 1887), confirmed the holding in Carlile
that a person need not be in the highway to commit obstruction. A preacher held a
meeting on the front yard of private premises at which he delivered a religious address
and sang hymns with a few women from 8:40 until 9:05 in the evening. Neither he nor
the women left private ground, but they caused a crowd to assemble on the highway.
The magistrates threw out an information under the Highways Act for lack ofjurisdiction, but the Queen's Bench Divisional Court reversed, stating that the Act
applied to the metropolitan area and that on the evidence the magistrate could have
found "wilful obstruction." Id. at 715.
government repeatedly insisted that prosecutions were based on the
commission of obvious criminal acts rather than on any desire to
suppress political speech.86 When in 1886 the Radical atheist Charles
Bradlaugh inquired in Parliament about the imprisonment of a
Salvationist, the Conservative Home Secretary, Henry Matthews, replied
that the defendant had been convicted "not of speaking in the streets, but
of obstructing a public thoroughfare."'87  As evidence of the
government's impartiality, he pointed out with relish that recent
prosecutions for obstruction had included "a preacher, a temperance
lecturer, a Conservative politician, and a Home Ruler."8 The follow-
ing year the Home Secretary was grilled about Salvationists at Stamford,
who in consequence of holding open-air services in the town square had
been dragged from their beds at 5:30 in the morning, placed in
handcuffs, and marched through the streets to the prison. The minister
blandly responded that the justices had convicted the Army members
"not for holding open-air services, but for wilfully obstructing the free
passage of the highway."8 9 The common police practice of handcuffing
the Salvationists doubtless assisted in the effort to disguise political
harassment as ordinary criminal law enforcement."
Obstruction dealt the central government another useful card in
rebutting charges of discrimination. It enabled authorities to disclaim
86. Salvation Army members and their Parliamentary sympathizers often
complained about the government's use of "technical" obstruction charges. See, e.g.,
267 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 1017 (Mar. 16, 1882); 319 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.)
1528 (Aug. 23, 1887); 320 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 29-30 (Aug. 20, 1887); 2 BEGB!E,
supra note 78, at 7; 4 SANDALL, supra note 78, at 279-93.
87. 308 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 1460 (Sept. 7, 1886).
88. Id. at 1461.
89. 317 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 943 (July 15, 1887). Government officials
similarly affirmed their neutrality throughout the 1880s and 1890s. When challenged
about five Salvationists imprisoned in Leicester Gaol for preaching on Sunday, Matthews
insisted that there was no religious issue; the magistrates had convicted on "the mere
facts of obstructing the public highway." 320 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 30 (Aug. 26,
1887). He also defended police action in 1889 by contending that the arrests "had
nothing in the world to do" with the fact that the Salvation Army was involved. 337
PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 899 (June 27, 1889); see 83 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 742
(May 21, 1900).
90. Handcuffing Salvationists and subjecting them to other forms of degrading
treatment occurred frequently. In 1888 at Willenhall, three Salvationists were chained
and handcuffed to convicted criminals en route from the police court, and at Needham
Market, Suffolk, Salvationists were handcuffed and marched through the streets to
Ipswich Gaol. See 4 SANDALL, supra note 78, at 285. Similarly, in 1889 five
Salvationists were led in handcuffs through the streets of Dorking to Wandsworth Gaol
for causing obstruction in the streets, see 336 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 264-65 (May
16, 1889), 360-61 (May 17, 1889), and four members convicted of causing an
obstruction for preaching in the square at Whitchurch were conveyed in handcuffs to
Winchester Prison, see 339 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 1336 (Aug. 15, 1889).
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responsibility for arrests and prosecutions by contending that official
action lay in the independent discretion of local police and magistrates.
For example, in 1882 the Liberal Home Secretary, William Harcourt,
maintained that he could do no more than "offer advice" about
obstruction prosecutions as he had no authority over constables or
magistrates.9 Two years later, when Booth sent a blistering memo to
the Home Office charging that the Worthing magistrates had consistently
refused to issue summonses to opponents of the Salvation Army,
Harcourt again insisted that he lacked power over the local authori-
ties.92 The Conservative government elected in 1886 followed the
example of its Liberal predecessor in asserting the importance in
enforcement of local initiative and independence.93
Owing to these procedural, substantive, and political advantages,
obstruction charges were heavily relied upon to suppress Salvation Army
street meetings. The earliest use of the offense came in 1869, even prior
to the formal creation of the Army, when the police arrested Booth
supporters in Poplar for obstructing the thoroughfare at a meeting
attended by only two dozen people.94 Imprisonment of Salvationists
for obstruction probably first dated from 1879, when a woman officer
and three soldiers in Pentre were jailed for three days for kneeling to
pray in a large open space in the street.95 In the 1880s the pace of
91. See, e.g., 267 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 990 (Mar. 16, 1882); 270 PARL. DEB.,
H.C. (3d ser.) 1413 (June 16, 1882). When an M.P. complained that sellers of the War
Cry, the Salvation Army publication, were prosecuted for obstruction whereas hawkers
of indecent periodicals were not, Harcourt replied that he had no authority over
magistrates or police. 267 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 1017 (Mar. 16, 1882).
92. COLLIER, supra note 76, at 112.
93. In 1887 the Under-Secretary of State predictably replied to a charge that police
dispersal of Salvationists and socialists deprived them of their right to public meeting
by stating that the question of obstruction was for the magistrate. 314 PARL. DEB., H.C.
(3d ser.) 961 (May 5, 1887). Similarly responding to a complaint about the handcuffing
of Salvationists in Whitchurch in 1889, Matthews claimed that he could "only lay down
general principles for the guidance of the police, who must act according to the
circumstances of each case." 339 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 1337 (Aug. 15, 1889).
94. 1 SANDALL, supra note 78, at 122. Obstruction prosecutions were frequent in
the Army's early years. See, e.g., 269 PARL. DEB., H.L. (3d ser.) 819 (May 16, 1882);
GENERAL FREDERICK Courrs, No DISCHARGE IN THIS WA": A ONE VOLUME HISTORY
OF THE SALVATION ARMY 94 (1975); 1 ST. JOHN ERViNE, GOD'S SOLDIER: GENERAL
WILLIAM BOOTH 405, 537 (1935); 1 SANDALL, supra note 78, at 121-22; WILLIAMS,
supra note 3, at 50.
95. See Courrs, supra note 94, at 94. Although obstruction offenses carried the
penalty of a fine, the Salvationists usually on principle refused to pay and were
enforcement accelerated, and several towns became particularly notorious
for their prosecutorial zeal. Whitchurch, a village of fewer than two
thousand inhabitants, pressed obstruction law to its limits by instituting
sweeping arrests. In 1882, for example, four Army members who
conducted a street meeting were sentenced to one month's imprisonment
with hard labor merely for potentially obstructing the highway.96 The
large number of obstruction prosecutions in the town provoked a major
demonstration in 1890 at which Commandant Herbert Booth, Field-
Secretary Major Alfred Barritt, and the Army solicitor were again
arrested for obstruction and other offenses.97 According to one
account, a Whitchurch magistrate commended the local police sergeant
for leveling no fewer than ninety-three charges of obstruction against
four local Salvationists."
Stamford was also the scene of persistent prosecutions, doubtless
because of its prominent brewing industry.99 In June 1887 the magis-
trates sentenced two Salvationists to fourteen days' imprisonment for
blocking the highway in the large marketplace of Red Lion
Square-even though the Army had restricted its meetings to one small
comer out of the line of traffic-and numerous other arrests followed in
succeeding months.' The town clerk freely admitted that the "ob-
struction" charges were purely technical. The prosecutions were for
"obstructing the passage of the highway--nothing more," he declared.
"I do not propose to prove that any person was obstructed."''
Although Stamford and Whitchurch were especially fervent in bringing
obstruction charges, more than one hundred other towns also instituted
prosecutions between 1886 and 1895.102
imprisoned, often serving sentences with hard labor. See, e.g., 268 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d
ser.) 1941 (May 2, 1882); CYRIL J. BARNES, GOD'S ARMY 54 (1978); CouTrs, supra
note 94, at 94-95; 4 SANDALL, supra note 78, at 287.
96. See 268 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 1941 (May 2, 1882). An Army general
commented on this episode that "the charge stuck because it was not necessary to prove
actual obstruction; the technical possibility was enough." CouTrs, supra note 94, at 94.
In 1889 seventeen Salvationists were arrested for forming a ring in the main square that
ostensibly prevented the free passage of carts and carriages. 337 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d
ser.) 1459 (July 4, 1889).
97. The case was tried before Lord Coleridge on July 1, 1890, and the defendants
were acquitted by the july. See 4 SANDALL, supra note 78, at 289.
98. See COLLIER, supra note 76, at 108.
99. See, e.g., 319 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 1528 (Aug. 23, 1887); 4 SANDALL,
supra note 78, at 282-83; WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 207-08.
100. See COUTrS, supra note 94, at 95; 4 SANDALL, supra note 78, at 282.
101. 4 SANDALL, supra note 78, at 282; see Courns, supra note 94, at 95.
102. 4 SANDALL, supra note 78, at 290. For example, in 1886 five Salvationists,
including "Salvation Smith," a London stockbroker, were charged with wilfully
obstructing the highway in the village of Markyate Street. All except Smith, who paid
a fine, were sentenced to seven days' imprisonment. Id. at 281. In the same year at
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Harassment of Army members slackened in the 1890s, 1°3 but the
police continued to use obstruction as a device to curb stationary
Salvationist meetings until shortly before World War I.114 Moreover,
the courts persisted in construing the offense very broadly. For example,
in the 1908 case of Haywood v. Mumford,0 5 two Salvationists were
arrested for standing in the street in the early evening even though the
assembled crowd of about eighty persons did not actually interfere with
traffic.' 6 The magistrate acknowledged that on that particular place
on a Monday night "it would be possible to fire a cannon down the
street without doing any injury,"'17 but he felt constrained to convict
them nonetheless. The defendants argued on appeal that an "obstruc-
tion" required an "appreciable interference" with the right to pass and
repass.10 The court disagreed, proclaiming the relevant question to be
not whether someone was actually prevented from exercising his right
on the highway, but only whether the obstruction interfered with the
right of every member of the public to use the whole highway at all
East Grinstead an officer was sentenced to seven days' imprisonment for obstructing a
cart even though the owner declined to lodge a complaint. Id. at 288. Three soldiers
of the Warwick corps were prosecuted in August 1887 for wilfully causing an
obstruction by holding a service in the Corn Market. 319 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.)
1807 (Aug. 25, 1887). In Somerset, Salvationists were fined for obstructing the free
passage to the church, see 4 SANDALL, supra note 78, at 284, and at Willenhall, Suffolk,
a captain and two soldiers were marched to prison in chains and handcuffs to serve a
sentence "for nothing worse than alleged obstruction," BARNES, supra note 95, at 54; see
also, e.g., 4 SANDALL, supra note 78, at 285. In 1890 the Chief of the Staff was
charged at Dalston police court with aiding and abetting seven Upper Holloway
bandsmen in an alleged breach of the Highways Act, 4 SANDALL, supra note 78, at 290,
and in 1893 a Poplar officer was sentenced to 31 days' imprisonment for holding an
open-air meeting, id. at 291. In 1900 the police in Belfast dispersed Army meetings on
obstruction grounds apparently because they disturbed the services of Protestant churches
in the street. 83 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 742 (May 21, 1900). As a result, the Army
advised its members regarding open-air meetings: "In selecting a stand always avoid
those spots where you will be likely to cause any obstruction to the thoroughfare." 1
ST. JOHN ERViNE, supra note 94, at 392.
103. See 4 SANDALL, supra note 78, at 290.
104. See CouTrs, supra note 94, at 95. The last instance of a pre-war charge of
obstruction appears to have been in 1912. Id.
105. (1908) 7 C.L.R. 133 (Austl.).
106. See id. at 134. They were charged under a bylaw of the borough of Sale that
required any person obstructing any carriageway by standing or loitering to move on
when requested to do so.
107. Id. at 135.
108. Id.
times for the purpose of passing and repassing.' 9 The Lord Chief
Justice observed that as a man standing in the middle of the road with
his arms stretched out might well supply the requisite diminution of
space, a crowd gathered on the road would certainly do so. 10 The
Carlile court's notion that a stationary street meeting was per se an
unreasonable obstruction thus had wide application after the 1880s.
2. Beatty v. Gillbanks and the Law of Processions
Processions presented a more complex problem, because by the 1880s
the tentative distinction between meetings and processions broached in
Carlile had evolved into a common understanding that marches, as
exercises of the "right to passage," deserved legal protection. The
Salvationists themselves believed that their processions were less
vulnerable to legal reprisal than their meetings, and they consciously
exploited this apparent exemption by emphasizing the tactic of street
processions. General Booth's "Rules for Open-Air Work," circulated in
1879, counselled that against "people who move along at a good pace
the police have no power, therefore there can be no need for you to be
distressed, even if they will not allow you to stand still anywhere.''
The cacophonous Army processions, however, infuriated the residents
of provincial towns, and in 1881 the Stamford magistrates preemptively
sought Harcourt's advice."' Their goal was to prevent marches in
advance, which they believed would secure public order more effectively
than prosecuting participants after the fact. The Home Secretary proved
to be accommodating. Although he cautioned that Salvation Army
parades were not "illegal in themselves" and could not be lawfully
prevented in the absence of special circumstances, he suggested that a
procession might well provoke a hostile reaction that would endanger the
peace. If the magistrates anticipated disorder and obtained a sworn
information to that effect from the chief constable, they could issue a
common law proclamation banning a march." 3 Numerous towns in
southern England seized upon Harcourt's recommendation and instituted
109. Id. at 140.
110. Id. at 138.
111. Reprinted in 2 SANDALL, supra note 78, at 311.
112. The magistrates consulted Harcourt even though in 1881 there was not yet any
Salvation Army corps in Stamford. See I ST. JOHN ERVINE, supra note 94, at 536.
113. TIM's (London), Oct. 11, 1881, at 6. In March 1882 Harcourt justified his
action in the House of Commons, stating that in researching what his predecessors had
done in similar situations, he had discovered that the matter was settled by the law
officers; he had therefore written the letter that had "always been written" in these
circumstances, even though he saw in some newspapers that his advice was "bad law,
and worse sense." 267 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 990 (Mar. 16, 1882).
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prior restraints on processions based on the anticipated reaction of a
hostile audience.14  The enraged Salvationists quickly condemned the
policy. In October 1881 Booth sent a telegram to Gladstone, the Prime
Minister, warning that unless "something is done immediately to
neutralize the effect of the Home Secretary's letter to Stamford, which
is already the war-cry of the roughs everywhere, there will be riot and
bloodshed all over the land."'15
The Army soon received substantial assistance from an unexpected
quarter. The following June the Queen's Bench Divisional Court
adjudicated the correctness of Harcourt's advice in Beatty v.
Gillbanks,'16 a decision attentively awaited by the entire country."7
Beatty arose out of a series of processions that the Army conducted in
the Somerset resort town of Weston-super-Mare. As a result of frequent
collisions between rival troops of the Salvation and Skeleton armies, the
town experienced "great uproar, blows, tumult, stone throwing, and
disorder."".. A particularly disturbing episode occurred in March 1882
when the antagonism of a large mob to a Salvationist parade sparked a
general melee. To prevent further such occurrences, the magistrates
posted a notice conforming with Harcourt's advice that directed all
persons to "abstain from assembling to the disturbance of the public
peace." Testing the legality of the ban, the Army proceeded to march
on the following Sunday. During the procession the police arrested three
Salvationist leaders on charges of unlawful assembly,"9 and the
114. The magistrates of Basingstoke, Exeter, and Salisbury, in addition to those of
Stamford, issued proclamations forbidding Salvation Army processions. Harcourt,
however, consistently denied the power to direct them to take any particular course of
action. 267 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 991 (Mar. 16, 1882).
115. Telegram from William Booth to W.E. Gladstone (Oct. 12, 1881), quoted in
I BEGBIE, supra note 78, at 444. Booth also wrote to Harcourt that he was surprised at
Harcourt's letter to Stamford, because "the Salvation Army is not in Stamford." Id.; see,
e.g., BOOTH, supra note 77, at 28 n.1 ("The question whether peaceable subjects of the
Crown were to be allowed to exercise their legal right and to walk in procession was to
be referred to the good pleasure of the roughs.").
116. 9 Q.B.D. 308 (1882).
117. See Note, The Salvation Army, 16 IR. LAw TIMES 290, 290 (June 24, 1882).
118. Beatty, 9 Q.B.D. at 309.
119. Unlawful assembly was committed when three or more persons gathered
together "[w]ith intent to carry out any common purpose, lawful or unlawful, in such a
manner as to give firm and courageous persons in the neighbourhood reasonable grounds
to apprehend a breach of the peace." STEPHEN, DIGEST, supra note 2, at 41; see
HEUSTON, supra note 39, at 125; Wallington, supra note 36, at 109.
magistrates bound the defendants over to keep the peace for a year or in
default to be imprisoned for three months.
2
In perhaps the most abbreviated opinion ever issued in such a
celebrated case, Mr. Justice Field quashed the binding-over order on the
ground that the Army procession was lawful and the disturbances were
not the "natural consequence" of the march but rather were attributable
to a hostile group:
What has happened here is that an unlawful organization has assumed to itself
the right to prevent the appellants and others from lawfully assembling together,
and the finding of the justices amounts to this, that a man may be convicted for
doing a lawful act if he knows that his doing it may cause another to do an
unlawful act. There is no authority for such a proposition .... 2
A superior court thus adjudicated Salvation Army processions to be
lawful-at least with respect to a charge of unlawful assembly -- and
ruled as a corollary that magistrates had no common law power to
impose a prior restraint on a legitimate march."
The explanation for this favorable result cannot be located in the
opinion itself, which was virtually devoid of analysis and cited not a
single precedent. The surrounding circumstances, however, were
120. Beatty, 9 Q.B.D. at 308. "Binding over" involved a criminal court (usually a
magistrates' court) ordering a person to agree to forfeit a certain sum of money to the
Crown in the event of failing to keep the peace or be of good behavior. The formal
undertaking was set out in a "recognizance." The origins of this power lay in the
Middle Ages, probably in the Justices of the Peace Act 1361. WADE & BRADLEY, supra
note 59, at 567. A binding-over order could be imposed in the absence of a conviction
for a specific criminal offense, see R. v. Justices of Londonderry, 28 L.R. Ir. 440, 444-
45 (Q.B. 1891), and failure to enter into a recognizance or to find sureties could lead to
imprisonment. The breadth of this discretionary preventive power and its utility in the
field of public order are indicated by its frequent use against Salvationists, suffragettes,
Communists, Fascists, hunger marchers and nuclear disarmers. See generally WILLIAMS,
supra note 3, at 87-96; Asher D. Grunis, Binding-Over to Keep the Peace and Be of
Good Behaviour in England and Canada, 1976 PUB. L. 16.
121. Beatty, 9 Q.B.D. at 314.
122. Technically only the binding-over order was at issue, but the prosecution
attempted to justify it by demonstrating that the Army was indeed guilty of unlawful
assembly. Inasmuch as the court found the Salvationists not guilty of the crime, it
discharged the order. Id. at 315; see Note, supra note 117, at 291.
123. Although the case formally dealt with binding-over powers and the crime of
unlawful assembly, it was interpreted to deal with the broader issue of the legitimacy of
prior restraints. "In form the case only decides that a person charged with creating an
unlawful assembly cannot be bound over to keep the peace because he is taking part in
a procession which is, without his so intending it, likely to lead to a breach of the peace;
but, in effect, the judges decide the larger proposition, that by no form of proceeding can
this kind of procession be prevented." Note, Processions in the Streets, 16 IR. LAW
TIMES & SOLIC. J. 451 (Sept. 9, 1882); see Note, The Right of Public Meeting, 21 IR.
LAW TwEs & SOLIC. J. 565, 566 (Oct 22, 1887) ("[T]he mere fact that a notice or
proclamation has been issued forbidding it to be held will not prevent it from being
lawfully held.").
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suggestive. First, Beatty was decided after widely publicized complaints
that constables and magistrates were harshly and unfairly discriminating
against the Salvationists. A JRmes editorial published shortly before the
events giving rise to the case castigated local authorities for ignoring the
misconduct of the Skeleton Army. "Magistrates have been too lenient,"
it charged, "in their dealings with criminals of this stamp."
A procession which the law and the police allow, however preposterous in its
character and ridiculous in its insignia, is as entitled to go on its course free
from insult as a merchant on his way to business. No rabble can safely be
allowed to decide for itself that a pageant deserves to be cheered or stoned.' 24
Second, as these observations suggest, though many people considered
the Salvationists "preposterous" and "ridiculous,"'" they did not
consider them dangerous. More important, they strongly preferred the
Salvationists to their Skeleton Army adversaries, who comprised
precisely the rabblesome crowd that the late Victorians found so
unsettling. 126  Finally, on the doctrinal level, the "right to pass" was
a significant factor in the result. The court was influenced by the
circumstance that the Salvationists were conducting a procession rather
than a stationary meeting and thus were asserting a positive right to
passage. Noting that they "marched in procession through the streets,"
Mr. Justice Field observed that "[n]o one can say that such an assembly
is in itself an unlawful one."' 27  Beatty was quickly interpreted as
124. See 2 SANDALL, supra note 78, at 182. A month before the decision was
announced, Lord Fortescue objected in the House of Lords to the "outrages" committed
by convicting Salvation Army members "of obstructing some highway by processions,
or halts for singing and prayer, or of disobeying some prohibition of their proceedings
by the local authorities .... ." 269 PARL. DEB., H.L. (3d ser.) 819 (May 16, 1882).
125. For example, in R. v. Justices of Londondeny, 28 L.R. Ir. 440, 463 (Q.B.
1891), a case favorable to the Army, Mr. Justice Holmes commented that many
townspeople disapproved of the Salvation Army, and he was "far from suggesting that
such disapprobation was not natural." Even a sympathizer wrote of the early years:
"We are disposed, on the whole, to think that the public of that period might be forgiven
for their suspicion and dislike of the Salvation Army." I BEGBIE, supra note 78, at 438.
126. The Solicitors'Journal observed soon after the decision: "Everyone must feel,
as a matter of justice, that proceedings should rather have been taken against the leaders
of the Skeleton Army than against those of the Salvation Army. Binding over the
leaders of the Salvation Army to keep the peace was rather like binding the lamb over
to keep the peace towards the wolf." Note, Assembly When Unlawful, 26 SoLIc. J. &
REP. 689, 689 (Sept. 9, 1882); see Note, supra note 117, at 291-92.
127. Beatty, 9 Q.B.D. at 313.
announcing a rule about processions, a limiting construction critical for
the developing law on obstruction.12
The distinction between processions and meetings had, of course,
predated Beatty. Indeed, Harcourt's advice to the magistrates in 1881
had presumed that processions were "lawful in themselves," and while
Beatty was before the court Lord Chief Justice Coleridge stated in the
House of Lords that "walking through the streets in order and in
procession, even if accompanied by music and the singing of hymns,
was an absolutely lawful act, an act in the doing of which every subject
had a right to be protected."129 Beatty was significant in acknowledg-
ing and validating the growing belief that processions were lawful. 3
Although Beatty established that magistrates' bans on marches were
invalid and that charges of unlawful assembly would be ineffective
against their participants, it did not rule on any issue of highways law
and therefore left obstruction untouched as an enforcement tool.13'
The Irish case of R. v. Justices of Londonderry'32 confirmed that
obstruction might succeed where unlawful assembly would fail. A group
of Salvationists, accompanied by a band, paraded down a thoroughfare
in Londonderry. Although the march was entirely peaceful, two days
later several Army members were arrested for parading under circum-
stances calculated to provoke a breach of the peace and were bound over
to keep the peace and be of good behavior. In the spirit of Beatty, the
Queen's Bench Divisional Court overturned the binding-over orders,
refusing to restrain the Salvationists on mere speculation that a breach
of the peace might occur. Lest one think that the opinion was sympa-
thetic to the Army, however, the court went out of its way to explain
128. See, e.g., Note, The Salvation Army, supra note 123, at 451; Note, supra note
82, at 659 (Beatty had "pretty clearly laid down that the mere processions of the
Salvation Army are not in the nature of unlawful assemblies."). The month after Beatty
was decided the Queen's Bench Divisional Court reversed the convictions of
Salvationists who had marched in procession in violation of a magistrates' ban in
Whitchurch. The court held that the case was indistinguishable from Beatty and that
"[i]n taking part in a procession, the appellants had been doing only an act strictly
lawful.... ." M'Clenaghan v. Waters, TIMEs (London) (Q.B.), July 18, 1882, at 4.
129. 269 PARL. DEB., H.L. (3d ser.) 821-22 (May 16, 1882). He added, however,
that "there was hardly any act which could not be so done as to become a nuisance to
the public peace." d. at 822. That is, even processions had to be conducted reasonably.
130. The Army, for example, viewed Beatty as a final statement on the common law
legality of processions and considered the matter settled. 4 SANDALL, supra note 78, at
264.
131. As a comment on Beatty noted, unlawful assembly did not exhaust the legal
possibilities, because if an Army procession substantially interfered with ordinary traffic,
it might be liable for obstruction. However, the author conceded that there were
practical difficulties in using obstruction against processions. Note, supra note 126, at
689.
132. 28 L.R. Ir. 440 (Q.B. 1891).
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that it would happily have found the Salvationists guilty of obstruction
of the highway. The Lord Chief Justice wished "to make the ground of
his judgment clear," that the magistrates had not found any obstruction
of the highway:'
33
It must be remembered that the fact of being engaged in the performance of
religious exercises is no justification of the obstruction of those lawfully using
the streets, and that an unjustifiable obstruction of the highway renders the
person responsible for it amenable, not only to the magistrates' jurisdiction to
compel sureties for good behavior, but also to be criminally indicted."N
This was a reminder, albeit in dictum, that processions might unreason-
ably obstruct the streets and violate the right to passage.
The fact that the magistrates had declined to find a highwayg violation,
however, indicated the extent to which the preference for processions
had permeated obstruction law. While the authorities occasionally used
highways law to prosecute Salvation Army processions, 135 and it was
obviously a more potent device than unlawful assembly,'36 it was not
especially satisfactory. The pervasive influence of Beatty encouraged the
view that processions were "reasonable." Moreover, arrests and
prosecutions of marching Salvationists were unpopular when the criminal
mobs attacking their processions were apparently immune from
punishment. The use of obstruction was thus far less effective in the
133. Id. at 447. A charge of obstruction had been brought but was dismissed, for
unstated reasons, by the magistrates. Id. at 441.
134. Id. at 447 (O'Brien, C.J.). Mr. Justice Holmes offered the comment that
although the question of obstruction was not before the court, the public was
undoubtedly entitled to use the streets of a town "for the purpose of passing and
repassing, and of whatever is naturally incidental to this use, but for no other purpose."
Persons who interfered with such lawful use might be liable even for acts performed on
private land "if the obstruction of the highway is the natural consequence of such acts
or conduct." Id. at 461.
135. For example, a prosecution of a procession for obstruction took place in 1889,
when hundreds of Army members marched in London from the City through the Strand
to Exeter Hall. Commenting on the resulting arrests for obstruction, Henry Matthews,
the Home Secretary after Harcourt, contended that "a body of 600 persons marching in
procession with bands and banners through a crowded thoroughfare is a public
nuisance." 337 PARL. DEu., H.C. (3d ser.) 898 (June 17, 1889). Matthews observed that
the general practice of organizing processions had caused much public concern, but he
claimed that in the preceding decade only three marches had been stopped from passing
along the Strand. Id. at 1151-52.
136. Charges of unlawful assembly were sometimes brought against the Salvation
Army-a procession calculated to produce a breach of the peace still constituted the
offense-but after Beatty they were largely unsuccessful. See, e.g., R. v. Londonderry,
28 L.R. Ir. 440 (Q.B. 1891); R. v. Clarkson, 17 Cox C.C. 483 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1892).
case of processions than meetings. As the official Salvation Army
historian recounted, the police took action against the Salvationists only
"when standing-not marching-and playing on the Sunday." '137 The
local authorities in any event sought a mechanism to prevent Salvation
Army processions entirely, the objective that had prompted the original
appeal to Harcourt. Fortunately for them, a stronger, preventive form of
obstruction doctrine was at hand.
3. Local Acts and Bylaws: Drawing, the Line on Prior Restraints
Although Beatty established that there was no common law or national
statutory authority to prohibit processions in advance, prior restraints
were permissible under local acts and bylaws directed against the
nuisance of obstruction. 38 Between 1883 and 1891, therefore, numer-
ous towns sought calculated recourse in obstruction regulations to control
Salvation Army processions. Some municipalities promulgated bylaws
prohibiting Sunday processions,131 while others obtained parliamentary
approval of clauses banning street marches in their local acts.140 By
137. 4 SANDALL, supra note 78, at 274. An observer noted in 1884 that Beatty had
not put the Army out of reach of the law because members could be prosecuted for
public nuisance if they "stand and hold their services on the highway." Note, supra note
82, at 659. He suggested that Army processions might also be an unreasonable use of
the highway but conceded that the courts had not yet held them to be a public nuisance
nor subjected them to the Highways Act or Town Police Clauses Act. Id. at 659-60.
138. A series of nineteenth-century statutes empowered the local authorities to enact
bylaws for the preservation of order and the prevention of obstruction and other
nuisances. These included the Metropolitan Police Act, 1839, 2 & 3 Vict., ch. 47,
§§ 52, 54, the Town Police Clauses Act, 1847, 10 & 11 Vict., ch. 89, §§ 21, 28, the
Municipal Corporations Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., ch. 50, § 23, and the Local
Government Act, 1888, 51 & 52 Vict., ch. 41, § 16. For the provisions of the first two
statutes, see supra note 43. The Municipal Corporations Act permitted borough and
county councils to make such bylaws "as to them seem meet for the good rule and
government of the borough, and for prevention and suppression of nuisances." Section
16 of the Local Government Act gave county councils powers analogous to those
conferred on urban districts by section 28 of the Town Police Clauses Act.
139. These included Ryde, Truro, and Colchester. See RICHTER, supra note 59, at
83; Bailey, supra note 73, at 245-46. As the official historian of the Salvation Army
declared, Beatty might have ruled on the right to march in procession so far as the
common law was concerned, but special acts continued to forbid Salvation Army
marches. 4 SANDALL, supra note 78, at 264. The Salvation Army immediately began
to violate the newly enacted bylaws, thus sacrificing most of its residual popularity in
these areas. See id. at 264-67.
140. Local acts were parliamentary acts applicable to particular localities. See 0.
HOOD PHLLIPS & PAUL JACKSON, CoNsTITUTIoNAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 530
(6th ed. 1978). When the Salvation Army appeared in Sussex in 1884, a conference of
coastal resorts agreed to seek parliamentary amendment of their local acts to include
clauses banning Sunday street processions with music. Hastings and Eastbourne secured
such provisions in 1885, Torquay in 1886. See GEORGE F. CHAMBERS, EAST BOURNE
MEMORIES 209 (1910); Bailey, supra note 73, at 246. Carlisle and Reading also passed
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1892 thirty-six local areas had enacted some sort of regulatory banning
provision. 14  Despite the prima facie legitimacy of processions, there
was widespread recognition that Salvation Army marches could cause
serious annoyance, and there was less resistance to reasonable regula-
tions directed at preventing nuisances than to prosecuting Salvationists
for criminal offenses.142
Most local authorities applied their obstruction acts and bylaws with
restraint and negotiated reasonable compromises with the Salvationists.
The officials of Torquay and Eastboume, however, engaged in zealous
enforcement efforts that generated substantial public, judicial, and
parliamentary resistance. The widespread opposition to their policies
reflected broad national agreement on the outer limits of local preventive
action. These two towns, applying their prohibitions with excessive
rigor, crossed the line of cultural consensus.
Torquay obtained an amendment of its local act in 1886 to prohibit
Sunday processions accompanied by music, and between 1886 and 1888
the magistrates imprisoned dozens of Salvationists for violating the new
local acts allowing the mayor in his discretion to prohibit Sunday processions. See 323
PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 859 (Mar. 12, 1888).
141. 2 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 481 (Mar. 10, 1892) (Admiral Field).
142. Although bylaws were governed by a reasonableness test, no successful
challenge was ever mounted against an obstruction bylaw. See, e.g., Deakin v. Milne,
20 Sc. L.IZ 30 (H.C.J. 1883) (upholding the conviction of members of the Salvation
Army for conducting processions in breach of a local proclamation); McGill v. Garbutt,
[1886] 5 N.Z.L.R. 73, 78 (upholding a bylaw prohibiting processions without the permis-
sion of the borough council and noting that the question was simply whether the Napier
bylaw was "good as a general measure of precaution" and not whether the Salvation
Army parade could be treated as an unlawful assembly); Abernathy, supra note 63, at
401; V.T. Bevan, Protest and Public Order, 1979 PuB. L. 163, 176. Although it was
difficult to overturn any municipal bylaw for being ultra vires the enabling legislation,
the courts did occasionally strike down Salvation Army bylaws directed against noise if
they did not require actual annoyance as an element of the offense. See, e.g., Johnson
v. Mayor of Croyden, 16 Q.B.D. 708 (1886) (invalidating as unreasonable a bylaw
prohibiting music on Sundays because it could apply to music that was not in fact a
nuisance); Munro v. Watson, 57 L.T.R. (n.s.) 366 (Q.B. 1887) (striking down a bylaw
prohibiting music in the street without a mayoral license because it empowered the
mayor both to legalize a nuisance and to prohibit something innocent). Obstruction
bylaws, in contrast, were deemed valid even if they did not require any independent
evidence of harm. It was presumed that any obstruction of the highway would cause
inconvenience, which was entirely consistent with the fact that proof of actual injury was
never required to ground any obstruction offense.
clause. 43 This official conduct provoked a national repeal effort, and
Army supporters submitted petitions containing 250,000 signa-
tures--including those of Canons Wilberforce and Holland and other
religious worthies--to the House of Commons. In 1888 Henry Fowler,
M.P. for Wolverhampton and a staunch supporter of the Salvationists,
successfully introduced a bill to repeal the objectionable clause.'"
The focus of public attention then shifted to Eastbourne, which in
1885 had secured amendment of its local act to incorporate a provision
identical to that of Torquay. As evidence of the panic that the Army
instilled in the town's residents, no Salvationists were present in
Eastbourne at the time and the Army did not even establish a foothold
until 1890.145 Not surprisingly, immediately upon commencement of
band operations in May 1891, the police arrested numerous Salvationists
for violating the prohibitory clause.146 In December the judges again
intervened to rescue the Army. R. v. Clarkson'47 involved nine
members of a visiting band from Camberwell, London, who had
travelled to Eastbourne in July 1891 to support the local Salvationists.
The Camberwell group, somehow separated from the local Army
contingent, marched to the beach accompanied by a menacing crowd of
over 1200 persons. They were arrested upon personal order of the
mayor and charged with unlawful assembly and conspiring to violate the
statute. At their trial at the Central Criminal Court, where H.H. Asquith,
M.P., assumed their defense, 48 the jury acquitted the bandsmen of
conspiring to violate the ban on processions but found them guilty of
unlawful assembly.'49 The appellate court unanimously overturned the
convictions. Speaking for his fellow judges, Mr. Justice Hawkins
characterized the behavior of the mob as a "most brutal outrage" on the
band. "The bandsmen had as much right to walk through the streets
143. 323 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 859 (Mar. 12, 1888), 1790 (Mar. 20, 1888); 2
PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 467 (Mar. 10, 1892); see COUTTS, supra note 94, at 91;
SANDALL, supra note 78, at 264-67.
144. See 4 SANDALL, supra note 78, at 267-68.
145. See id. at 270-71. The town councillor who drafted the bill admitted that the
clause was inserted for the express purpose of preventing the Salvation Army from
conducting its processions should it extend its operations to Eastbourne. See CHAMBERS,
supra note 140, at 210.
146. See, e.g., 353 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 1821 (June 8, 1891); 354 PARL. DEB.,
H.C. (3d ser.) 400 (June 15, 1891); 1188-89 (July 14, 1891); see also CHAMBERS, supra
note 140, at 209; COUTrs, supra note 94, at 93; 4 SANDALL, supra note 78, at 270-72.
147. 17 Cox C.C. 483 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1892).
148. See Courrs, supra note 94, at 93.
149. The jury apparently found no specific intention to breach the act. Clarkson,
17 Cox C.C. at 488. The defendants were convicted of unlawful assembly for disturbing
and terrorizing the Queen's subjects "then passing and repassing along the Queen's
common highways." Id. at 484.
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carrying their musical instruments," he remarked, "as anyone has to walk
through the streets without a musical instrument."' 50 Clarkson demon-
strated the unreliability after Beatty of an unlawful assembly charge
against marchers, substantial judicial sympathy for the beleaguered
missionaries in contrast to their vicious opponents, and a strong
affirmation of the Salvationists' "right to passage."
Only a few months after Clarkson was decided, Parliament repealed
the Eastboume provision. The vigorous judicial condemnation of the
town's behavior no doubt spurred the repeal effort, and the bill was
widely endorsed by the government, the press, and public opinion.
151
The debate in the House of Commons indicated that although some
M.P.s were concerned about the inflexibility of the relevant provision in
Eastbourne's local act,152 the general validity of prior restraints on
150. Id. at 489. The judge's sympathy for the Salvation Army and antipathy toward
the Army's opponents were obvious. "[Tlhere cannot be conceived, under the
circumstances, a more peaceable body of men than these nine defendants. Not so the
crowd, however; they, without the smallest ground for taking the action they did, raised
their sticks in the air close to the defendants; and one cannot help thinking that blows
were falling on the heads of the bandsmen from them, and that, if the bandsmen did
retaliate, it was not such a retaliation as would in our judgment cause an unlawful
assembly... ." Id. at 190. A similar attitude was evident in Beaty v. Glenister, 51
L.T.R. (n.s.) 304 (Q.B. 1884), where the court quashed the conviction of 15 members
of the Salvation Army for disturbing the peace in violation of the Hastings Local Act.
The Hastings group had also been accosted during a march by a large, hostile mob.
Lord Coleridge concluded that there was no evidence of a disturbance of the peace
within the meaning of the Act. Id. at 305.
151. The press and the government generally supported repeal. See 4 SANDALL,
supra note 78, at 277. Indeed, the Solicitor-General, Sir Edward Clarke, rather
surprisingly wrote to Bramwell Booth: "I feel the force of what you say as to the
necessity of maintaining an actual protest against the Eastboume Act in order to have
any chance of getting it repealed. I personally shall be glad to help in securing the
appeal." 2 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 491 (Mar. 10, 1892); 4 SANDALL, supra note 78,
at 276. Predictably, the residents of Eastbourne overwhelmingly opposed repeal. In a
poll of the ratepayers, 3257 opposed the bill and 470 supported it. 2 PARL. DEB., H.C.
(4th ser.) 481 (Mar. 10, 1892); CHAMBERS, supra note 140, at 210.
152. The facial problem with the Eastbourne provision was that its prohibitory
clause was contained in a local act, which as a parliamentary statute was absolute and
inflexible and could not be altered locally to permit processions. 2 PARL. DEB., H.C.
(4th ser.) 469 (Mar. 10, 1892). Moreover, the absolute ban on processions gave
Eastbourne a power "in excess of the general law." Id. at 473. These defects were not
dispositive, however, because other towns-for example, Carlisle, Reading, and Hastings,
see 323 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 859 (Mar. 12, 1888)--had similar local acts in effect
that aroused little controversy. In moving the second reading of the Eastbourne
Amendment Act, H.H. Fowler noted that "[c]ommon sense and common justice have
prevailed in the town of Hastings, and no difficulty has arisen there." 2 PARL. DEB.,
959
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processions by means of nuisance bylaws was not in question. Henry
Matthews, the Home Secretary, suggested that "the inhabitants of
Eastboume can get all they can legitimately desire under the powers of
the Municipal Corporation Act by bye-laws: they can prevent proces-
sions by Salvationists or any other persons that are a nuisance to the
inhabitants, and they ought not to desire more."' In the case of this
particular town, however, his statement was not prophetic. When the
Eastbourne council followed the Home Secretary's suggestion and
proposed new but extremely restrictive bylaws, Matthews refused to
approve them."M An M.P. pointed out that this was "a very exception-
al state of circumstances" involving "a Municipality not likely to be
impartial in the treatment of those who chose to assemble for the
processions." '55 Eastbourne, in other words, had departed from
prevailing political norms in its overly sweeping and inflexible denial of
the Salvationists' freedom to march.
The episodes in Eastboume and Torquay were significant in disclosing
the existence of an institutional and popular understanding regarding the
boundary that separated acceptable from unacceptable prior restraints on
processions. Rigid and unreasonably enforced prohibitions infringed
unnecessarily on passage rights and unfairly injured a group that did not
pose a substantial national threat and was more "deserving" than its
disreputable opponents.'56 Legal doctrine and social consensus thus
H.C. (4th ser.) 465 (Mar. 10, 1892).
153. 2 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 498 (Mar. 10, 1892).
154. See 4 SA-DALL, supra note 78, at 279. Admiral Field, an Eastboume council
supporter, complained in the House of Commons: "Well, Sir, it seems to me in this
business Eastbourne is 'between the devil and the deep sea'--not allowed to keep the
clause and not allowed to have the bye-laws she wants." 4 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.)
1273 (May 19, 1892).
155. 4 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 1280 (May 19, 1892).
156. The Army did, however, forfeit considerable sympathy when it broke the law.
In proposing repeal of the Eastbourne provision, Fowler somewhat abashedly admitted:
There is a strong feeling against them I know, and the feeling has been
expressed in letters from all classes.. . .Their commander is not very modest,
and in the instructions he issues to his lieutenants he rules with an almost
papal authority. Nevertheless, we must bear testimony to the honesty of their
intentions, and the courage with which they carry them out.
2 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 474 (Mar. 10, 1892). At the second reading of the
Eastbourne Amendment Bill in the House of Lords, Lord Fortescue, while supporting the
bill, observed:
Now, for some time the Salvation Army, as it is called, was sinned against
rather than sinning; they were law-abiding, and inadequately protected as law-
abiding and benevolent citizens. But after a time, I suppose feeling the need
of fresh excitement on their part and on their behalf, Mr. Booth encouraged
them to violate the law, and to persevere in violating the law, at Torquay; and
since then, to a far worse degree, as we all know, quite recently at Eastbourne.
... [H]aving on a previous occasion taken upon myself to speak on behalf of
960
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established both the legitimacy of local regulation of Salvationist
processions and the need to contain such regulation within reasonable
limits.
By the 1890s, as the Eastbourne repeal movement also reflected, Army
activities had become more commonplace and even respectable; as
indicated, prosecution of Salvationists for holding meetings also radically
diminished in this decade.'57 The Army increasingly enjoyed the
freedom to march, ceased to suffer from overzealous enforcement, and
began to acquire broader social legitimacy. Indeed, in 1903 President
Theodore Roosevelt invited William Booth to the White House, and the
following year King Edward VII received him at Buckingham Pal-
ace.15 8  With their growing respectability, the importance of the
Salvationists in the history of obstruction law came to an end.5 9 The
events of the 1880s, however, had demonstrated both the efficacy of
obstruction law as compared with standard criminal law doctrines and
the favored status of processions, which could only be restrained by
special regulation."
the Salvation Army and their work when they were law-abiding, I feel it my
duty to protest against them and their acts when they are deliberately law-
defying and law-breaking.
5 PARL. DEB., H.L. (4th ser.) 326-27 (May 31, 1892). Nonetheless, the House of
Commons in March 1892 soundly approved the repeal bill on its second reading by a
vote of 269 to 122. 2 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 502 (Mar. 10, 1892).
157. See supra note 103 and accompanying text; K.S. INGLIS, CHURCHES AND THE
WORKING CLASSES IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND 193 (1963) ("Police and magistrates tended,
however, to become more tolerant as they realized that the Army, whatever its
eccentricities, was on the side of public order."); Bailey, supra note 73, at 252 n.65 (riots
against the Army probably ceased because familiarity bred indifference and the Army's
social work attracted the support of the middle classes); Munro, supra note 75, at 762("It is not entirely clear why the wave of disorder ceased, but perhaps the Salvationists
appeared less threatening as their activities became more familiar.").
158. BARNES, supra note 95, at 60.
159. The doctrine continued, however, to be used as an occasional means of
harassment through the twentieth century. For example, the Chief of the Staff of the
Salvation Army complained in 1954 that the authorities were still using local obstruction
bylaws to regulate Army activities and were "constantly seeking new powers to control
the use of the roads." JAMES E. NORTHEY, OUTREACH: TOWARD EFFECTIVE OPEN-AIR
EVANGELISM 13 (1954).
160. Another advantage that obstruction gave the authorities after Beatty was that
it circumvented Beatty's ruling, in the context of unlawful assembly, that members of
a procession were not responsible for the hostile reaction of a crowd. A charge of
obstruction could reach precisely this situation, because it was a settled proposition as
far back as R. v. Carlile in 1834 that the collection of a crowd, even a sympathetic one,
was a basis for liability. See, e.g., Note, supra note 126, at 689. On the hostile
The legal preference for processions, however, was a product of more
than the logic of the "right to passage" and sympathy for the Army
marchers. It also resulted from the fact that contemporaneously with the
activities of the Salvation Army, a far more ominous challenge had
emerged to test the resources of the government.
B. The Socialists, the Unemployed, and the
Road to Trafalgar Square
While the Salvationists were engaged in rescuing souls in the
provinces, the socialists were proceeding to mount a major challenge to
the central government in the capital. In the 1880s economic hardship
and intensifying international competition caused severe unemployment
and distress among unskilled and casual workers in London.
161
Socialists and radicals of various stripes-especially the Social
Democratic Federation (SDF) founded by Henry Hyndman in
1881-achieved substantial success in mobilizing unemployed workers
against the government's political and economic policies. 162  In
contrast to the Salvation Army, the socialists resorted primarily to the
tactic of open-air meetings, and the government deployed obstruction
law effectively against both street meetings scattered throughout London
and the massive demonstrations in Trafalgar Square.
1. The Suppression of Socialist Street Meetings
Throughout the 1880s the police frequently used the obstruction
devices of dispersal, arrest, and prosecution to control small socialist
street meetings. A typical instance was the suppression of the "nui-
audience question, scholars have debated whether Beatty's exoneration of speakers for
the response of a hostile audience was inconsistent with later public order cases such as
Wise v. Dunning, [1902] 1 K.B. 167, which upheld a binding-over order issued against
a Protestant pastor who insulted Catholic audiences at street meetings in Liverpool.
Some analysts have argued that the two cases are flatly inconsistent on the "hostile
audience" issue and that Beatty was in effect overruled, see, e.g., Note, 70 L.Q. REV.
110 (1902), but others have distinguished Wise on the ground that the pastor's behavior
in that case was exceptionally provocative. Beatty and Wise were clearly distinguishable,
however, on the ground that Wise involved a meeting that obstructed the highway. As
Lord Alverstone stated: "Here we have distinct findings of fact that the appellant held
a number of meetings in the public streets; that the highways were blocked by crowds
numbering thousands of persons." Wise, [1902] 1 K.B. at 176. Thus the cases perhaps
simply reflected the view that obstructive street meetings were unlawful whereas
processions were not.
161. ALLEN HuTr, TIES FINAL CRISIS 104 (1935); RODNEY MACE, TRAFALGAR
SQUARE 171 (1976); GARETH STEDMAN JONES, OUTCAST LONDON 291 (1971).
162. MACE, supra note 161, at 160-62; CHusFHIH TSUZUKI, H.M. HYNDMAN AND
BRITISH SOcIALIsM 73 (Henry Pelling ed., 1961).
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sance" of Sunday street speakers in the popular radical gathering place
of Dodd Street in London's East End. In the summer of 1885 the police
arrested SDF leaders and other reformers for blocking up Dodd Street
even though it contained only warehouses and had no appreciable traffic
at the time in question.1 63 At a major protest rally organized in
September, the police again made arrests for open air preaching and
causing an obstructive crowd to assemble. 64 When the magistrate
sentenced some of the defendants to hard labor, the courtroom burst into
fury. William Morris cried "shame" and scuffled with police, and a few
days later a philosophy professor angrily charged that the magistrate had
"made it plain that what he desired to put down was not street obstruc-
tionism but the preaching of socialism. 165
With the advent of a Conservative administration in 1886, the police
intensified the policy of harassment.66 Their determination to curb
socialist meetings was apparent, for example, in events in 1887 involving
the Lambeth branch of the SDF. The members typically held peaceful
meetings on Sunday mornings, and for several weeks a militant anti-
socialist group calling itself the "Primrose Society" physically assaulted
the socialists and disrupted their activities. Rather than protecting the
socialists from their adversaries-as Beatty would have required in the
case of a procession-the police banned the radicals from the street or
dispersed them on obstruction grounds.167 Throughout the decade and
beyond, the practice of using obstruction law to disrupt socialist
meetings occasioned frequent complaints in the House of Commons.168
163. See HENRY HYNDMAN, THE RECORD OF AN ADvENrtuRous LIFE 421 (1911).
164. RICHTER, supra note 59, at 95.
165. Id. at 95-96. An M.P. noted that the Dodd Street meetings had attracted only
twenty persons prior to the intervention of the police, but thereafter the audience
increased to two or three thousand. 314 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 1766 (May 12,
1887).
166. Radicals complained that after 1886 there was a substantial change in the
attitude of the police toward public meetings. According to an East End member,
although the Home Secretary denied that the police had new instructions, "when you are
dealing with so delicate a question as the right of public meeting, even admitting that
the general regulations in their letter remain the same, still the spirit in which they are
administered and carried out may make the difference between a reasonable freedom and
an intolerable tyranny." 333 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 998 (Mar. 5, 1889).
167. See, e.g., 314 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 1746-50 (May 12, 1887).
168. See, e.g., 333 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 961-62, 1016 (Mar. 5, 1889); 336
PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 1131-32 (May 27, 1889); 339 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 173
(Aug. 2, 1889); 179 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 772-73 (July 30, 1907); 2 PARL. DEB.,
Obstruction doctrine offered the government the same benefits against
socialists as against Salvationists, providing a reliable and flexible
discretionary tool that enabled it both to claim impartiality and to deny
responsibility. Radicals in Parliament, echoing Salvationist sympathiz-
ers, frequently charged the government with selective enforcement of the
law. Charles Bradlaugh, for example, accused the administration in
1887 of "a great deal of harsh treatment" toward socialists that was not
shown to street preachers, even though preachers "very often assemble
in places where they stop the traffic and cause inconvenience to the
neighbourhood." He offered to "drive the Home Secretary round in a
Hansom cab next Sunday morning, and show him 200 or 300 such
meetings in places where the traffic in the streets is certainly greatly
impeded." 69 The use of obstruction against socialist meetings, he and
other critics charged, was the result of a deliberate and coordinated
governmental policy.
170
Despite the plausibility of this accusation, considering that the Home
Office was ultimately responsible for the actions of the Metropolitan
Police,17 1 the government invariably responded that its only concern
was to prevent obstruction of the highway. In 1887 Home Secretary
Matthews denied that the Home Office exhibited any particular animus
against socialist meetings. "I assure the House that that is absolutely
untrue," he insisted. "I have never given any directions of any sort or
kind with regard to socialist meetings. The only directions I have given
H.C. (5th ser.) 22 (Mar. 8, 1909); GERTRUDE WILLIAMS, THE PASSIONATE PILGRIM: A
LIFE OF ANNIE BESANT 162 (1931).
169. 314 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 1765 (May 12, 1887).
170. See id. at 1754 (claiming that the action of the police "has been inspired from
very high quarters"); 339 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 173 (Aug. 2, 1889) (insisting that
socialist meetings were suppressed in Westbourne Grove when religious meetings on the
same spot were not disturbed); 192 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 49 (July 9, 1908)
(contending that the police had dispersed socialists while permitting temperance meetings
to be held on Sunday mornings near Regent's Park); TOM MANN, MEMOIRS 168-69
(1967) (recounting persecution of socialist groups when Salvation Army and temperance
meetings were tolerated); James Stuart, The Metropolitan Police, 55 CONTEMP. REV.
623, 629 (1889) (charging that interference with radical and socialist meetings was "rife
under the present Government"). A government report in 1892, indicating places where
open air meetings had been held in London between March 1891 and March 1892
without police interference, gave credence to the charge. It listed a full 472 meetings
that were left undisturbed, most of them taking place on highways. The vast majority,
however, involved religious and temperance groups, with only a handful of socialist and
trade union meetings. BRIT. PARL. PAPERS, HOME OFFICE RETURN, H.C., 1892,
METROPOLITAN POLICE DIST. (OPEN AIR MEETINGS).
171. See, e.g., STEFAN PETROW, POLICING MORALS: THE METROPOLITAN POLICE
AND THE HOME OFFICE 28 (1994); SMrh, supra note 65, at 34; R. Plehwe, Police and
Government: The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, 1974 PuB. L. 316, 323-30.
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have tended to prevent obstruction in the streets. . 22 Moreover,
the Home Office claimed that it did not issue detailed instructions to the
police on the treatment of street obstructions. "Each case must depend
on its own particular circumstances," the Under-Secretary of State
maintained, "and must be left to be dealt with according to the discretion
of the Chief Commissioner."173  In 1889 the Radicals seized on a
statement allegedly made by a constable to the effect that the police
were under orders "to suppress socialist meetings only."'74 Matthews
responded with the familiar refrain that the only orders of the police
were to break up meetings "by whomsoever held which infringe upon
the public right of free passage in the streets.""17 When the Liberals
returned to power in 1892, they hewed to the same line. The new Home
Secretary, H.H. Asquith, contended that the police did not interfere with
a meeting "unless it occasion[ed] serious obstruction to the traffic."
What constituted an obstruction, according to Asquith, depended on "a
number of local circumstances.' 76  Similar charges and rebuttals
continued into the early twentieth century.'77
The government bolstered its ostensibly nonpolitical stance by
asserting that prosecutions were necessary not to suppress "respectable"
demonstrators but rather to subdue the "undeserving" elements that
obstructive crowds inevitably attracted. Matthews pointed out to the
House that if a space in the crowded business area of London became
known as a regular meeting place, "the vultures--the birds of prey of
172. 314 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 1759 (May 12, 1887). Matthews continued that
if "any body of men, whether the Socialists or the Primrose Society, chose to hold large
meetings in streets, and inconvenience arises, and interruption of traffic takes place, they
ought to be dispersed." Id.
173. Id. at 1752.
174. 335 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 1131 (May 27, 1889).
175. Id. at 1132. He also claimed that the "object of the meeting can have no
bearing whatever on the question, which is, whether the meeting obstructs the
thoroughfare or not." 333 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 962 (Mar. 5, 1889); see 339 PARL.
DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 173 (Aug. 2, 1889).
176. 17 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 1279 (Sept. 15, 1893).
177. In 1907, for example, the M.P. for West Ham complained about police
violence against a demonstration in Whitehall to protest the Russian alliance. Herbert
Gladstone, the Home Secretary, insisted that the action was taken only to stop
obstruction to traffic. 179 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 772-73 (July 30, 1907).
Similarly, when asked in 1909 why the police had dispersed an unemployed meeting in
Berkeley Square, he replied that the police had done so because "traffic was being
completely obstructed." 2 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 22 (Mar. 8, 1909).
society--will flock there."1 s  Even the Radicals admitted that their
meetings attracted undesirable elements. "i]t is an unfortunate fact,"
conceded the member from Bethnal Green, "that there is a large criminal
class in London which always finds its harvest on every occasion when
large masses of people are collected." ' Again, the link between
obstructive crowds and criminality served as a useful justification for
official action.
The government's routine reliance on obstruction law to suppress
small socialist gatherings, however, was of lesser magnitude than its
vigorous response to the major demonstrations occurring in Trafalgar
Square in 1886-87. In those years the government faced an exceptional
challenge from the unemployed workers who inhabited the Square, and
it exploited obstruction law relentlessly to combat street activity that it
viewed as a serious threat to its authority.
2. The Battle for Trafalgar Square
The unfolding crisis in Trafalgar Square illuminated the shifting
strategies of the government in dealing with socialist meetings in the
most prominent site of political protest activity in Britain. For almost
forty years after the Chartist riots of 1848, the population of London
assumed that the Square was a legitimate public forum. '8 The events
of the 1880s, however, established that Trafalgar Square was a highway.
That determination, in turn, enabled the government to apply-and
178. 333 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 1013 (Mar. 5, 1889). According to Matthews,
the organizers of demonstrations gave a "plausible excuse and a decent occasion for the
roughs of London to gather together, and then ... plunder shops and commit other
outrages." Id. at 1008. The Police Commissioner himself informed Matthews in 1888
that he did not apprehend trouble from the organized Socialist movement, "but it is from
the roughs and criminals who always attach themselves to large processions and
meetings that I anticipate serious damage to property." Bailey, supra note 66, at 108.
179. 333 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 996 (Mar. 5, 1889). The speaker added,
however, that the situation was the same during public illuminations or royal
processions. Id.; see 333 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.), 1002-03, 1016 (Mar. 5, 1889).
The Radical M.P. James Stuart, however, complained that the police consistently
confused extreme political views with "violence and criminality." Stuart, supra note
170, at 629.
180. The Square was the site of many major demonstrations in the second half of
the nineteenth century, including rallies concerning parliamentary reform (1867), the
French Republic (1870), the bombardment of Paris (1871), the early closing movement
(1872), the Tichbome case (1878), duties on beer (1885), and the activities of Charles
Bradlaugh (1881 and 1883). See WILLIAM4S, supra note 3, at 74. In a debate in the
House of Commons in 1889, members pointed to the fact that for nearly forty years
Trafalgar Square had been used for purposes of public meeting. See, e.g., 333 PARL.
DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 995, 1001, 1029 (Mar. 5, 1889).
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indeed abuse-obstruction law to control what it perceived as an
intolerable threat to public order.
The escalating drama began with an economic downturn and an
exceptionally severe winter in 1886. Outdoor employment disappeared,
and there was acute suffering among dock and construction workers.'
8
'
Various socialist groups, including the SDF, the Socialist League, and
the Fabian Society, organized an ambitious program of daily open-air
rallies in the Square." A particularly large demonstration took place
on "Black Monday," February 8, 1886, when Henry Hyndman and three
other prominent socialists addressed thousands of unemployed dockers
and building workers. Following the meeting, the four leaders and a
handful of supporters spontaneously marched through the West End of
London, gathering a crowd that numbered two or three thousand by the
time it reached the gentlemen's clubs in Pall Mall. Members of the
crowd smashed the windows of clubs and looted several shops,
spreading intense panic among middle and upper-class residents of
London. 18
3
Worsening economic conditions the following year transformed
Trafalgar Square into a literal encampment of the homeless poor, and the
government confronted enormous public pressure to suppress the
continual meetings that disrupted local trade and frightened area
residents.8' Initially, however, the government reacted indecisively,
owing both to internal policy disagreements and uncertainty about the
legal status of the Square. The Conservative government was divided
between two strong personalities: Charles Warren, a former hero of the
Egyptian campaign, who as Police Commissioner favored vigorous
action against the unemployed; and Henry Matthews, the Home
Secretary, who tended to be more respectful of legal forms. Two critical
181. See JONES, supra note 161, at 291.
182. See id. at 291-92; MACE, supra note 161, at 161-62; RICHTER, supra note 59,
at 103. The London United Workmen's Committee, an arm of the Tory Fair Trader
movement, organized counter-rallies that competed with the socialists for working-class
support. RICHTER, supra note 59, at 103.
183. See RICHTER, supra note 59, at 107-20; Tsuzuxi, supra note 162, at 73-74.
The SDF leaders attempted to control the crowd but were powerless to do so, and The
Times considered the resulting riot to be even more alarming than the Chartist
demonstration of 1848. TsuzuKI, supra note 162, at 73-74 (citing TIMES (London), Feb.
10, 1886). The four leaders were prosecuted for sedition but were acquitted by the jury.
Id. at 74-75.
184. Bailey, supra note 66, at 104-05.
legal issues were unresolved. The first was whether Trafalgar Square
was legally a highway,"8 5 and the second was, if so, whether the
government could legally impose permanent prior restraints on meetings
held there. After Beatty there was no common law or national statutory
power adequate to the purpose. The only possible instrument was a
local act, the Metropolitan Police Act 1839, which granted the police
broad authority to regulate street obstructions. It was questionable,
however, whether the Act was expansive enough to authorize an
indefinite closure of the Square to meetings. The relevant section
permitted the police to prevent street obstructions only on particular
occasions when the streets were "liable to be obstructed,"'8 6 and a
general ban might well exceed this limiting condition.
In the face of both legal uncertainty and internal policy conflict, the
government vacillated. Through October it alternately allowed and
prohibited meetings and demonstrations in Trafalgar Square.18 7  In
early November, however, without Home Office approval, Warren
posted a public notice warning that he would disperse disorderly
crowds. 8 At this point the law officers of the Crown rendered an
opinion rejecting a general prohibition on "wandering bands" as ultra
vires the Metropolitan Police Act. Such a measure, they concluded,
would "practically prohibit groups of men wandering through the
streets," that is, would interfere with public passage. 89 Nonetheless,
the government remained under relentless pressure-from proprietors of
stores and hotels abutting the Square, from the press, and from members
of the Cabinet---to cleanse the area of the unemployed. 9 Anticipating
a major demonstration on November 9, Lord Mayor's Day, the Cabinet
on November 8 finally authorized a police notice banning public
meetings in the Square.19'
Although the legality of the notice was dubious, the government
persisted in its policy."9 Rainy weather enabled it to avoid confronta-
185. It was unclear whether the Trafalgar Square Act 1844, 7 & 8 Vict., ch. 6,
rendered the Square an ordinary highway containing an easement of passage or whether
it created another legal entity conferring other rights on the public.
186. 2 & 3 Vict., ch. 47, § 52.
187. See RiCHTER, supra note 59, at 139; Bailey, supra note 66, at 107-08.
188. Bailey, supra note 66, at 108.
189. Id. at 110.
190. Id. at 110-11; MACE, supra note 161, at 171-79.
191. See R. v. Cunninghame Graham and Bums, 16 Cox C.C. 420,423 (Cent Crim.
Ct. 1888).
192. In casting about for some legal justification, the government briefly toyed with
the theory that Trafalgar Square was not a street but rather a park in the possession of
the Crown. For example, on November 11 Matthews told a deputation that the Square
was Crown property and that the Queen could therefore ban meetings there. Bailey,
968
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tion on Lord Mayor's Day, but the Metropolitan Radical Federation-an
umbrella organization comprising various socialist and Radical
groups--scheduled a further demonstration for Sunday, November 13.
On November 12 Matthews issued a second notice under the Metropoli-
tan Police Act forbidding "organized processions" from approaching the
Square the following day,193 and Warren assigned five thousand
constables to special Sunday duty. The precautions failed to deter a
massive number of demonstrators, estimated at between twenty and fifty
thousand, from mobilizing to protest infringements on free speech.194
Initially, the November 13 demonstration proceeded according to the
Federation's plan. In the afternoon, nearly sixty groups held neighbor-
hood rallies and then marched toward the Square from different
directions. Many contingents found their way blocked, however, and
those reaching the Square confronted 1500 police officers amassed in a
cordon two to four deep. No such display of military might had
occurred in London since the days of the Chartists! 5 The police
repelled the enormous crowds in what was alternately described by the
press as "The Defence of Trafalgar Square" and by the demonstrators as
"Bloody Sunday." '196 The socialist John Bums and a Radical Scottish
M.P., Cunninghame Graham,'9 7 together led a few hundred men in a
supra note 66, at 123 n.89. A park did not confer an easement of passage and could be
closed to the public entirely. See, e.g., 184 PARL. DEB., H.L. (3d ser.) 1371 (July 24,
1866) (Earl of Derby stating that there "can be no doubt that the Crown is the owner of
these Parks" and had undoubted powers to prevent them from "being diverted from their
proper purposes" of enjoyment and recreation); 186 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 1956
(May 3, 1967) (John Bright conceding that the government could close Hyde Park on
any occasion). The government abandoned this line of argument when the law officers
advised that Trafalgar Square was a highway.
193. BRIT. PARL. PAPERS, TRAFALGAR SQUARE REGULATIONS: RETURN GIVING
THE REGULATIONS ISSUED BY THE CHIEF COMMISSIONERS OF POLICE WITH RESPECT TO
TRAFALGAR SQUARE, H.C., 1889.
194. See RICHTER, supra note 59, at 143-45.
195. Hur, supra note 161, at 110.
196. See MACE, supra note 161, at 179-89; TsUzUKi, supra note 162, at 78; CEDRIC
WAITS & LAURENCE DAVIES, CUNNINGHAME GRAHAM: A CRITICAL BIOGRAPHY 67-69
(1979); WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 78.
197. On November 12, Cunninghame Graham published the following remarks in
the Pall Mall Gazette:
I imagine that, save at Luxor, Memphis (or perchance Glasgow), no square in
any city is so deserted as Trafalgar-square on Sunday. But even supposing
that it were not, I hold that the right of free speech and free meeting is a more
precious one to Englishmen than even the right of free traffic ... for that
reason I intend to address the meeting on Sunday.
frontal attack on the police line at the Square's southeastern comer. The
two leaders were arrested along with three hundred others, Cunninghame
Graham suffering a head wound in the process. The Grenadier Guards,
armed with fixed bayonets, later conducted a mopping-up operation.19
Altogether two hundred persons were injured, including seventy-seven
policemen, and three demonstrators later died of their wounds. 19
Fearing additional assaults on the Square,2"' the government again
solicited the opinion of the law officers as to the propriety of a
permanent ban. On this occasion they proved more cooperative,
advising that although Trafalgar Square was a highway, section 52 of the
Metropolitan Police Act authorized an indefinite prohibition if the Police
Commissioner anticipated serious obstruction to the thoroughfare.20 '
Presumably the officers were now relying on the November disturbances
to support an argument that the Square was "likely to be obstructed" by
meetings on a continuing basis. On November 18, therefore, Warren
issued a further police notice banning meetings and processions in the
Square indefinitely.20 2
Although the notice was generally observed,2 3 the Home Office
remained uncomfortable with the ban. To strengthen its position, it
sought judicial ratification by means of a successful prosecution on
indictment for a serious common law crime. Matthews in particular
desired a jury verdict in favor of the government in a case "of an
aggravated kind," calculating that it was not sufficient "to rest on
decisions of Police Magistrates." 2' For this reason, although the
government could have charged the participants with obstruction of the
highway, it declined to do so. It preferred judicial rulings that would
squarely establish several constitutional principles: that there was no
PALL MALL GAzETTE, Nov. 12, 1887, at 5, quoted in WATTS & DAVIES, supra note 196,
at 67.
198. MACE, supra note 161, at 188-89.
199. 323 Parl. Deb., H.C. (3d ser.) 1433 (Mar. 16, 1888); MACE, supra note 161,
at 189.
200. Warren asked the Home Office to approve a standing body of 20,000 special
constables for duty on Sunday mornings, see RICHTER, supra note 59, at 151, and a few
thousand were deputed to the Square on Sunday, November 20. On November 16,
however, the Radical clubs agreed not to mount another assault on Trafalgar Square but
rather to rely on legal action to secure the Square as a site of public meetings. See
Bailey, supra note 66, at 113.
201. See Bailey, supra note 66, at 114, 123 n.89.
202. TRAFALOAR SQUARE REGULATIONS, supra note 193.
203. Police firmness and economic recovery prevented further demonstrations of the
magnitude of Bloody Sunday. See RICHTER, supra note 59, at 158. However, attacks
on the Square continued sporadically for the next several years, and the ban remained
a rallying cry for the Radicals.
204. Bailey, supra note 66, at 114.
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right to meet in Trafalgar Square or indeed" any highway; that Beatty's
ruling on the lawfulness of assemblies was confined to processions; and
that indefinite prior bans on meetings were valid under the obstruction
provisions of the Metropolitan Police Act. Thus hoping to secure at
least a fagade of legality, the Crown charged Cunninghame Graham and
Bums with riot, unlawful assembly, and assault for their actions on
"Bloody Sunday." The two defendants equally viewed the prosecutions
as a test case on the right of public meeting in the streets. °5
On January 16, 1888, R. v. Cunninghame Graham and Burns"' was
tried at the Old Bailey. Both the Solicitor General, Sir Edward
Clarke-who had defended the Salvation Army in Beatoy° 7-- and the
Attorney General, Sir Richard Webster, appeared for the Crown. Bums
appeared pro se, and Cunninghame Graham was defended by his friend
H.H. Asquith, an M.P. and future Prime Minister, who would later
represent the Salvationists in their troubles at Torquay and Eastbourne.
Obstruction of the highway, though not specifically charged, was an
important factor in the case inasmuch as the arguments and decision
dealt with the right to passage on the highway and the scope of police
powers to prevent obstruction under the Metropolitan Police Act.
Webster, who would also support the Salvationist cause at Eastbourne,
argued that Warren's proclamation was valid because the police had a
duty under the Act to maintain a clear passage in the thoroughfare of
Trafalgar Square. He pointed to the traditionally wide definition of
obstruction in cases involving stationary gatherings, arguing that there
was no right to hold a public meeting in the street. Asquith, relying on
Beatty, countered that the demonstration was a lawful assembly, that the
disorder had been precipitated by police efforts to prevent the meeting,
and that the prior restraint was invalid. In an attempt to underscore the
government's overreaching, he acknowledged that the meeting would
have been indictable as a common law obstruction or punishable under
205. As Bums told the House of Commons a few years later, the Trafalgar Square
"riot' consisted merely of Cunninghame Graham and himself walking from the comer
of the Grand Hotel into Trafalgar Square. "They thought they had a legal right, and they
put the legal right to the test .... They were told by the Law Courts that they had no
right to go there, and, therefore, they were punished." 18 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.)
896 (Nov. 14, 1893).
206. 16 Cox C.C. 420 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1888).
207. 314 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 1751 (May 12, 1887).
the Highways Act 1835. This did not, however, make the meeting an
unlawful assembly."'
The government was partially successful in its quest for validation.
On the issue of the unlawfulness of street meetings, the court unequivo-
cally supported the Crown. Mr. Justice Charles charged the jury that,
pursuant to the Trafalgar Square Act 1844, the Square was a thorough-
fare for purposes of the Metropolitan Police Act and held the same status
as any other street.2" Although it had undoubtedly been used for
public assemblies,"' there was no right of public meeting either in the
Square or in any other public thoroughfare. "So far as I know the law
of England," he proclaimed, "the use of public thoroughfares is for
people to pass and repass along them.., and they are not dedicated to
the public use for any other purpose that I know of than for the purpose
of passing and repassing."" In contrast to Beatty 's ruling on proces-
sions, Cunninghame Graham affirmed that street meetings, even those
located in the customary forum of Trafalgar Square, were unlawful
infringements of the right to passage.2 12
On the question of prior restraints under the Metropolitan Police Act,
however, the government was less pleased with the judicial response.
The judge was ambiguous on the legality of the police order, somewhat
cryptically charging the jury that Warren's notices did not in and of
themselves make the meeting unlawful but were simply a "warning" that
the public peace was in danger.2" He further instructed the jury that
"whatever may be your view of the necessity for the two notices issued
208. Cunninghame Graham, 16 Cox C.C. at 425 (a fuller report of the arguments
of counsel is provided in 4 T.L.R. 212).
209. 16 Cox C.C. at 429. The court observed that prior to the Trafalgar Square Act
the Square had been the "private possession" of the Crown. Id. at 428-29.
210. The judge specifically referred to Charles Bradlaugh's testimony that for the
past thirty years he had held meetings there for political purposes. Id. at 429.
211. Id. at 429-30. In less than an hour the jury convicted the defendants of one
count of unlawful assembly but acquitted them of the more serious charges of riot and
assault. Bums and Graham were sentenced to six weeks' imprisonment without hard
labor. THE A.JNuAL REGISTER FOR THE YEAR 1888, at 7 (1889). With remission for
good conduct, they served four and a half weeks, most of it spent picking oakum.
WATTS & DAvIES, supra note 196, at 73.
212. The court also expressed the usual concern that obstructive crowds would
attract idlers and ruffians. In all large gatherings, the judge stated, there were "persons
meaning mischief," Cunninghame Graham, 16 Cox C.C. at 430, and the larger portion
of the persons assembled in Trafalgar Square were "rough and disorderly persons," id.
at 432. The Attorney General later remarked that although the organizers were well
intentioned, "what charm have the summoners of a meeting got that they can keep away
the roughs and the criminal classes, who have been watched in the Square day by day?"
323 PARt.. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 56 (Mar. 2, 1888).
213. Cunninghame Graham, 16 Cox C.C. at 431.
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by Sir Charles Warren," they did not justify riotous conduct.2 14 In
refusing to uphold unequivocally the legality of the ban, the judge was
possibly influenced not only by the language but also the history of the
Metropolitan Police Act, which had never previously been used to
impose a permanent ban on public meetings under the theory of
preventing obstruction.215
Later that year opponents of government policy countered with a test
case of their own. In Ex parte Lewis,216 a solicitor challenged the
November 18 notice by suing the Home Secretary and the Police
Commissioner for a variety of offenses, including committing a
"nuisance at common law, stopping the processions, preventing by force
the lawful use of the thoroughfare, and the enjoyment of public rights
and privileges."217 Although he argued pro se for nearly three hours
that the notices of November 8, 12 and 18 were illegal, the court gave
short shrift to his contentions. Mr. Justice Wills pointed out that a
supposed right to assemble on the highway was "in its nature irreconcil-
able with the right of free passage, and there is, so far as we have been
able to ascertain, no authority whatever in favour of it., 218 The
Trafalgar Square Act, the judge asserted, conferred public rights of
passage but not a right of "public meeting."219
The two test cases thus forcefully declared the illegality of street
meetings but did not expressly uphold the validity of a permanent ban
under the Act. Indeed, most of the language helpful to the government
was arguably dicta.' ° The government's own lawyers remained
214. Id. at 432.
215. Charles Bradlaugh later insisted that the Metropolitan Police Act only imposed
a duty on the police to regulate traffic, and that until Warren's proclamation it had
"never entered into human imagination" that anyone could ban meetings under the
section. 333 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 1044 (Mar. 5, 1889).
216. 21 Q.B.D. 191 (1888).
217. Id. at 193. When the Bow Street magistrate rejected his application for
summonses against Warren and Matthews, Lewis sought an order of mandamus from the
Divisional Court to compel the magistrate to issue them. The court upheld the
magistrate's exercise of his discretion.
218. Id. at 197.
219. Id. at 198. Apparently the "public rights of passage" were conferred in this
case by a parliamentary statute, the Trafalgar Square Act, rather than by means of a
common law easement. Id.
220. Arguably, Cunninghame Graham adjudicated only whether one particular
assembly was an unlawful assembly, see 333 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 1004 (Mar. 5,
1889), and Lewis technically decided only that the court could not review a magistrate's
skeptical about the legality of the November 18 notice, the Treasury
Solicitor informing Matthews in September 1888 that the notice probably
did not justify the indefinite closure of the Square because it referred to
conditions specific to the previous November.' Matthews himself
later conceded that the notice strained the law "to the utmost,"2' and
Warren's successor as Police Chief, James Monro, entertained similar
doubts as to its legality. Monro believed that applying the Metropolitan
Police Act to peaceful political meetings was probably not defensible,
and he pressed for clarifying legislation? - Despite abundant evidence
that the ban was unlawful-the language of section 52, the absence of
any historical or legal precedent for such action, the opinions of the
judges, the skepticism of the government attorneys, and the uncertainty
of a Police Commissioner-the government adamantly adhered to its
policy. Regardless of other considerations, it was willing to stretch the
law as far as necessary to restrain socialist meetings.'
Although the government held private reservations, it staunchly
defended the November 18 ban in public. It resisted pressure to
promulgate explicit new regulations, which it considered politically
inexpedient,' and it weathered determined assaults from Radicals, and
eventually Liberals, who took up the Trafalgar Square notice as a
discretion in refusing to issue summonses to government officials. With respect to
whether there were any public rights other than passage in the Square, Mr. Justice Wills
in Lewis abstained "from pronouncing a judgment upon that which we think it is not
under the circumstances for us to decide," although Lewis had failed to convince him
that a right to hold meetings was among them. 21 Q.B.D. at 198; see, e.g, 333 PARL.
DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 1035-37, 1043 (Mar. 5, 1889) (Lewis and Cunninghame Graham did
not decide the issue of the right of meeting on its merits); B.L. Mosely, Trafalgar
Square, 13 L. MAG. & L. REV. 260, 262 (1888) (ruling in Cunninghame Graham was
dictum).
221. Bailey, supra note 66, at 115. The law officers advised the Home Office to
resolve the matter by framing explicit regulations under the Trafalgar Square Act. Id.
at 115-16.
222. RiCHTER, supra note 59, at 159.
223. See Bailey, supra note 66, at 116.
224. Victor Bailey has pointed out that the government was more divided, cautious,
and legalistic in dealing with the unemployed than has generally been assumed. See
Bailey, supra note 66, at 117-18. It is equally important, however, not to underestimate
the unlawful lengths to which it was sometimes willing to go. Although the government
would undoubtedly have preferred judicial ratification of its actions, it considered the
Trafalgar Square situation sufficiently urgent to follow for years a course of action the
legality of which was seriously questioned both inside and outside the government.
225. The government thought that permitting meetings on a regulated basis would
be perceived as a concession to the Liberals and Radicals, whereas new regulations
banning meetings would imply that the police had previously acted unlawfully. Bailey,
supra note 66, at 115, 117.
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rallying cry. 6  In March 1888 and again in March 1889 lengthy
debates in the House of Commons scrutinized the actions of the police
and the government on "Bloody Sunday." One Radical member even
threatened that if the administration did not permit meetings in the
Square, "violence and bloodshed" might ensue and a "terrible responsi-
bility will rest upon the Government."227 Nonetheless, the government
relied on the law as established in the cases of Cunninghame Graham
and Lewis. The judges had "distinctly laid it down," Matthews
instructed the House in 1889, "that there was no right of public meeting
in Trafalgar Square." 22  Magistrates as well treated the matter as
judicially settled, upholding the ban and refusing to certify any legal
issues for appellate review.229 Despite the probable illegality of its
policy, the Conservative government continued the prohibition in place
throughout its five remaining years in office.230
226. The Liberals did not immediately support the Radical challenge to the ban, as
Gladstone preferred to wait until the courts had ruled on its legality. Pressure by the
Radicals finally induced the Liberals to join them in directly attacking the notice in a
debate in March 1888. MACE, supra note 161, at 195. The Radicals, relying on Beatty,
pressed the government to safeguard the "long-accustomed popular right" of public
meeting in Trafalgar Square by submitting proposals to regulate the right. 333 PARL.
DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 996-97 (Mar. 5, 1889). They pointed out that for nearly forty years
prior to Bloody Sunday, Trafalgar Square had been used for purposes of public meeting,
id. at 995, and insisted that at the time section 52 was enacted no one had dreamed that
it would be used for the purpose of suppressing meetings. Id. at 1046. James Stuart,
M.P. for Shoreditch, and five other East London M.P.s drafted a bill to authorize public
meetings in the Square. Their proposal was careful to respect the right of passage,
providing that no public address "shall be delivered where the assemblage of persons to
hear the same causes obstruction to the use of any road or walk by the public outside
of the boundaries herein mentioned, and no such obstruction shall be wilfully caused by
any person forming part of any assemblage which may have met to hear any such
address." BRIT. PARL. PAPERS, A BILL FOR THE REGULATION OF MEETINGS IN
TRAFALGAR SQUARE, H.C., 1888. The second reading was put off ten times and finally
abandoned, and a similar bill introduced by Cunninghame Graham suffered the same
fate. MACE, supra note 161, at 197. Reform had to await the return of the Liberal Party
to power in 1892. Id. at 198.
227. 333 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 999 (Mar. 5, 1889).
228. Id. at 1010.
229. Both the government and the Radicals claimed to be frustrated at the inability
to obtain a High Court judgment pronouncing unequivocally on the validity of the ban.
See 333 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 993-95, 1010 (Mar. 5, 1889); Bailey, Metropolitan
Police, supra note 66, at 115 (throughout 1888 the courts deflected all attempts to
challenge the notice of November 18).
230. See Bailey, Metropolitan Police, supra note 66, at 117.
The issue was finally resolved with economic improvement and the
return of the Liberals to power in 1892. Gladstone appointed Asquith,
the Salvationists' defender at Torquay and Eastbourne as well as
Cunninghame Graham's defender at Trafalgar Square, to be Home
Secretary in his new administration. Asquith now moderated his
libertarian posture and withdrew his endorsement of an absolute right to
meet in the Square. He offered the Radicals an acceptable compromise,
however, agreeing to allow public meetings on a limited basis.2 31 He
abrogated the November 18 ban and promulgated restrictive regulations
under the Trafalgar Square Act permitting daylight meetings and
processions on weekends and holidays conditional on the police
receiving advance notice and approving the routes.232 A right to meet
on this particular highway was thus conferred by regulation and,
however constricted, it was a more substantial right to public meeting
than existed in any other street. In contrast to processions, which after
the 1880s could only be prevented by special regulation, meetings could
only be permitted on the same basis. The unusual situation of Trafalgar
Square aside--the exception proving the rule-by the end of the decade
it was indisputably the law that street meetings unlawfully interfered
with the right of passage.
C. The Doctrinal Resolution of the 1880s
The decade of the 1880s was the first critical period when the
government used nuisance law systematically as a public order device,
and the respective fates of the Salvationists and the socialists suggest
two primary conclusions. First, "obstruction" in its various forms was
a potent discretionary tool against street assemblies, bestowing many
advantages that traditional public order doctrines lacked: it extended to
most street activities, reliably brought convictions, presented the
appearance of impartiality, held demonstrators responsible for the
conduct of their audiences, and in regulatory form permitted reasonable
prior restraints.
231. Within two days of Asquith's taking office, the press began to discuss the issue
of the Trafalgar Square notice and the Metropolitan Radical Federation pressured him
to act. At a meeting at the Home Office in October 1892, a deputation of the Federation
accepted his compromise, a modification of Stuart's proposed regulations of 1889. See
MACE, supra note 161, at 198.
232. See 18 PA~R. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 884 (Nov. 14, 1893); RICHTER, supra note
59, at 160; E.R.H. Ivamy, The Right of Public Meeting, 2 CuRRENT LEGAL PROB. 183,
190-91 (1949). Of course, the restrictions evaporated on certain occasions, as when
large crowds filled the Square to celebrate Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee or the
relief of Mafeking in 1900. See MACE, supra note 161, at 204.
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Second, the political applications of the law in this period shaped the
legal doctrine, sharpening and crystallizing the distinction between
stationary meetings and moving processions. The contemporaneous
challenges to governmental authority posed by the Salvationists and the
socialists solidified the inchoate distinction that had existed prior to the
1880s but remained unrefined by the courts and untested by political and
social conflict. Although the two movements had much in com-
mon--creating public disturbances, seeking working-class recruits, and'
defying governmental authority--the differences between them were
critical for the evolution of legal theory. The Salvation Army proces-
sions, affecting primarily local authorities in peripheral areas, were a
distressing but ultimately insubstantial threat to general public order.
Indeed, the Salvationists commanded considerable sympathy from the
public, the courts, and the central government for the abuse inflicted on
them by the Skeletons and provincial officials. In contrast, the meetings
of the unemployed in the heart of London were part of a radical political
campaign that, while perhaps not perceived as revolutionary, nonetheless
generated pervasive and acute public alarm. Differing social threats,
differing public pressures, and differing governmental responses
accentuated and entrenched the conceptual bifurcation in legal doctrine.
The distinction between meetings and processions invalidated the major
organizational tool of the socialists at the acceptable cost of legitimating
the primary tactic of the Army.
Formal constraints inherent in the concept of passage--the fact that
processions, unlike meetings, moved along the street-doubtless played
a role in this development. They cannot, however, provide a full
explanation, because the "right to passage" was neither logically nor
factually determinate. Arguably the religious processions of the
Salvation Army, conducted for purposes of publicity and recruitment,
constituted "legitimate travel" no more than had the actions of Harrison
and Maisey in passing along the road to accomplish their own ulterior
objectives. Further, the courts could easily have differentiated concerted
from individual passage, treating the former as an unreasonable use of
the road. A New Zealand judge in 1886 indeed offered such an analysis,
observing in McGill v. Garbut2 33 that passing in procession through
the streets was entirely different from the "individual right of passage of
233. [1886] 5 N.Z.L.R. 73.
the same persons as private citizens without preconcerted arrangement
and mutual understanding."234 In his view, a compact body moving
along a thoroughfare, especially if "attended by the rabble which is
frequently attracted," had an obvious tendency to obstruct traffic and
become a nuisance.235 The English courts, however, rejected this
approach, forging a doctrine that conformed to prevailing social policy
judgments and enabled the Salvation Army to march.
The favorable treatment of processions served the additional purpose
of preserving the lawfulness of such customary and "respectable" civic
processions as the Lord Mayor's parade, military pageants, the judges'
processions, and other community spectacles. These traditional marches,
predating the nineteenth-century phenomenon of public meetings, might
have become ensnared in obstruction law if Salvation Army processions
were treated as unlawful. Richard Carlile, after all, had argued plausibly
as early as 1834 that civic processions were as obstructive of the
highway as political demonstrations.236
Equally important, recognition of the doctrinal distinction between the
two types of assembly enhanced the credibility of the government in its
effort to suppress socialist meetings. The fact that even disruptive and
"preposterous" processions remained lawful demonstrated the objectivity
and fairness of the legal regime. Validating the Salvationist marches
confirmed that formal legal rules, not practical politics, dictated the
government's prohibition of radical meetings. The legitimacy that the
distinction conferred on the harsh treatment of meetings was especially
useful when, as at Trafalgar Square, the government strained and twisted
the law to accomplish patently political objectives.
Indeed, at every possible opportunity the government justified its
actions against the socialists by reliance on "the law" and its fundamen-
tal and "objective" premise that meetings were unlawful. In 1888 the
Attorney General informed the House of Commons that there was "not
from beginning to end of the books, one single dictum or judgment
justifying or supporting the proposition" that there was a right of public
meeting in a thoroughfare set aside for passage.237 Conversely, the
234. Id. at 75.
235. Id. at 75-76.
236. See R. v. Carlile, 6 C. & P. 636, 644-45, 172 Eng. Rep. 1397, 1401-02 (Cent.
Crim. Ct. 1834). In 1889, in connection with a Salvation Army procession in the Strand,
an M.P. pointedly asked Matthews whether the law relating to Salvation Army
processions also applied to military processions and the Lord Mayor's show. Matthews
simply evaded the question. 337 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 1011 (June 28, 1889).
237. 323 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 47 (Mar. 2, 1888). Commenting on Dicey's
statement that people may assemble "for a lawful purpose and in a lawful manner," he
asked: "Does any lawyer in this House pretend that a lawful purpose is to go into a
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government readily acknowledged the legitimacy of processions,
recognizing that public opinion supported the distinction. When the
Police Commissioner considered banning a friendly societies' march in
1890, Matthews objected that "[t]hese men are the pick of the working
classes":
Processions are not necessarily illegal.... I am quite aware how troublesome
to the police these demonstrations are, but it will not do to go beyond the law
in dealing with them. In the case of Trafalgar Square the law was strained to
the utmost; but public safety and public opinion supported the action of the
Police. That would not be so in this instance.238
Thus, although the dichotomy between meetings and processions
accorded with formal notions of "passage," the historical contingencies
of divergent political pressures and changing social values, not logic or
language, ultimately determined its contours. Allowing the Salvation
Army to march was a reasonable price to pay to protect customary civic
processions and legitimize the suppression of socialist meetings.
In permitting the Salvation Army to march, the resolution of the 1880s
enabled all other demonstrators to march as well. Traditionally a means
of protecting the convenience of the public in moving along the
street-and as such invoked by the government in its prosecutions of
stationary meetings-after the 1880s the "right to passage" could also be
asserted by political and religious marchers as a right to use the
highways for purposes essentially unrelated to ordinary travel. The
legitimacy of Salvation Army processions, settling into the law, came to
have broad application as all types of marchers equally claimed a "right
to passage." In the case of marchers, therefore, "reasonableness" was
defined to include obstructing the road and causing considerable
annoyance to passers-by. Society and the courts, in balancing the
passage rights of the larger community against those of participants in
processions, had determined that the marchers' rights could supersede
the right to convenience of the travelling public.
highway and make a speech? Why, it has been decided over and over again by the
Courts of this country that a man may not go into a public place and make a speech so
as to attract a crowd. It has been decided that a man may not put pictures in his window
so as to attract a crowd. It has been decided that a man may not even preach on his
private property if people gathered in the street to listen to him. It is an indictable
offence so to obstruct a public place." Id. at 48.
238. RICHTER, supra note 59, at 159.
The doctrinal framework constructed in the 1880s solidly and
irrevocably embedded the distinction between meetings and processions
in the law. Lowdens v. Keaveney,239 an Irish case decided in the early
twentieth century, was the first High Court decision to address obstruc-
tion law in the specific context of political processions, and it formalized
the resolution of the 1880s. Whereas Beatty had dealt only with
processions, and Cunninghame Graham and Lewis only with meetings,
Lowdens directly compared the two forms of assembly and affirmed the
prima facie legitimacy of the former in contrast to the inherent
unlawfulness of the latter.
Early on a rainy Easter morning in 1901, a band playing sectarian
tunes and accompanied by a few hundred persons marched down a
Belfast Street. The magistrates convicted the drummer and eighteen
others of wilfully interrupting the free passage of persons and car-
riages.24 Characterizing the case as one of "very considerable impor-
tance,""24 the High Court reversed the conviction because the magis-
trates had failed to respect the "marked distinction" between a stationary
assembly and a moving crowd.242 Unlike meetings, the court ex-
plained, processions used the streets for passage and were therefore
prima facie legitimate. The funeral of an illustrious soldier or statesman,
a Lord Mayor's show, or the judges' procession to St. Paul's might all
occasion "substantial obstruction to free passage," but they were not
wrongful if they did not "unreasonably encroach on the rights of
others."243
The court's application of a reasonableness standard was traditional,
but the opinion was unusual in developing it at some length and imbuing
it with greater flexibility. In the view of the court, "reasonableness" was
a common-sense notion based on ordinary experience, one that
considered such circumstances as the "occasion, duration of the uses,
place and hour" as well as whether the obstruction was "trivial, casual,
temporary and without wrongful intent."2' It inevitably involved
239. [1903] 2 Ir. R. 82 (K.B.).
240. Id. at 82. They were convicted of violating the Summary Jurisdiction Act
(Ireland), 1851, 14 & 15 Vict., ch. 92, § 13, a statute imposing criminal penalties on a
person who wilfully prevented or interrupted the free passage of any person or carriage
in the street. Id. at 86.
241. [1903] 2 It. R. at 85.
242. Id. at 89, 92.
243. Id. at 89-90. The magistrates had erred, the judge declared, in basing theirjudgment on the mere fact of an obstruction without considering whether the use of the
street by a moving body was unreasonable. Id. at 88. The magistrates also had not
considered whether the statutory requirement of "wilfulness" was satisfied, and it was
unlikely that "excessive uses of a right" could be a guilty obstruction. Id. at 94.
244. Id. at 90-91.
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some degree of balancing: "There must be give and take. In estimating
a nuisance some regard must be had to the incidents of everyday
life."245  Lowdens was a specific articulation in the public order
context of a comprehensive factual approach that judges would later
increasingly adopt in applying obstruction law to street activity. More
important, the case treated processions, even those of a political
character, as mere "incidents of everyday life." The opinion made clear
that marches were reasonable despite the fact that they were substantial
obstructions that encroached significantly on the right to travel of the
general public.
Despite the court's endorsement of the prima facie lawfulness of
processions and a flexible approach to "reasonableness," it did not
decide whether the procession at issue was in fact reasonable. The
positing of funerals, pageants, and judges' processions as examples of
reasonable processions, 46 however, indicated that the presumptive
lawfulness of marches would serve to protect traditional processions
from the force of obstruction law. An ad hoe, factually oriented
"reasonableness" standard would permit magistrates to validate social
policy judgments in favor of customary marches while leaving objection-
able processions open to obstruction charges.247 The court found
245. Id. at 90. This flexible approach was also evident in a 1913 Scottish case,
M'ara v. Magistrates, [1913] Sess. Cas. (J.) 1059, where the Lord President stated: "The
whole thing is a question of degree and nothing else, and it is a question of degree
which the Magistrates are the proper persons to consider in each case.. . ." Id. at 1073.
As in Lowdens, this broad approach nonetheless precluded legitimacy for street meetings.
The judge continued: "I wish most distinctly to state it as my opinion that the primary
and overruling object for which streets exist is passage. The streets are public, but they
are public for passage, and there is no such thing as a right in the public to hold
meetings as such in the streets." Id.
246. As an example of an unreasonable procession, Mr. Justice Gibson mentioned
R. v. Long, 59 L.T.R. (n.s.) 33 (Q.B. 1888), where several young men had walked arm-
in-arm up and down the sidewalk and driven others off the path. He remarked that
neither individuals nor processions could escape responsibility for such conduct "on the
pretext that they kept in motion." Lowdens, [1903] 2 I. R. at 90.
247. The court's affirmation of the right to march in this case also corresponded to
parliamentary intent. In 1850 Parliament enacted the Party Processions Act to dampen
religious strife in Ireland by prohibiting processions of both Protestant and Catholic
groups. An Orange leader, Johnston of Ballykilbeg, was imprisoned for violating the
Act in 1868 and soon thereafter was elected to a Belfast seat in Parliament. He moved
to repeal the Act and accomplished this in 1872 with bipartisan support from Catholic
and Protestant M.P.s. E.R. NORMAN, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND IRELAND IN THE
AGE OF REBELLION 346, 407-08 (1965). The court in Lowdens was concerned that the
obstruction charges at issue might have been a device to circumvent the repeal of the
stationary assemblies, in contrast, to be unreasonable per se. It
construed Carlile as a "meetings" case and considered the decision an
inapposite precedent, standing only for the proposition that it was
unreasonable to collect a stationary crowd in the street.24 The limita-
tion of Carlile to meetings demonstrated that its tentative distinction
between stationary and moving crowds had now reached maturity.
D. Congruence of Policy and Doctrine: The Suffragette Campaign
Events soon confirmed the political utility of the doctrinal resolution
permitting processions but invalidating meetings. In the years preceding
the First World War, the second critical period in the political history of
obstruction law, the refined doctrine assisted the government in meeting
a new and exceedingly intractable challenge to its authority.
The decade prior to World War I was a period of sustained civil
unrest,2 49 and the suffragette campaign for the franchise contributed
considerably to the turmoil. Evoking the Salvationists with their
abrasive marches and the socialists with their homeless encampments,
the suffragettes similarly aroused antipathy by their single-minded
dedication and calculated use of provocative tactics.2"' They focused
their efforts on embarrassing the Liberal government that had severely
disappointed their expectations for franchise reform, and they embraced
such controversial strategies as heckling speakers at Liberal meetings,
vandalizing government property, and engaging in hunger strikes.25'
ban on processions. Lowdens, [1903] 2 Ir. R. at 89. It thus effectuated a parliamentary
enactment permitting processions in the face of an apparent attempt by local Irish
magistrates to circumvent its provisions through obstruction law.
248. Lowdens, [1903] 2 Ir. R. at 89. In dictum, the court suggested that some
stationary commercial activity was permissible, such as stopping to take up or discharge
persons or goods, provided it was done reasonably. Id.
249. The turmoil involved Irish militancy and industrial action as well as the
suffragette campaign. See T.A. CRITCHLEY, A HISTORY OF POLICE IN ENGLAND AND
WALES 179 (rev. ed. 1978). See generally GEORGE DANGERFIELD, THE STRANGE
DEATH OF LIBERAL ENGLAND (1935).
250. STEPHEN Koss, ASQUITH 131 (1976). In the public mind the various
movements were intertwined. Lord Russell remarked to the House of Lords in 1908 that
the ladies "hold a certain view and they hold it as definitely as people connected with
the Salvation Army hold their views .... ." 193 PARL. DEB., H.L. (4th ser.) 1430 (July
29, 1908).
251. See LES GARNER, A BRAvE AND BEAUTIFUL SPIRIT: DORA MARSDEN, 1882-
1960, at 30 (1990); ANDREW ROSEN, RISE UP, WOMEN! THE MILITANT CAMPAION OF
THE WOMEN'S SOCIAL AND POLrICAL UNION, 1903-1914, at 118-32 (1974);
CONSTANCE ROVER, WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE AND PARTY POLITICS IN BRITAIN, 1886-1914,
at 82-83 (1967). The women also engaged in the more protected tactic of street
processions. On the occasion of a march in February 1907, for example, a newspaper
commented that "women as well as men have a perfect right to march in orderly
procession through the streets." LISA TICKNER, THE SPECTACLE OF WOMEN: IMAGERY
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They also held street meetings and picketed public offices, thereby
creating a new opportunity for the application of obstruction law.
Writing from Holloway Prison in 1906, the suffragette Teresa
Billington recounted the first militant incident of the suffragette
movement. The previous year in Manchester two leading members of
the Women's Social and Political Union (WSPU), Christabel Pankhurst
and Annie Kenney, had been ejected from a Liberal meeting at the Free
Trade Hall for heckling Sir Edward Grey, who was speaking in support
of Winston Churchill's Liberal candidacy for a parliamentary seat.252
When the women proceeded to organize their own meeting outside the
hall, the police arrested them on what Billington termed the "technical
charge" of obstruction.253 Refusing to be fined, the women were
sentenced respectively to three and seven days' imprisonment.2 4
Numerous arrests and prosecutions for obstruction followed in subse-
quent years.255
OF THE SUFFRAGE CAMPAIGN, 1907-1914, at 78 (1987).
252. Kenney and Pankhurst attempted to ask Grey a question relating to women's
suffrage. When he refused to answer, they stood up and cried "Votes for Women," and
were thereupon ejected. RAYMOND POSTGATE, THE LIFE OF GEORGE LANSBURY 121
(1951).
253. TERESA BILLINGTON-GREIG, THE NON-VIOLENT MILITANT: SELECTED
WRITINGS 111 (Carol McPhee & Ann FitzGerald eds., 1987).
254. MARION RAMELSON, THE PETICOAT REBELLION: A CENTURY OF STRUGGLE
FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS 133 (1967). The suffragettes welcomed imprisonment to
publicize their cause, following the example of the Salvationists in rejecting lighter
options such as paying a fine or entering into a recognizance for good behavior. Their
consistent refusal to cooperate eventually forced the authorities to institute formal
prosecutions rather than relying on binding-over powers. See 160 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th
ser.) 331 (July 6, 1906); 193 PARL. DEB., H.L. (4th ser.) 1429-30 (July 29, 1908);
WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 98. In 1913 George Lansbury was bound over after giving
a speech in Bow to supporters of the WSPU. He unsuccessfully challenged the order
on the ground that "[w]e have the right to use the streets, the people have the right to
jeer in the streets, and there is no reason why the authorities down here should attempt
to use their power to coerce us into submission." Lansbury v. Riley, 109 L.T.R. 546,
547 (K.B. 1913).
255. Billington claimed that 173 women willingly suffered imprisonment for
"technical" breaches of the law in 1905-06. BILLINGTON-GREIG, supra note 253, at 111.
For example, in June 1906 the police again arrested Billington and other women for
obstruction in Manchester, 159 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 648 (June 25, 1906), and in
1908 two suffragettes were charged with obstruction of the highway for distributing
leaflets in Regent Street. On the latter occasion a member of Parliament objected that
the police court evidence had substantiated neither the presence of a crowd nor
obstruction of traffic; the offense in fact was "perfectly trivial." 195 PARL. DEB., H.C.
(4th ser.) 1207-08 (Nov. 4, 1908); see id. at 1194; 165 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 969
The novelty of the suffragette agitation in the history of obstruction
law lay in the women's adoption of a particular form of stationary street
protest. A major tactic of the WSPU was to picket the House of
Commons and other government buildings in an effort to deliver
suffrage petitions to the Prime Minister2 6 After 1906 that office was
occupied by none other than H.H. Asquith, who at this point in his
career was neither the defender of religious and political radicals nor an
astute compromiser but rather an ardent opponent of the demonstrators.
Inveterately hostile to women's suffrage, he avoided the delegations and
forced them to spend hours and even days awaiting him on the
pavements outside Parliament or Whitehall.257 During their extended
stationary vigils, the women carried banners, distributed leaflets, and
sought the support of passers-by. The government and the courts treated
the picketing-even if conducted by only one or two persons-as
functionally equivalent to a street meeting.258
Their chosen tactic of picketing the entrances to Parliament and other
government buildings rendered the women especially vulnerable to
obstruction charges under a Sessional Order enacted annually by the
House of Commons. Issued pursuant to the Metropolitan Police Act, the
Order directed the police to prevent obstruction in the highways near
Parliament in order to facilitate the passage of members to and from the
House. Its legality derived from section 52 of the Act, the same section
(Nov. 22, 1906); POSTGATE, supra note 252, at 121-22.
256. GARNER, supra note 251, at 30.
257. See Roy JENKINs, AsQuiTH 57 (1964); Koss, supra note 250, at 102, 131.
Asquith stated in his memoirs that the "resources of the law were severely taxed by the
fact that the outrage-mongers were for the most part women intoxicated by a genuine
fanaticism." He claimed that "the campaign developed into a species of vendetta of
personal violence," and that "[e]ven our children had to be vigilantly protected against
the menace of abduction." HERBERT HENRY AsQUITH, FIFTY YEARS OF BRITISH
PARLIAMENT 141 (1926).
258. The only reported prior use of obstruction against non-industrial picketing
occurred in M'Giveran v. Auld, 21 R. (J.) 69 (1894), where shopkeepers in Greenock,
Scotland had disagreed on whether to introduce a half holiday on Wednesdays. Id. at
70. A tailor and three others who supported the proposal obstructed the premises of
opponents by parading up and down with boards and placards. A magistrate sentenced
them to a fine of £1 or seven days' imprisonment for violating a local act by walking
back and forth "to the obstruction and annoyance of the residents and passengers in
Dalrymple Street." Id. (italics omitted). On appeal, Lord Young expressed his
displeasure at the lightness of the sentence. "[T]here was an obstruction of the street of
a serious character," he remarked, "wilfully and purposefully got up in a particular
locality for a most indefensible and illegal purpose, and for this, if it had been tried at
common law, and the accused convicted, I should have expected a sentence of a
lengthened imprisonment with hard labour." Id. at 73. Lord Traynor concurred,
remarking that "I do not think that his Lordship has overstated the very serious and
aggravated character of the offence...." Id. at 74.
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at issue in the Trafalgar Square demonstrations.5 9 The police fre-
quently utilized the Order to arrest members of suffragette deputations
on obstruction charges, especially in 1909 when the suffragettes
escalated their picketing efforts. In February, when a number of
suffragettes awaiting the Prime Minister were convicted of obstruction
of the highway, the government as usual claimed that the issue was
simply that the women had "caused the collection of a crowd" and that
"the approaches to the House had become obstructed."26  The follow-
ing month, a member of the Women's Freedom League was imprisoned
for demonstrating outside 10 Downing Street; according to the Home
Secretary, the evidence "clearly proved the charge of obstruction." 261
Two additional picketing episodes later that year led to unsuccessful
attempts by the suffragettes to challenge the Order's legality. Pankhurst
v. Jarvis26z concerned events on the evening of June 29, 1909, when
a "Women's Parliament" in Caxton Hall delegated eight members of the
WPSU to picket on the public footpath outside St. Stephen's entrance to
the House of Commons. The picketing attracted a crowd of fifty or
sixty spectators, but it did not prevent M.P.s or other persons having
business at Westminster from entering or leaving the Houses of
Parliament. Two members of the deputation, Emmeline Pankhurst and
Evelina Haverfield, were convicted under the Sessional Order for
obstructing access to Parliament and disobeying a police order to
disperse.263
259. Section 52 of the Metropolitan Police Act authorized the Police Commissioner
to "give directions to the constables for keeping order and for preventing any obstruction
of the thoroughfares in the immediate neighbourhood of her Majesty's palaces and the
public offices, the High Court of Parliament [and other locations] .... " 2 & 3 Vict.,
ch. 47, § 52. The Sessional Order of the House of Commons directed the Police
Commissioner to "take care that, during the Session of Parliament, the passages through
the streets leading to this House be kept free and open, and that no obstruction be
permitted to hinder the passage of Members to and from this House.... ." 7 PARL. DEB.,
H.C. (5th ser.) 393 (June 30, 1909). The Speaker of the House stated in 1909 that an
identical Sessional Order had been passed annually for nearly seventy years. 7 PARL.
DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 610 (July 1, 1909).
260. 2 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 508 (Mar. 11, 1909). Another M.P. observed
that in fact the only obstruction had been caused by the police cordon drawn up to deter
the demonstrators. Id.
261. 1 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1719 (Mar. 4, 1909).
262. 26 T.L.R. 118 (K.B. 1909).
263. The women were convicted of "wilful obstruction of the police in the
execution of their duty" under the Prevention of Crimes Amendment Act, 1885, 48 &
49 Vict., ch. 75, § 2. This was a broad summary offense committed by anyone
In their appeal to the Divisional Court the women presented two
arguments: first, that the "obstruction" was only caused by denial of
their right to petition the Prime Minister; and second, that police
implementation of the Order deprived them of their right to passage.
The court rejected both propositions. On the claim of a right to petition,
Lord Alverstone concluded that although the women had such a
right-and, in his view, Asquith would undoubtedly have received a
petition that was properly presented-they did not have a right to deliver
the petition by means of a personal deputation. In response to the
argument that the police had unlawfully used the Order to prevent the
women and others from passing along the highway,2" the court
observed that the House of Commons unquestionably had the authority
to issue a Sessional Order to prevent obstructions at the approaches to
Parliament. Although the judges might have reached a different result
had the police applied the Order in a manner that interfered with public
passage on the highway, fortunately that question did not arise: "They
need not consider what would have happened if a constable, under
colour of the above orders, had stopped these ladies [processing] in the
street." 65  The court thus characterized the women's conduct as a
violation of the public's right to passage rather than as an exercise of
any right of their own, and in contrast to Cunninghame Graham it took
pains to emphasize that the police had not unlawfully strained the
applicable provision of the Metropolitan Police Act.
A few weeks later, in Despard v. Wilcox,266 the Divisional Court
took the opportunity to reaffirm its holding in Pankhurst. On the
afternoon of August 18, 1909, members of the Women's Freedom
League picketed in groups of two, three, and four on the pavements
interfering with an act undertaken by a constable in accordance with a common law or
statutory "duty." In this case, the women admitted that they were on the highway, but
they argued that because of their rights to petition and pass, the police had no "duty" to
order them to disperse. The position of the government, upheld by the court, was that
the police had a duty to clear the streets of obstruction. The fact that the offense of
obstructing a constable in the execution of his duty was predicated on the anterior
offense of highway obstruction is obvious from the opinion but not from the formal
charge, suggesting that the use of obstruction was much wider than the formal record
indicates. The police frequently charged obstruction of a constable when a person
obstructed the highway and refused to move after a police request to do so. See, e.g.,
SHERR, supra note 18, at 125 n.1; THORNTON, supra note 4, at 93. The use of binding-
over powers could similarly conceal an underlying obstruction offense.
264. That this was in fact the women's argument is indicated clearly from the
court's comments in Despard v. Wilcox, 102 L.T.R. 103, 107 (Q.B. 1910).
265. Pankhurst, 26 T.L.R. at 121. In fact, the police escorted the deputation from
Caxton Hall to the House of Commons, indicating their reluctance to arrest the women
for obstruction while they were actually passing along the streets. Id. at 119.
266. 102 L.T.R. 103.
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outside 10 Downing Street. Their presence as usual attracted a number
of spectators to the streets, and by the following afternoon the police had
lost patience and arrested some of the suffragettes for violating the
Order.267 Despard reiterated the court's view that picketing constituted
an unlawful stationary assembly. Lord Alverstone, relying on Pankhurst,
again suggested that the police might have acted questionably if they had
employed the Order to prevent persons from passing along the highway,
but in this case they had used their powers only to prevent stationary
obstructions.268 The right of an individual to pass along the street
differed from conduct that would unquestionably lead to obstruction of
the thoroughfares. 269 According to Mr. Justice Bucknill, a reasonable
use of the highway that happened to draw an obstructive crowd was not
an offense, but in this case the magistrate had found that the women
were using the highway improperly and unreasonably.
27
On the doctrinal level, the suffragette opinions illustrated four
persistent and interrelated themes. First, following Lowdens, the two
cases contrasted meetings with processions, confirming that the
dichotomy had become a settled feature of the law. Whereas Lowdens
had found a procession to be prima facie lawful, Pankhurst and Despard
reaffirmed the unlawfulness of street meetings. Second, the cases
extended the definition of "meeting" to encompass stationary picketing
267. Id. at 104-05. Although the case directly concerned picketing only on these
two days, the picketing apparently had gone on for a much longer period. When at noon
on August 19 Asquith emerged from a cab at 10 Downing Street, one of the appellants,
Lily Boileu, said to him, "Mr. Asquith, we have been waiting here six weeks with this.
Will you take it?" The Prime Minister replied, "No; don't be silly; go away!,"
whereupon she unsuccessfully tried to throw the petition at him. Id. at 104. In July
1909 an M.P. asked Asquith if he was aware that over one hundred members of the
Women's Freedom League had during the past three weeks stood outside the House of
Commons for an aggregate of over three thousand hours to gain an interview. Asquith
replied that he did not think that any public interest would be served by receiving
another deputation. 8 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 846-47 (July 26, 1909). The
magistrate concluded that the picketing was unreasonable and that the police had a duty
to maintain a clear passage for M.P.s by arresting persons who defied a police order to
disperse. Despard, 102 L.T.R. at 106.
268. Despard, 102 L.T.R. at 107. Lord Alverstone noted that collecting a crowd
was the natural consequence of presenting the petition in person: "As we know from
experience of such conduct, crowds of idle people, and perhaps people who are occupied
too, are interested in this, and they assemble in considerable numbers and hope there will
be something in the nature of a disturbance, and they rather rejoice to see these
unfortunate ladies being taken off to prison." Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 108.
conducted by as few as two persons, indicating the malleability of
obstruction law to meet diverse threats to public order. Third, the
opinions reflected the continuing formal application of a "reasonable-
ness" test, although, as the cases demonstrated, it was in fact predeter-
mined that political meetings were an inherently unreasonable use of the
streets. Finally, passage again emerged as an important right whose
vindication was claimed by both sides in the dispute. The government
and the courts justified the prosecutions by the need to maintain the
streets free from obstruction, while the suffragettes asserted that the
authorities were undermining their own passage rights. Although the
women's argument was unsuccessful, the court took special care to
ascertain that the application of the Sessional Order did not
impermissibly violate the Metropolitan Police Act or interfere with their
"right of passage." Picketing simply did not qualify as a proper exercise
of that right.
The use of obstruction against the suffragettes demonstrated the
continuing serviceability and utility of highways law. Accused by
franchise proponents of harassing the women,271 the government again
marshalled the standard defenses that prosecutions were instituted only
to prevent obstructions and were in any event the responsibility of the
local police. The Home Office declared that it had issued only a
"general instruction" to the police to secure the passage of members;
beyond that, the "police had done their duty, and no doubt would
continue to do it."272  The government proclaimed itself loathe as a
policy matter to interfere with the discretionary powers of magistrates
and enforcement officials. "The procedure to be adopted is a matter for
the discretion of the police authorities," declared the Home Secretary,
"and I see no reason for any interference on my part."'273 Obstruction
271. Members of Parliament frequently complained that the police arrested the
suffragettes only for "technical" offenses. See, e.g., 160 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.)
331-32 (July 6, 1906) (charging that the women were suffering "from a vindictive
prosecution"); 1 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1405 (Mar. 3, 1909), 1721 (Mar. 5, 1909).
272. 169 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 272 (Feb. 13, 1907); see 195 PARL. DEB., H.C.
(4th ser.) 1207-08 (Nov. 4, 1908).
273. 195 PARL. DEB., H.C. (4th ser.) 1195 (Nov. 4, 1908); see 1 PArL. DEB., H.C.
(5th ser.) 1405 (Mar. 3, 1909); 7 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 394 (June 30, 1909). The
day that the defendants in Despard were arrested, a member sarcastically asked
Gladstone how it was "that an obstruction was caused something like 24 hours after the
picketing began?" According to the Home Secretary, it was "necessary for the police
on each occasion to decide according to the best of their judgment whether there is or
is not obstruction." 9 PARI.. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1530 (Aug. 19, 1909).
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again proved to be a flexible, reliable, and ostensibly impartial means of
governmental control over troublesome street activity.
274
In this period, moreover, the obstruction doctrine continued to coalesce
with political exigencies. Just as Lowdens served the function of
protecting "reasonable" processions, so the suffragette cases enabled the
government to control a new and politically combustible form of protest
activity in the capital. 275  The extension of "meeting" to encompass
picketing was not logically compelled, as it would have made equal
sense to distinguish individual from concerted activity, or acts truly
274. A certain degree of scholarly attention has focused on the pre-World War I
case of Burden v. Rigler, [1911] 1 K.B. 337, involving the Public Meeting Act 1908, 8
Edw. 7, ch. 66, § 1, which made it a crime to "act in a disorderly manner" at a "lawful
public meeting." The government had rushed the act into law in eleven days after
suffragettes heckled Lloyd George at a Liberal meeting in the Albert Hall in December
1908. E. SYLvIA PANKHURST, THE SuFFRAGETIE MOvEMENT. AN INTmATE AccoUNT
OF PERSONS AND IDEALS 298 (Kraus Reprint Co. 1971) (1931). Burden, chairman of
a local branch of the Tariff Reform League, organized a meeting on the highway that
Rigler disrupted. The justices dismissed the information on the ground that a meeting
on a highway could not be a "lawful" public meeting within the meaning of the Public
Meeting Act. Burden, [1911] 1 K.B. at 339. The Divisional Court concluded that the
magistrates' ruling had gone too far in concluding that meetings in the street were not
"necessarily unlawful." Id. at 339-40. It is a stretch, however, to interpret the one-
paragraph opinion as conferring a right to hold a meeting on the highway. According
to Lord Alverstone, although a meeting on a highway was not necessarily unlawful, it
would be so if there were an obstruction, and on that factual matter "he did not express
an opinion." Id. at 340. Moreover, the judge was apparently eager to implement a
particular statute previously applied only to indoor meetings, which would have been
impossible without a finding that a meeting was lawful at least for purposes of the
Public Meeting Act. According to Lord Alverstone, the justices had no right to assume
that simply because the meeting was on a highway, it could be interrupted notwithstand-
ing the Public Meeting Act. Id. at 340; see A.L. Goodhart, Public Meetings and
Processions, 6 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 161, 167 (1937). At most, the decision held that the
lawfulness of a meeting was a factual question of obstruction, and this was already the
formal law. In any event, the Public Meeting Act was soon a dead letter. See
PANKHURST, supra, at 298; Note, Public Order and the Right of Assembly in England
and the United States: A Comparative Study, 47 YALE L.J. 404, 419 (1938).
275. Governmental anxiety about suffragette picketing activity reached the point
where officials feared an assassination of the Prime Minister. In September 1909 the
Home Secretary received a police report that for the past six weeks, two members of the
Women's Freedom League had been practicing pistol shooting at a shooting range in
London's Tottenham Court Road. The Police Commissioner wrote that "there is now
definite ground for fearing the possibility of the P.M.'s being fired at by one of the
pickets at the entrance to the House." ROSEN, supra note 251, at 126; see JENKINS,
supra note 257, at 246. The Home Secretary worried that Asquith might be the first
Prime Minister to be assassinated since Percival in 1812. See GARNER, supra note 251,
at 30.
incidental to passage from acts using passage to accomplish ulterior
objectives, than to place all stationary conduct in one category and all
moving activity in another. However, treating picketing as a form of
"meeting" allowed the doctrine to expand in a plausible if not ineluctable
way to serve governmental interests. To this point the doctrinal
distinction between meetings and processions was congruent
with-indeed, had been significantly determined by--the government's
political requirements. This congruence would unravel in the coming
decades.
IV. DISSONANCE AND REORIENTATION: THE RIGHT OF PASSAGE
FROM THE 1930S TO THE PRESENT
Throughout the twentieth century, obstruction law continued to afford
the police an effective mechanism for regulating public order during
periods of civil strife, especially in three particularly tumultuous
decades-the 1930s, 1960s, and 1980s--when it was employed primarily
against groups on the political left. The earlier features of obstruction
doctrine persisted: unfettered discretionary enforcement by local
authorities; use of obstruction charges to mask selective prosecution of
targeted groups; judicial deference to ad hoe factual determinations by
police and magistrates; application of a reasonableness analysis to
determine the legitimacy of street activity; solicitude for adjacent private
property owners; and the assumption that obstructive crowds would
inevitably produce disorder and crime. However, changing political,
social, and economic circumstances-world wars, depression, increasing
governmental centralization, and mounting domestic violence-produced
subtle yet significant alterations in these characteristics.
In particular, three developments occurred in the later twentieth
century that profoundly affected the theory and practice of highways
law. First, public apprehension of domestic disorder dramatically
intensified as political action took increasingly militant forms and, with
the advent of mass communications, became widely publicized. Second,
the predicate underlying the doctrinal resolution of the 1880s, that
processions were more benign than meetings, was undermined in the
1930s when tumultuous marches and countermarches emerged as the
primary threat to public order. Legal theory grew discordant with
political reality, and the government and the courts struggled to redress
the imbalance between the two types of assembly without repudiating the
established doctrinal framework. Third, there was growing acceptance
of the need for preventive and centralized controls. In consequence,
judges augmented the preventive common law powers of the police, and
Parliament for the first time nationalized the regulation of public
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assemblies. Culminating in the 1980s, these and other developments
produced major functional if not formal alterations in the obstruction
regime.
A. Communism and Fascism in the 1930s
The 1930s, the third critical period in obstruction law, was a decade
of relentless economic distress and mounting political violence. The
pattern of harsh treatment of meetings continued to conform to
governmental objectives, and the authorities widely employed obstruction
law to suppress gatherings by the left. However, in a period when
processions, not meetings, became the dominant cause of domestic
turmoil, solicitude for marches wilted and their privileged status
appeared increasingly anachronistic. Politicians and judges struggled to
counteract the presumptions that the resolution of the 1880s had
embedded in legal doctrine, and they did so by supplementing highways
law with new statutory and common law weapons of public order.
Severe depression and sweeping unemployment spawned two rival
ideological movements that threatened public peace in the 1930s. The
Communist-dominated National Unemployed Workers' Movement
(NUWM) 276 organized by skilled engineers to secure unemployment
relief, orchestrated meetings outside labor exchanges and national
"hunger marches. 277  Its efforts provoked militant opposition from
276. The NUWM, formed by Wal Hannington in 1921, attempted to obtain either
work or "full maintenance" for the unemployed. Its strength lay in the engineering
centers of Glasgow, Coventry, Birmingham, and southeast Lancashire. Although closely
associated with the Communist Party, it was not a revolutionary organization; the actions
of the local branches primarily consisted of sending deputations to government agencies
and representing the unemployed before public assistance committees. Owing to its
Communist affiliations, however, the NUWM was never officially supported either by
the Labour Party or the Trades Union Congress, although after 1933 there was greater
cooperation between the unemployed movement and Labour rank and file to form a
united front against fascism. See, e.g, PETER KINGSFORD, THE HUNGER MARCHERS IN
BRITAIN 167-68 (1982); JANE MORGAN, CONFLCT AND ORDER: THE POLICE AND
LABOUR DISPUTES IN ENGLAND AND WALES 237 (1987); Ralph Haybum, The Police
and the Hunger Marchers, 17 INT'L REV. SOc. HIST. 625, 625-30 (1972).
277. The first national hunger march took place in 1922, and additional marches
occurred in 1929, 1930, 1932, 1934, and 1936. Most involved about a thousand selected
marchers starting off from various cities and reaching London a few weeks later for
several days of demonstrations and rallies. See, e.g., MORGAN, supra note 276, at 230;
Haybum, supra note 276, at 627. See generally WAL HANNINGTON, TEN LEAN YEARS
(1940).
Fascist groups, most notably Sir Oswald Mosley's British Political
Union, and clashes between the two movements erupted with growing
frequency. Violence was especially endemic in the East End of London,
where Fascists assaulted Jews, demonstrators of al stripes barricaded the
streets, and marches and countermarches fueled widespread public
panic."' The heightened disorder induced the police to abandon their
usual forbearance of public assemblies and to resurrect nuisance law as
a device of political control.
1. The Street Meetings of the NUWM: Use and
Abuse of Obstruction Law
The government was highly antagonistic toward the NUWM because
of its radical ideology and Communist affiliations 27 9 and it gave
increasingly centralized direction to local police forces as part of a
coordinated national policy of repression. The police-who for their
own reasons were largely hostile to the unemployed and relatively
sympathetic to the Fasc 2S-8 -used obstruction law to suppress
NUWM meetings outside labor exchanges, the organization's most fertile
source of recruitment.2' The Highways Act 1835, which conferred a
power of arrest without warrant, was an especially effective tool fordispersing such meetings.2 3 Referring to the statute's use for this
278. See, e.g., DAVID WADDINGTON, CONTEMPORARY IsSUEs IN PUBLIC DISORDER:
A COMPARATiVE AND HISTORICAL APPROACH 32-33 (1992); Note, supra note 274, at
405.
279. The Tory government in the 1920s, the Labour government from 1929 to 1931,
and the National Government after 1931 all sanctioned police severity toward the
unemployed, although the government was somewhat more restrained after the rise of
Hitler in 1933. See, e.g., KINGSFORD, supra note 276, at 167-68; MORGAN, supra note
276, at 232; WADDINGTON, supra note 278, at 31; Haybum, supra note 276, at 630;
Barbara Weinberger, Police Perceptions of Labour in the Inter-War Period: The Case
of the Unemployed and of Miners on Strike, in LABOUR, LAW AND CRIME: AN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIE 150, 156-63 (Francis Snyder & Douglas Hay eds., 1987).
280. See, e.g., TONY BUNYAN, THE HISTORY AND PRACTICE OF THE POLITICAL
POLICE IN BRITAIN 72-73 (1986); EMSLEY, supra note 65, at 128-30; MORGAN, supra
note 276, at 232, 239-40.
281. Although historians disagree about the precise reasons for police antipathy to
the NUWM, these undoubtedly included the disciplined nature and relative cooperative-
ness of the Fascists, the hostility of the police to communism, and the failure of
organized labor to support the unemployed movement. See, e.g, ROBERT REINER, THE
POLITICS OF THE POLICE 66 (2d ed. 1992); Haybum, supra note 276, at 627; Weinberger,
supra note 279, at 162.
282. See KINGSFORD, supra note 276, at 181; MORGAN, supra note 276, at 245.
283. On the use of obstruction against meetings of the unemployed, see 269 PARL.
DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 277 (Oct. 19, 1932); 314 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1553 (July
10, 1936); KINGSFORD, supra note 276, at 156; MORGAN, supra note 276, at 250;
WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 208 (describing how protestors outside a conference on
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specific objective, a contemporary observed that "[t]his venerable
Statute, passed for uite another purpose, is to-day frequently used as a
political weapon." 2  Left-wing members of Parliament echoed this
sentiment. As one M.P. complained, the police could almost always
prevent a meeting on a highway by saying that it "constitute[s] an
obstruction, if it be only a technical one, and in nearly every case they
will be upheld.' 28 5 The government as usual responded by pointing
to the exigencies of traffic control,286 the neutrality of obstruction law,
and the importance of allowing the police to exercise their independent
discretion in individual cases.2
leisure at the Savoy Hotel, shouting "hungry leisure is no pleasure," brought traffic to
a standstill); Hayburn, supra note 276, at 629; D.G. Hitchner, Freedom of Public
Meeting in England Since 1914, 36 AM. POL. SC. REV. 516, 519 (1942). In addition
to bringing formal charges, the police dispersed meetings by threatening to prosecute for
obstruction. In June 1938 the Home Secretary informed the House of Commons that in
the previous year there had been 29,315 summonses in London for various offenses of
obstructing the highway, with an additional 4141 cases dealt with by written caution and
222,518 cases by verbal warning or advice. 337 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 2105 (June
30, 1938). Although it is impossible to determine how many of these related to public
order offenses, they undoubtedly included some attempts by the police to disperse or
prosecute political meetings.
284. Barrister, The Police and Their Powers, 12 NEW STATESMAN AND NATION 80,
81 (1936). The author further noted that the doctrine of potential obstruction enhanced
the utility of highways law because it allowed prosecution merely "for causing an
obstruction which might prevent the passage of somebody if they were present and
wished to pass over that particular part of the thoroughfare." Id. at 80.
285. 314 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1596 (July 10, 1936). For contemporary
accusations of discrimination against the unemployed and in favor of the Fascists, see
290 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1975-76, 1991, 1994 (June 14, 1934); 310 PARL. DEB.,
H.C. (5th ser.) 2424 (Apr. 6, 1936); 314 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1547, 1563, 1566,
1596 (July 10, 1936); 318 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1724 (Dec. 7, 1936); Barrister,
supra note 284, at 81 (charging that the Home Secretary failed to use the Highways Act
against Fascists when they caused disorder at outdoor meetings but prevented freedom
of assembly for leftist groups by enforcing the laws against obstruction); E.C.S. Wade,
The Law of Public Meeting, 2 MOD. L. REv. 177, 187 (1938); Note, supra note 274, at
404.
286. Referring to police reliance on "traffic," a Labour M.P. proclaimed that
"[n]ever was there a more slipshod and more contemptible excuse," especially since
fashionable weddings in Westminster daily upset the traffic of London at its busiest
place. 269 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 273 (Oct. 19. 1932); see 273 PARL. DEB., H.C.
(5th ser.) 1272 (Dec. 22, 1932) (George Lansbury complaining that although weddings
and socialist crowds equally blocked the road and caused inconvenience, the police
treated the events entirely differently).
287. For example, when in April 1936 members of Parliament complained that the
police used obstruction to prevent socialists from selling newspapers at Mosley's meeting
at Albert Hall but did not prevent Fascists from selling leaflets at a socialist meeting, the
Reminiscent of the government's action against the unemployed in
Trafalgar Square, the police also resorted to a highly dubious use of the
Metropolitan Police Act. Seeking a permanent ban on meetings outside
labor exchanges, they again took recourse in the Act's generous
obstruction provisions. Doubtless recalling the outcry that had greeted
the Trafalgar Square ban, however, the police now acted with stealth.
In 1931 the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Lord Trenchard, issued
an order pursuant to the Act forbidding all meetings in the vicinity of
employment exchanges. 2"8  This was a permanent prohibition, not
limited to particular occasions when the streets were "likely to be
obstructed," and as such was probably not legally defensible. In
consequence, the authorities enforced it covertly. The Trenchard ban
was "so wrapped in obscurity and secrecy," charged a radical M.P., "that
it is almost as difficult to discover what it is, as it is to discover what are
the decrees of the Nazi Government." 29 Nonetheless, the Commis-
sioner retained it in place and employed it regularly until 1936.290
A significant prosecution involving a violation of the ban provided the
Divisional Court with the occasion to reaffirm the rigorous law on street
meetings." In 1934 various radical organizations--4he NUWM, the
newly formed National Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL),292 and the
Amalgamated Engineers' Union-organized a meeting outside a
Deptford unemployment center. Advertised as a rally to "[d]efend the
right of free speech and public meeting, '2 93 its apparent objective was
to challenge the Trenchard ban. Katherine Duncan, a member of the
NUWM, was about to speak to thirty people from a soapbox opposite
the center when a constable-claiming to fear a repetition of distur-
Home Secretary responded that "[a]ll these cases must be judged according to the
circumstances." 310 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 2425 (Apr. 6, 1936); see 269 PARL.
DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 278 (Oct. 19, 1932).
288. See 314 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1601 (July 10, 1936). In January 1932
the NUWM began disobeying the Trenchard ban, leading to serious clashes with the
police. Wal Hannington described how "[d]ay after day the London unemployed defied
the ban and faced baton charges by the police to uphold their right to free speech and
peaceful assembly outside the Labour Exchanges." WAL HANNiNGTON, NEVER ON OUR
KNEES 248 (1967) [hereinafter NEVER ON OUR KNEES]; see HANNINGTON, supra note
277, at 36; KINGSFORD, supra note 276, at 181.
289. 314 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1551 (July 10, 1936) (D.N. Pritt). He added
that Lord Trenchard "had no more right to do that than I had." Id.
290. See MORGAN, supra note 276, at 245, 266; WAL HANNINGTON, UNEMPLOYED
STRUGGLES 307 (1936).
291. Duncan v. Jones, [1936] 1 K.B. 218.
292. The National Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL) was founded in 1934 to
monitor police handling of the hunger marchers. NCCL, STONEHNGE 3 (1986);
Weinberger, supra note 279, at 158.
293. Duncan, [1936] 1 K.B. at 219.
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bances that had occurred at the same location fourteen months earli-
er--directed her to move the meeting 175 yards away. "I'm going to
hold it," Duncan defiantly responded, and the police arrested her.294
Revealingly, they avoided a test case on the legality of Trenchard's order
by charging her not with violating the ban but rather with obstructing a
constable in the execution of his duty by defying an order to dis-
perse.29
5
On such a charge, the legal issue was whether the constable had a
common law or statutory "duty" to prevent the meeting. In Duncan v.
Jones, 96 the Divisional Court circumvented the question whether such
a duty arose under the Metropolitan Police Act-indeed, the judges
obligingly avoided mentioning the Trenchard ban altogether-and
cooperatively created a new common law duty to justify the constable's
action. It ruled that an arrest was warranted whenever a constable
"reasonably apprehended" a breach of the peace, regardless of whether
such a breach had actually been provoked or committed.297
Although the issue of obstruction was not formally before it, the court
may have been encouraged in its novel step by the fact that the meeting
294. Id.
295. Duncan's attorney, D.N. Pritt, observed in Parliament that the government had
avoided a test case on the ban by charging her merely with obstructing a constable in
the execution of his duty. 314 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1552 (July 10, 1936). On
the charge of obstructing a constable, see supra note 263.
296. [1936] 1 K.B. 218.
297. Id. at 223. The NCCL, which sponsored Duncan's appeal, argued that the
constable had no "duty" because under Beatty the meeting was lawful and Duncan was
not responsible for a possible breach of the peace caused by others. As in the Trafalgar
Square cases, the defendants tried to extend the holding of Beatty to meetings, but the
Divisional Court dismissed Beatty as irrelevant. Lord Chief Justice Hewart noted that
Beatty involved prior disturbances by people antagonistic to the Army, and in any event
the case was "somewhat unsatisfactory" and its exact meaning unclear. Id. at 222. Mr.
Justice Humphreys observed that Duncan had nothing to do with unlawful assembly but
only with a charge of obstruction. Id. at 223. Nonetheless, Duncan was obviously
difficult to reconcile with Beatty and came to be perceived as casting doubt on the
earlier case. See, e.g., T.C. Daintith, Disobeying a Policeman: A Fresh Look at Duncan
v. Jones, 1966 PUB. L. 248 (arguing that Duncan substantially altered the prior law and
was inconsistent with Beatty); E.C.S. Wade, Police Powers and Public Meetings, 6
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 175, 178 (1938) ("it is now dangerous for public speakers to rely on
Beatty v. Gillbanks in the face of Duncan v. Jones .... "); J.A. Coutts, Note, 52 L.Q.
REv. 470,472 (1936) (claiming that Duncan radically departed from Beatty in expanding
obstruction of a constable to encompass situations where there was no proof of unlawful
assembly). Interestingly, Lord Hewart could easily have distinguished Beatty on the
ground that it was a "processions" case, but in light of the new hostility to processions,
he apparently preferred simply to undermine Beatty's legitimacy and relevance.
involved an obviously unlawful obstruction of the highway. According
to the case report, there was no obstruction save that "necessarily caused
by the box which was placed in the roadway and by the presence of the
people surrounding it., 298 Under prior case law, the presence of thirty
people at a meeting in the street unquestionably constituted an obstruc-
tion, and Lord Hewart's opinion suggested that a constable's duty
included preventing nuisances as well as breaches of the peace.29
Indeed, at Duncan's earlier unsuccessful appeal to Quarter Sessions, the
court had seemed particularly concerned with the fact that the case
involved a meeting that obstructed the street. "What is the object of this
appeal?" the Deputy Chairman had inquired. "Is it to establish a practice
of ladies standing on boxes in public streets and addressing meet-
ings? 300
As if to answer this question, the Divisional Court gratuitously used
Duncan to reaffirm that there was no right of public meeting on the
highway. Although the organizers had deliberately promoted the rally
as a defense of "the right of public meeting,"' the judges began their
opinions by denying the demonstrators' premise. This was not, Lord
Chief Justice Hewart declared, "a grave case involving what is called the
right of public meeting,"3° and Mr. Justice Humphreys agreed that it
was "a plain case" raising no question of the law of assembly.0 3
Referring to Dicey's Law of the Constitution, Lord Hewart stressed that
English law "does not recognize any special right of public meeting for
political or other purposes."3 4  The only question for the court, he
maintained, was whether the particular crime of obstructing a constable
had been committed.
Despite the judges' insistence that the case raised no constitutional
issues, their decision had important implications for the right of public
meeting and extended legal doctrine far beyond its existing parameters.
298. Duncan, [1936] 1 K.B. at 219.
299. Lord Hewart relied on the nuisance case of R. v. Prebble, 1 F. & F. 325, 175
Eng. Rep. 748 (N.P. 1858). See Duncan, [1936] 1 K.B. at 223. Duncan later came to
be extended to a constable's anticipation of obstruction of the highway as well as breach
of the peace. See infra note 343 and accompanying text.
300. SHERR, supra note 18, at 126. Indeed, a recent treatise on constitutional law
suggests that the single most important fact in Duncan was that the meeting caused an
obstruction of the highway, even though the police did not rely on evidence of it. E.C.S.
WADE & A.W. BRADLEY, CONSnTITIONAL AND ADMINSTRAVE LAW 555-56 (1 1th
ed. 1993) (attempting to limit the scope of Duncan to obstructive meetings on the
highway).
301. Duncan, [1936] 1 K.B. at 219.
302. Id. at 222.
303. Id. at 223.
304. Id. at 222.
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By allowing a constable to prevent any meeting that might potentially
cause a disturbance, Duncan essentially bestowed on the police a
common law power to restrain street meetings at will. °" Perhaps not
coincidentally, shortly after the decision was announced, the Commis-
sioner withdrew the Trenchard ban. While the police continued to rely
on obstruction law to curb the demonstrations of the NUWM, they now
possessed a new supplementary public order power enabling them to
impose prior restraints on street meetings.
2. Processions and Nationalized Controls:
The Public Order Act 1936
If the law on street meetings coalesced with the policy of quelling
rallies outside labor exchanges, the preferred status of processions hardly
comported with the need to resolve the greater menace posed by rival
marches conducted by militant, ideologically motivated groups. In
contrast to Salvation Army processions, where public opinion clearly
preferred the participants to their disreputable antagonists, both
Communist and Fascist marches aroused deep public outrage and alarm.
Their violence precipitated a new realism about processions and growing
sentiment for redressing the legal imbalance between the two types of
street assembly.
Although the formal law of obstruction, as exemplified in Lowdens,
restricted the mantle of protection to "reasonable" processions, by the
1930s the act of marching had in practice and public perception become
almost inviolate. There was a "general belief in an absolute right to
hold a procession," a constitutional scholar observed in 1937, even
305. The decision provoked much adverse contemporary commentary. "Since
Duncan v. Jones," warned a Cambridge professor in 1938, "the net has closed entirely
upon those who from lack of resources, or for other reasons, desire to hold meetings in
public places." He added that had the police "sought a general power of this nature
from the Legislature, no House of Commons in the twentieth century would have been
willing to grant it." Wade, supra note 297, at 179. The Yale Law Journal the same
year similarly observed that "Duncan v. Jones serves to make more impenetrable the
legal barrier closing the streets in England to those who wish to hold street meetings."
Note, supra note 274, at 411. The author also observed that magistrates exhibited a
"decided propensity to agree with the police." Id. at 412. See, e.g., Moffatt Hancock,
Public Meetings-Police Powers, 18 CAN. BAR REV. 646, 649 (1940); W. Ivor Jennings,
Public Order, 8 POL. Q. 7, 17-18 (1937); Wade, supra note 285, at 187; Coutts, supra
note 297, at 472.
though theoretically the right could "only be exercised reasonably."306
The tenacity of the formal legal distinction, the longstanding official
practice of favoring processions, and the widespread popular belief that
marches were lawful rendered traditional obstruction prosecutions
inadequate to cope with the new peril. 7 In addition, the authorities'
ultimate objective was to prevent processions entirely rather than merely
prosecute "unreasonable" marches after the fact."' As in the 1880s,
local officials again resorted to the nuisance and obstruction provisions
of local acts and bylaws to prohibit processions or control their
routes.3° Marches and countermarches placed increasing strain on the
national psyche, however, and momentum developed for a centralizing
statute that would supersede local regulation and put advance prohibi-
tions on an authoritative national basis.
A number of factors encouraged the campaign for new statutory
controls. Police chiefs and the Home Office, stretched to the limit by
the vexatious dual challenges presented by the unemployed and the
Fascists, lobbied vigorously for uniform national legislation.1 ° In
addition, the left, which ordinarily would have opposed legislation
inimical to civil liberties, viewed curbing Fascist aggression as an even
higher priority. Another factor was increased vehicular traffic in the
twentieth century, which exacerbated the disruptions that processions
caused in congested urban areas.3n Finally, the government cleverly
framed the new national statutory controls not as a revolutionary break
306. Goodhart, supra note 274, at 172 (1937). Goodhart was attempting to argue,
without success, that obstruction could be used to control the marches because they
would not meet the reasonableness requirement. See Wade, supra note 285, at 184.
307. The hunger marchers themselves were apparently not charged with obstruction,
and indeed many localities gave them police protection. This may have been partly due
to the fact that the police in one district were only too happy to pass the marchers along
to the next town. HANNINGTON, NEVER ON OUR KNEES, supra note 288, at 155; see
MORGAN, supra note 276, at 243. There were, however, isolated instances of the use
of obstruction against processions of the unemployed in urban areas. See, e.g., 318
PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1713 (Dec. 7, 1936); KINGSFORD, supra note 276, at 56;
HANNINGTON, supra note 290, at 87.
308. See MORGAN, supra note 276, at 254.
309. See, e.g., 317 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1211 (Nov. 12, 1936) (Sir John
Simon); HANNiNGTON, NEVER ON OUR KNEES, supra note 288, at 103, 115 (applying
Sessional Order of House of Commons); HANNiNGTON, supra note 290, at 310.
310. See MORGAN, supra note 276, at 262.
311. Trenchard, for example, apparently became increasingly concerned with the
general problem of street obstruction during his tenure as Police Commissioner.
ANDREW BOYLE, TRENCHARD 671 (1962). In 1932 Trenchard wrote to the Home
Secretary that to allow "all and sundry" to pass through central London was an
anachronism apart from the question of disorder, and he advocated prohibiting all
weekday processions in the central area. See MORGAN, supra note 276, at 254.
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with the past but simply as a codification of existing local regula-
tion.312
On November 9, 1936, the day after a national demonstration by
hunger marchers, the government introduced its Public Order Bill. It
was largely directed against quasi-military Fascist organizations, 13 but
section 3 specifically addressed the problem of processions and
authorized both limiting conditions and bans. Under subsection 3(1), a
chief of police could impose restrictions on a procession if he had
reasonable grounds for apprehending "serious public disorder."314 This
provision was relatively noncontroversial because it only generalized
powers that the police already exercised in many parts of the coun-
try.31' The general ban authorized by subsection 3(2), however, was
a greater departure. If a police chief was "of opinion" that imposing
conditions would be insufficient to prevent serious disorder, he could
apply to the local council for a ban on all public processions, or any
specified class of processions, in a particular area for a period of up to
three months. 16 The bill left meetings, however, free from prior
312. See 318 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th set.) 1728 (Dec. 7, 1936); 1 HOME AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE, FIFTH REPORT: THE LAW RELATING TO PUBLIC ORDER, 1979-80, H.C. 756-
I & II, 11 [hereinafter HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE REPORT].
313. The first two sections, for example, prohibited the wearing of political
uniforms and the formation of quasi-military organizations. Public Order Act, 1936, 1
Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, ch. 6, §§ 1, 2. The Public Order Act also extended to the whole
country the offense under the Metropolitan Police Act 1839 of using "threatening,
abusive, or insulting words or behaviour" whereby a breach of the peace may be
occasioned, 2 & 3 Vict., ch. 47, § 54(13); Public Order Act, 1936, § 5, and gave the
police additional powers to control indoor meetings, Public Order Act, 1936, § 6.
314. Some M.P.s were apparently concerned that "serious disorder" would
encompass even obstructions to traffic. Aneurin Bevin found relevant his own recent
experience: "If the original route laid down by Scotland Yard for our last demonstration
to Hyde Park had been followed, our East End contingent would have reached the Park
at half-past eight at night. They would have led us all round the most tortuous by-ways
of the City in order, they said, that we should not enter on the main roads because of
the traffic. I suspect that there was little involved in respect of traffic on a Sunday
afternoon, but unless we had resisted them most robustly they would have been able,
under existing powers, by raising the question of traffic, to have frustrated the
demonstration." 318 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1713 (Dec. 7, 1936).
315. Sir John Simon, the Home Secretary, described the provision in the House of
Commons as being largely "the present power to control the route that a procession
takes." 317 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1359 (Nov. 16, 1936); see 318 PARL. DEB.,
H.C. (5th ser.) 1728 (Dec. 7, 1936) (D.M. Foot conceding that section 3(1) essentially
put into statutory form the powers that the police already possessed).
316. The local council could approve or modify such an order with the consent of
the Home Secretary. In London the Metropolitan Police Commissioner could issue such
restraints. This exemption was because processions were the immediate
focus of public concern and meetings could in any event be easily
controlled through existing obstruction law and the new common law
powers established in Duncan. The point of section 3 was precisely to
reach activity that arguably constituted "passage," and it significantly
countered the favored position that processions enjoyed under obstruc-
tion doctrine.
Responding with expedition, Parliament enacted the bill within
weeks--the first major piece of public order legislation since the early
nineteenth century-and the police almost immediately took advantage
of their new powers. The Metropolitan Police Commissioner banned all
political marches in the East End for six weeks and renewed the
restriction at intervals thereafter. There was, in fact, an almost
continuous ban on processions in London from 1937 until after World
War ]1.317 As a result of the Act, paramilitary marches soon disap-
peared from English life.31
The 1930s thus witnessed restrictive developments in the law
governing street assemblies. Reacting to the magnitude of the turmoil,
the authorities introduced new public order devices that complemented
and augmented highways law in the case of meetings and counteracted
it in the case of processions. Duncan conferred on the police a broad
common law power to disperse meetings in advance, while the Public
Order Act granted them new statutory authority to regulate processions.
Both the courts and Parliament had revealed their willingness to
intervene forcefully when legal doctrine became discordant with political
reality.
B. The 1960s: Revitalizing the Resolution of the 1880s
The conceptual framework of the nineteenth century, wobbling and in
need of external support in the 1930s, again proved adequate to cope
an order with the Home Secretary's approval. Public Order Act, 1936, § 3(3). A ban
could not target a particular procession, as this would open the police to charges of
discrimination. Many critics objected to the banning power as conferring excessively
wide powers on the police. See, e.g., 318 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1728 (Dec. 7,
1936) (D.M. Foot describing section 3(2) powers as "entirely novel"); Jennings, supra
note 305, at 19 (1937) (the right to ban processions was "a dangerous innovation.
Neither the chief officer of police nor the local authority can be trusted with a power to
prohibit for weeks, months or even years on end, all or any political processions.");
WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 57; Note, supra note 274, at 428.
317. 1 HoME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 312, 13.
318. See id. ("In its immediate objective the Act was extremely successful.");
ROBERT BENEIVICK, T FASCIST MovEMENT IN BRITAIN 264 (Allen Lane ed., 1972)
(reporting that in the view of Sir John Simon, the Public Order Act "worked like a
charm").
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with new social challenges in the 1960s. In this fourth major period of
exceptional turbulence, public attention returned to meetings, which now
appeared in the provocative form of the "sit-down" demonstration. As
a result, the strict rules against meetings tightened even further, while
processions returned to their preferred status. The doctrinal resolution
of the 1880s, again coalescing with governmental interests, enjoyed a
further decade of stability before it would disappear, functionally if not
formally, in the late 1970s and 1980s.
In the 1960s the political climate changed markedly from the
preceding two decades of relative social quiescence. 19 "Direct action"
occurred in a variety of forms, including student "sit-ins," militant
industrial strikes, terrorism in Northern Ireland, confrontational
antinuclear protests, and strident mobilizations against the Vietnam
war. 2 To obtain media coverage, demonstrators adopted dramatic
and newsworthy tactics, often provoking brutality on the part of the
police. The Committee on Nuclear Disarmament (CND), a left-wing
peace organization founded in 1958, was singlehandedly responsible for
much disruptive street activity.321 As in the 1930s, political activity
on the left was matched by a resurgence of fascism on the right. The
early 1960s witnessed renewed activism in the form of Sir Oswald
Mosley's Union Movement, Colin Jordan's National Socialist Movement,
and John Bean's British National Party?' 2 Clashes at street meetings
between ideologically opposed groups again became prominent features
319. The period from the outbreak of World War II to the end of the 1950s was one
of relative tranquility, and meetings that constituted technical obstructions were generally
left undisturbed. Even in the 1950s, however, obstruction doctrine was used to curb the
expression of minority views. As an academic noted in 1954, "the obstruction cases
indicate ground for suspicion that the extent of the obstruction quite probably varies
inversely with the popularity of the doctrines expounded." Abernathy, supra note 63,
at 398; see NORTHEY, supra note 159, at 13.
320. See, e.g., JAMES HINTON, PROTESTS AND VISIONS: PEACE POLITICS IN
TwENTIETH-CENTURY BRrrAIN 165-70 (1989); WADDINGTON, supra note 278, at 33-37;
D.G.T. Williams, Offences Against the State, 1964-73, 1974 CRIM. L. REV. 634, 634-35
[hereinafter Williams, Offences]; D.G.T. Williams, Protest and Public Order, 1970
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 96, 97-99 [hereinafter Williams, Protest]. The decade also witnessed
football hooliganism, clashes between rival gangs, and a broad range of"countercultural"
activities. See Williams, Protest, supra, at 97-99; D.G.T. Williams, Freedom of
Assembly and Free Speech: Changes and Reforms in England, 1 U. NEW S. WALES L.
J. 97, 110 (1975) [hereinafter Williams, Freedom of Assembly].
321. See HINTON, supra note 320, at 153-70.
322. See D.G.T. Williams, The Police, Public Meetings and Public Order: 1962,
1963 CRlM. L. REV. 149, 150.
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of the English political landscape. In the face of this growing discord,
the government revived obstruction law as a means of regulating protest
activity and applied it particularly against the demonstrations of the left.
1. New Left Meetings: Strengthened Controls
The authorities primarily employed four forms of obstruction doctrine
against leftist political meetings, two statutory and two common law:
the Highways Act, the Metropolitan Police Act, Duncan powers, and
common law nuisance prosecutions. Whereas the statutory forms of
obstruction had been widely used since the late-nineteenth century, the
common law offenses were either new or reinvented in the 1960s.
The Highways Act, long a potent force against stationary assemblies,
was frequently invoked in this decade against left-wing demonstrators
such as "Hands Off Cuba" protestors, hawkers of socialist newspapers,
Communist Party street speakers, and participants in anti-Vietnam war
rallies. 3  In 1963 the Act was strengthened and clarified in
Arrowsmith v. Jenkins,"2 a decision upholding a decidedly technical
prosecution of an antinuclear organizer and explicitly rejecting any
plausible defenses to the statutory charge. Pat Arrowsmith, a well-
known peace activist, addressed a small crowd in Nelson Street, Bootle,
for twenty minutes during the middle of the day. Nelson Street was a
traditional "Speakers' Corner" for the local dock workers, and numerous
rallies had previously taken place with police sanction and even
assistance."' Arrowsmith did everything in her power to ensure the
323. Id. at 155-56. In the early 1960s "Hands Off Cuba" demonstrators were a
particular target of the police. For example, over 70 persons were fined £2 each for
obstructing the highway at a sit-down demonstration outside Liverpool Town Hall; 80
sit-down demonstrators were similarly fined at Bristol; 15 students at Leeds University
were fined for obstructing newspaper vans outside The Yorkshire Post; and demonstrators
in Albert Square, Manchester, were charged with obstructing the footpath. Stationary
obstruction was also used against such diverse protestors as a Communist Party official
in 1963 for holding a "soapbox" meeting outside an employment exchange, residents of
Putney Vale who engaged in a sit-down demonstration in 1961 to secure a pedestrian
subway, and Camden residents who participated in a road safety demonstration in 1966.
See WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 208-09. The police often charged obstruction against
leafleters and sellers of left-wing publications such as The Daily Worker and Peace
News. See, e.g., STUART BOWES, THE POLICE AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 73-75 (1966);
WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 211. On March 17, 1968, 246 anti-American demonstrators
in Grosvenor Square were charged with offenses that included obstructing the highway
and footway, see 767 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 892-93 (Apr. 8, 1968), and in
November a civil rights protestor who lay down in front of Enoch Powell's car was fined
for wilfully obstructing the free passage of the highway. Obstructed Mr. Powell's Car,
TIMES (London), Nov. 6, 1968, at 4.
324. [1963] 2 Q.B. 561.
325. Id. at 562; see BOWES, supra note 323, at 75-76.
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lawfulness of the meeting, including giving the police advance notice
and cooperating with them to permit the passage of vehicles. The police
nonetheless arrested her because the crowd blocked the street entirely for
five minutes and partially for fifteen, and she was convicted under the
Highways Act for "wilful obstruction of the highway without lawful
authority or excuse.
326
Arrowsmith presented two arguments in her appeal to the Divisional
Court. First, she denied that she was guilty of "wilfulness" because she
had genuinely and reasonably believed that her actions were lawful.
Second, she asserted that she had "lawful authority" for the obstruction
because the police had previously condoned the use of Nelson Street for
open-air meetings. Validating the standard interpretative practice of
magistrates and police, the court summarily rejected her "wilfulness"
argument, equating the term with mere intentionality. The statute, it
ruled, required only that an obstructive act occur "intentionally as
opposed to accidentally, that is, by an exercise of his or her free
will.32 7  Eviscerating the mens rea requirement, the court thus
confirmed that the statutory element of "wilfulness" added nothing to
common law requirements. 28
Even more significant, the court expressly announced that police
sufferance of similar meetings did not confer "lawful authority" on
Arrowsmith's actions. Echoing R. v. Carlile, decided more than a
century earlier, Lord Parker dismissed the defendant's contention that
customary nonenforcement authorized her use of the street:
I think that the defendant feels that she is under a grievance because-and one
may put it this way-she says: "Why pick on me? There have been many
meetings held in this street from time to time. The police, as on this occasion,
have attended those meetings and assisted to make a free passage, and there is
no evidence that anybody else has ever been prosecuted. Why pick on
me? ,,32 9
326. Quarter Sessions convicted her because it considered itself bound by Homer
v. Cadman, the 1886 case holding that an obstruction was committed whenever a large
number of persons collected on the roadway and rendered it "less convenient and
commodious to the public." See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
327. Arrowsmith, [1963] 2 Q.B. at 567.
328. The court characterized Arrowsmith's argument as based on a "genuine belief'
in lawful authority. Id. at 567. In fact, Arrowsmith had argued that her belief was
"reasonable" as well as bona fide, id. at 566, but the court simply sidestepped the
"reasonableness' issue.
329. Id. at 566.
1003
Lord Parker was unsympathetic, concluding that even if the claim of
customary nonenforcement were true, it was wholly irrelevant. "That,
of course, has nothing to do with this court," he declared. "The sole
question here is whether the defendant has contravened section 121(1)
of the Highway Act, 1959."'330
It was hardly surprising that the court refused to treat selective
prosecution as a legally cognizable defense. The police necessarily
underenforced obstruction law, the utility of which lay precisely in its
universal availability as a plausible basis for prosecution. Arrowsmith,
however, was the only modem decision explicitly to consider and then
reject the defense of discriminatory prosecution, and it ratified police
discretion to apply highways law selectively against particular
groups.
331
Whereas the Highways Act supplied a basis for "on-the-spot" arrests
or subsequent prosecutions, another act, the Metropolitan Police Act,
enabled the police to take preventive action against obstruction. As in
every other period of disorder, the police in the 1960s turned to its wide
obstruction provisions to support prior restraints on street activity.
332
In one notable episode in 1966, the Police Commissioner invoked the
Sessional Order of the House of Commons-the same Order at issue in
330. Id. In another failed claim of discrimination the same year, a magistrate fined
four Oxford students for obstructing the pavement by selling copies of Peace News in
Commarket Street; the magistrate's court rejected the argument that other vendors had
sold newspapers at the same spot without harassment. See WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at
211-12.
331. Arrowsmith again ran afoul of the obstruction doctrine in 1968 when she was
convicted of the offense during a sit-down demonstration in London outside the firm of
Elliott-Automation, which was supplying equipment to American forces for use in
Vietnam. Refusing to pay the £50 fine or be bound over, she was sentenced to six
months' imprisonment. See GoalAfter Protest, TIMEs (London), Nov. 5, 1968, at 2.
332. Throughout the decade the police arrested anti-nuclear protestors who violated
regulations promulgated under the Act. For example, in September 1961, 48 sit-down
demonstrators attempting to march to the American embassy to protest the resumption
of nuclear testing were charged with violating an order against obstruction. The
magistrate stated that although their reasons for sitting in the road might be "most
admirable," they did not interest him. Fines on Nuclear Demonstrators, TIMES, Sept.
8, 1961, at 17. In 1962 the police charged obstruction against 1172 supporters of the
Committee of 100 during a sit-down action in Parliament Square in March, against
demonstrators outside the American embassy in April, and against protestors in
Whitehall, Trafalgar Square and Grosvenor Square in October. See WILLIAMS, supra
note 3, at 68; Williams, supra note 322, at 152. The Commissioner also issued
regulations on the occasion of the closing stages of the Aldermaston march and the
Greek Royal visit in 1963. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 68-69. He used the Act as well
to disperse student demonstrations outside Rhodesia House after the Unilateral
Declaration of Independence in 1965. See id. at 128.
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the suffragette cases--to implement a wide ban on public assem-
blies.333 His directions were substantially more extensive than in the
pre-World War I period, when the Commissioner had merely circulated
the parliamentary Order to the police and left it to their discretion to
arrest violators who resisted instructions to disperse. In this instance, the
Police Commissioner issued a formal notice banning in advance all
"assemblies or processions" over a wide area in central London.
Despite the breadth of the ban, the Divisional Court upheld it with a
slightly limiting construction in Papworth v. Coventry.334  The case
involved members of the Committee of 100, a splinter group of the CND
that advocated civil disobedience.35 Andrew Papworth and six others
held a vigil against the Vietnam War from noon to 1:00 p.m. at the
junction of Whitehall and Downing Street, where they spaced themselves
without moving along the pavement. Notwithstanding the apparent
triviality of the offense---the defendants did not actually obstruct the
passage of anyone in or out of government buildings--a magistrate
convicted Papworth and his co-defendants for violating the police
ban.336 Appealing to the Divisional Court, the defendants argued that
the Commissioner's notice was ultra vires section 52 of the Metropolitan
Police Act because it prohibited all assemblies, processions, and
obstructions of whatever nature over an extensive geographical area.
The court upheld the police notice as construed not to exceed the scope
of the section,337 interpreting "assemblies and processions" to mean
only those "capable of causing" either disorder, annoyance, or "conse-
quential obstruction to the free passage of members.33 Concluding
that the magistrate might have convicted the defendants regardless of
333. The Order instructed the police to maintain the passages in the vicinity of
Parliament free of obstruction while Parliament was in session. See supra note 259 and
accompanying text.
334. [1967] 1 W.L.R. 663 (Q.B.).
335. It was founded by a group of writers, actors, and artists in 1960 to engage in
non-violent civil disobedience. See, e.g., HINTON, supra note 320, at 168-69.
336. The magistrate, perhaps mindful of comments protective of passage in the
suffragette cases, specifically noted that the defendants were not engaging in a
procession but rather a stationary demonstration. See Papworth, [1967] 1 W.L.R. at 668.
337. The court found that the Sessional Order itself did not support the
Commissioner's direction because it had no force outside the immediate precincts of
Parliament. It therefore considered the police notice in light of the general powers
conferred on the police by section 52 of the Act to prevent obstruction in the vicinity
of Parliament. Id. at 670-71.
338. Id. at 671.
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whether the assembly was capable of causing obstruction, the court
remitted the case for further factfinding. Papworth was subsequently
acquitted.
Papworth elicited a favorable response from liberal constitutional
scholars, who viewed it as narrowing the reach of the Metropolitan
Police Act."' Admittedly, the rare acquittal on an obstruction charge,
as well as language in the decision expressing concern for the "rights
and liberties of subjects, '"34 provided some support for this position.
From a civil liberties perspective, however, the decision contained many
disturbing features. It was the first instance in which the Divisional
Court expressly upheld an extensive prior ban under the Metropolitan
Police Act that specifically targeted "processions and assemblies." The
limitation of the police order to demonstrations "capable of causing
obstruction" did not, given the breadth of obstruction law, provide much
comfort to demonstrators; in fact, the ruling perpetuated the restrictive
view that actual obstruction was not a requirement of the offense.
Moreover, one of the judges explicitly endorsed the use of preventive
bans against street assemblies, observing that "the best way to put out
a fire is to prevent it before it occurs." '341 Although the magistrate
eventually determined that the vigil was not "capable of causing
obstruction," her conclusion was aberrational in light of the precedents
and exerted no influence on subsequent cases.342 Papworth arguably
represented in the main an expansion rather than constriction of the
government's statutory obstruction powers.
The most notable strengthening of obstruction law against meetings
occurred, however, with regard to its common law rather than statutory
forms. First, the courts extended Duncan to cover situations where a
constable anticipated mere highway obstruction unrelated to any breach
of the peace, thereby providing the police with an exceptionally broad
339. See, e.g., SHERR, supra note 18, at 83 (arguing that an important right to
protest near Parliament was safeguarded and could not simply be banned by police
order); SUPPERSTONE, supra note 3, at 60 (claiming that without this construction of the
police orders, any gathering regardless of whether it caused an obstruction could have
been prohibited over a large area in central London); HARRY STREET, FREEDOM, THE
INDI~rIDuAL, AND THE LAW 67-68 (5th ed. 1982) (declaring that the police were no
longer able to impose a total ban on peaceful demonstrations merely because Parliament
was sitting).
340. Papworth, [1967] 1 W.L.R. at 668.
341. Id. at 673. It was useful, Mr. Justice Winn remarked, to "prevent the coming
into existence of causes from which consequentially, and on a reasonable view
potentially, such mischief may well arise." Id.
342. The magistrate may in fact have been influenced by Mr. Justice Winn's
observation that the defendants had acted in a "very proper manner" and were "good
mannered, restrained and gentlemanly." Id. at 668.
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preventive power that was invoked with particular effect against labor
picketers.3 4P Second, prosecutors revived the long-dormant common
law offense of public nuisance by obstructing the highway. This
corresponded to a broader disinterment of seemingly moribund common
law crimes such as affray, riot, unlawful assembly, incitement, and
conspiracy.3" Unlike summary charges under the Highways Act or
other statutes, common law offenses enhanced deterrence by subjecting
the accused to lengthy proceedings and potentially severe penalties.3 ~
Moreover, the common law charge of "incitement" to commit a public
nuisance allowed prosecutors to muzzle organizers in advance of planned
events. This resuscitation of common law measures reflected the fact
that in the 1960s the authorities perceived a threat to public order on an
unprecedented scale.
The police employed the common law crime of public nuisance
particularly against sit-down demonstrations, a form of protest that was
exceedingly popular among left-wing protestors and exceptionally
frustrating to the police.346 A sit-down action naturally invited ob-
struction charges because blocking the road was not an incidental
byproduct of a bona fide meeting but rather the precise object of the
demonstration 47 The Committee of 100, which frequently organized
sit-down protests, predictably became a major target of prosecution. In
fact, the first use by the authorities of a charge of "incitement to
obstruct" involved a sit-down demonstration that the Committee planned
for September 17, 1961. Five days before the scheduled action, the
343. Duncan had held that the police could prevent a street meeting based on a
"reasonable apprehension" of a breach of the peace; anyone defying a police order to
disperse was therefore guilty of obstructing a constable in the execution of his duty.
This ruling was applied in the labor context in Piddington v. Bates, [1961] 1 W.L.R. 162
(Q.B.), and eventually to the situation of anticipated obstruction of the highway by union
picketers. See, e.g., Tynan v. Chief Constable of Liverpool, [1965] 3 All. E.R. 99, affd
sub nom. Tynan v. Balmer, [1967] 1 Q.B. 91; see also Kavanagh v. Hiscock, [1974] 1Q.B. 600; P.E. Kilbride & P.T. Bums, Freedom of Movement and Assembly in Public
Places, 2 N.Z.U.L. REV. 1, 20-23 (1966).
344. See, e.g., William Birtles, The Common Law Power of the Police to Control
Public Meetings, 36 MOD. L. REV. 587, 588-89 (1973); Williams, Offences, supra note
320, at 636-37.
345. Common law crimes were punishable at the discretion of the court. See
SUPPERSTONE, supra note 3, at 77; see also supra note 39.
346. See Williams, Offences, supra note 320, at 638; Williams, Protest, supra note
320, at 106 ("Obstruction is an obvious offence to turn to in response to sit-down
demonstrations.").
347. See Note, 80 L.Q. Rv. 155 (1964).
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police arrested thirty-six members, including the eighty-nine year old
Bertrand Russell, on charges of inciting various "persons unknown
unlawfully to obstruct the highway" in the vicinity of Parliament
Square.348 At their hearings before a magistrate, thirty-two of the
defendants, among them Lord and Lady Russell, refused to be bound
over and received terms of imprisonment ranging from seven days to
two months.349 The incitement charges thus succeeded in preventing
almost a third of the Committee from participating in the demonstra-
tion.35
0
In 1963 came the first appellate decisions adjudicating the lawfulness
of applying the common law nuisance of obstruction to sit-down
demonstrations on the highway. The cases confirmed that several
persons sitting on the sidewalk constituted a "meeting" and that the
doctrinal framework treating stationary political activity as an inherently
unreasonable use of the road still retained its vitality. The prosecutions
were initiated in response to a series of demonstrations against tyranny
in Greece arising out of a visit of the Greek royal family in July
1963.351 In R. v. Moule,3s2 the Secretary of the Committee of 100
was convicted of committing, and inciting others to commit, a public
nuisance by obstructing the highway. Moule had led some followers
around Trafalgar Square and into Whitehall, where he directed a few
persons to sit on the sidewalk; this act, unfortunately for his legal
position, transformed the procession into a meeting. Moule appealed his
conviction on the ground that the trial judge had not adequately
explained to the jury the circumstances in which an obstruction might be
a reasonable use of the highway. The Court of Criminal Appeal was
unimpressed. In its view, sitting down in the highway was prima facie
348. See WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 101; Grunis, supra note 120, at 30.
349. Prison for 32 Anti-Nuclear Supporters, TnEs (London), Sept. 13, 1961, at 5.
The smallest sentences were given to Lord and Lady Russell. Lord Russell was
originally sentenced to a two months' term, but cries of "shame" induced the Bow Street
magistrate to reduce the sentence to seven days, still long enough to keep him away
from the demonstration. Id.
350. See, e.g., HINTON, supra note 320, at 168-69 (1989); WADDINGTON, supra note
278, at 33-34. Despite a police order prohibiting any obstruction of Trafalgar Square,
Parliament Square, or the surrounding streets-with the exception of an RAF procession
to commemorate the Battle of Britain, Nuclear Protesters Will Ignore Police Ban on
Meetings, TIM:S (London), Sept. 16, 1961, at 5-the demonstration took place on
September 17 and resulted in the arrest of 1314 of the 12,000 participants. See 1,314
Arrests in Trafalgar Square Disorders, TIMES (London), Sept. 18, 1961, at 10. The
police made further use of the incitement charge in connection with demonstrations in
Grosvenor and Parliament Square in 1962. See WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 207;
Williams, supra note 322, at 157.
351. See SHERR, supra note 18, at 31.
352. [1964] Crim. L.R. 303 (Crim. App.).
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"not only an obstruction but an unreasonable obstruction. 353 A few
weeks later, the court reached a similar result in R. v. Adler,3 4 where
the defendant had directed some protestors to remain at Buckingham
Palace by uttering the fatal words, "sit down here, please. 355  The
court reaffirmed that sitting in the street was an unlawful obstruction
316amounting to a public nuisance.
Throughout the 1960s, therefore, the law on political street meetings
continued in the same restrictive pattern that had evolved in the
nineteenth century. This was true despite the fact that in 1965 the
Divisional Court introduced a more flexible approach to "reasonable-
ness" in the commercial context. Nagy v. Weston,357 using language
reminiscent of Lowdens, held that whether an obstruction was an
unreasonable use of the highway was a factual question that depended
on "all the circumstances. 358 In the 1960s, however, the courts still
found no circumstances that could conceivably render stationary protest
353. Id. at 303. The court also noted that Moule's explanation that he had given
the instruction simply to calm the crowd had been rejected by the jury as a factual
matter. Id. Richard Chandler, convicted separately on the same charges, was sentenced
on three counts to nine months', three months', and three months' concurrent sentences.
R. v. Chandler, [1964] 2 Q.B. 322, 331 (Crim. App.).
354. [1964] Crim. L.R. 304 (Crim. App.).
355. Id. at 304.
356. Id. Clark had previously been sentenced to nine months' imprisonment for
incitement to public nuisance for a "ban the bomb" incident in September 1961, when
he directed a procession to sit at the junction of Park and Brook streets. The conviction
was quashed because the court had improperly excluded the testimony of a witness. See
R. v. Clark, [1962] 1 All E.R. 428 (Crim. App.).
357. [1965] 1 W.L.R. 280 (Q.B.).
358. Id. at 284. In Nagy, Lord Parker provided an authoritative interpretation of
section 121 of the Highways Act, thereby supplying the general standard for all
obstruction offenses. He indicated that obstruction required three elements. First, there
must be an obstruction, which he defined loosely as "any occupation of part of a road
thus interfering with people having the use of the whole of the road." Id. Second, the
defendant's act must be wilful, that is, purposeful or deliberate. Third, the obstruction
must be without lawful authority or excuse. Lawful excuse was the same as reasonable-
ness, and whether an obstruction was an unreasonable use of the highway was a question
of fact: "It depends upon all the circumstances, including the length of time the
obstruction continues, the place where it occurs, the purpose for which it is done, and
of course whether it does in fact cause an actual obstruction as opposed to a potential
obstruction." Id. Despite the flexibility of this test and the apparent absence of any
significant obstruction in the case itself--the defendant, a mobile hot dog vendor, had
parked his van in the road for five minutes on a Tuesday night in Oxford-Lord Parker
deferred to the magistrates' finding that the defendant was using the highway
unreasonably. Indeed, he found it difficult to see how "they could conceivably arrive
at any other conclusion." Id.
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activity a lawful use of the street. The manual Police Law accurately
described the state of the law on meetings:
There is no right to hold meetings in any public place, as such places are for
people to pass along. Every unauthorised obstruction of the highway is illegal
as being either an offence by some statute or bye-law or indictable as a
common nuisance. Streets are for passage, and passage is superior to
everything else, and nothing short of absolute necessity will justify a person in
obstructing a highway.359
The result of an obstruction prosecution was such a foregone conclusion
that, as a commentator observed in 1967, the crucial decision was "not
whether the defendant is guilty or innocent but whether or not to
prosecute at all. '
2. Processions in the 1960s: Continuing Forbearance
The contrasting situation of processions was strikingly illustrated by
the fate of another CND member who protested the Greek royal visit in
1963. R. v. Clark (No. 2)36! stood in dramatic juxtaposition to Moule
and Adler decided the same year. George Clark, the field secretary of
the CND, was arrested for inciting persons to commit public nuisance by
obstructing the highway at several central London locations. Two
detectives testified at his trial that he had led a march of 500 to 2000
persons through various parts of the city, and upon conviction the
County of London Sessions sentenced him to an extraordinary eighteen
months' imprisonment. 62 Clark contended on appeal that the proces-
sion was prima facie lawful and that the question of reasonableness
should have been left to the jury. 63 The Court of Criminal Appeal
agreed. Expressly relying on Lowdens, it reversed his conviction on the
ground that the trial court had not instructed the jury on reasonableness
but had simply directed that any physical obstruction would constitute
359. C. MORIARTY, POLICE LAW, quoted in BowEs, supra note 323, at 72.
360. See WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 211. He added that anyone who addressed a
public meeting or participated in a demonstration on the highway "truly does so at his
peril." Id.; see STREET, supra note 339, at 63 (stating that the right of public meeting
was dependent almost entirely on the police exercising their discretion in a reasonable
manner).
361. [1964] 2 Q.B. 315 (Crim. App.).
362. Id. at 315-16. The case suggested both the advantages and pitfalls of bringing
a common law prosecution for obstruction. The prosecutors obtained an extremely harsh
penalty, but ultimately the strategy may have backfired. The widespread public outcry
against the severity of the sentence, see CmSTOPHER DRIVER, THE DISARiERS 163
(1964), was reminiscent of the furor created by the prosecution of the Salvationists in
Beatty, and it may have influenced the appellate court to quash the conviction.
363. Clark, [1964] 2 Q.B. at 317.
1010
[VOL. 34: 921, 1997] Freedom of Assembly
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
a nuisance.36 The virtually identical argument had failed in Adler and
Moue.3
65
George Clark succeeded, however, only because the jury had not
considered the issue of reasonableness. The court provided no guidance
as to what constituted a "reasonable" procession, and there was no
guarantee that a magistrate or jury would find a procession to be
reasonable in fact. Indeed, the court observed that "it may well be that
on a proper direction this defendant would, all the same, have been
convicted."36 In addition to facing a "reasonableness" test, proces-
sions, unlike meetings, were potentially subject to the controls of the
Public Order Act and to various prohibitions contained in local acts and
bylaws. Nonetheless, owing to a variety of factors-the force of custom,
cultural consensus, the continuing mythology of the "right to pass," the
improving image of marches after the 1930s, the preoccupation with
stationary activity, and the desire to protect customary marches 367-in
the 1960s processions regained their favored status in both legal theory
and practice.3" Now that the threat of quasi-militaristic marches had
364. Id. at 321.
365. A comment on the case noted that a procession was perfectly lawful if
conducted reasonably even though persons were obstructing the road. "If this were not
true, then thousands of persons would be guilty of obstructing a highway whenever they
were engaged in attempting to cross Oxford Street during the rush hours." Note, supra
note 347, at 155. The author noted that this was in stark contrast to a sit-down
demonstration, where "the obvious intention would be to cause an obstruction by sitting
down, which is not a reasonable user [sic] of the highway." Id. at 156.
366. Clark, [1964] 2 Q.B. at 321.
367. During major demonstrations organized by the Vietnam Solidarity Committee
in 1968, the Police Commissioner and the Home Secretary, James Callaghan, decided
against imposing any bans under the Public Order Act. When a member protested that
his constituents wished to spend a quiet Sunday in their homes, Callaghan replied, "I
think that it is a consequence of all processions-whether they be the Lord Mayor's
Show in the City or the Durham Miners' Gala, both of which are great national
traditional processions-that the peace of those living on the routes is disturbed. That
is a natural result of processions." 770 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1601 (Oct. 24,
1968). This confirmed that part of the underlying motivation for validating marches was
to extend the mantle of protection over customary processions.
368. Picketers tried unsuccessfully in the 1960s to exploit the doctrinal distinction
between meetings and processions. For example, during a student demonstration against
Hugh Gaitskell outside a Leeds hotel in 1960, the protesters walked in a circle with the
cry, "If we keep walking, they can't get us." See WILIAMS, supra note 3, at 215.
Similarly, when draftsmen struck the English Electric Company in Liverpool in 1965,
the pickets in the public highway outside the factory gates moved in a circle to avoid
the rules regarding stationary demonstrations. Tynan v. Chief Constable of Liverpool,
[1965] 3 All E.R. 99, affd sub nom. Tynan v. Balmer, [1967] 1 Q.B. 91. However, the
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receded, the local authorities generally declined to invoke the Public
Order Act, and processions reverted to the preferred position that was
deeply ingrained in both formal obstruction law and the national political
culture.369 Standard police procedure in the 1960s was to afford
marches as much protection as necessary, and the legacy of Beatty
continued remarkably intact.37
C. The Triumph of Functionalism: From Red Lion
Square to the Public Order Act 1986
The final period of substantial disorder, from the late 1970s through
the 1980s, brought significant developments. The concept of a "right to
protest" appeared more prominently in political discourse, and some
judges began expressly to treat such a right as a relevant factor in
determining the legitimacy of meetings. At the same time, however,
new public order legislation enhanced the restrictions on processions and
subjected meetings for the first time to national regulation. These
developments, in further equalizing the status of meetings and proces-
sions, ultimately augmented the ability of the police to discriminate
between acceptable and objectionable assemblies without regard to their
courts did not consider such movement sufficient to trigger the "right of passage." As
Mr. Justice Forbes commented in Hubbard v. Pitt, [1976] 1 Q.B. 142, 157, "it is no use
adopting a colourable pretence at passage by having pickets move around .... "
369. In testimony before the Home Affairs Committee, Sir David McKnee, the
Police Commissioner, submitted evidence that whereas section 3 provisions against
processions were widely used in the 1930s and even in the 1950s, the 1960s "gave the
police some respite. There were many demonstrations during this decade---mostly in
connection with the CND campaign-and thousands of arrests. But this was the era of
'peaceful protest', most arrests being made for sitting down in the road." 2 HOME
AFFAIRS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 312, at 75.
370. See K.D. EWiNG & C.A. GEARTY, FREEDOM UNDER THATCHER 87 (1990)
(through the 1970s the "spirit of Beatty v. Gillbanks was alive and reasonably well").
On occasion the police used their powers to prescribe the routes of processions, but
Home Secretaries were leery of imposing bans, and most took place prior to 1964. In
the 1960s only four bans were imposed in London: in September 1960 in connection
with the St. Pancras rent riots; a one-day ban in the West End on September 17, 1961
against the Committee of 100 demonstration; and 48-hour bans in September 1962 and
July 1963 against Fascists and anti-Fascists. There was only one ban in the provinces,
in September 1964 in Salford. 2 HOME AFFAIRS COMWMITTEE REPORT, supra note 312,
at 228-29. In 1968 the Metropolitan Police Commissioner declined to use the Public
Order Act to ban a procession by the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign on October 27, see
770 Parl. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1598 (Oct. 24, 1968), during which 60,000 people
marched from Charing Cross to Hyde Park. See WADDINGTON, supra note 278, at 35;
A.F. WiLCOx, THE DECISION TO PROSECUTE, 35-37 (1962); D.G.T. Williams,
Processions, Assemblies and the Freedom of the Individual, 1987 CRim. L. REv. 167,
174. Use of the Metropolitan Police Act against processions was also infrequent. See
REVIEW OF THE PUBLIC ORDER ACT 1936 AND RELATED LEGISLATION, 1980, Cmnd.
7891, 62 [hereinafter REvIEw OF PUBLIC ORDER AT 1936].
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relation to passage. The "right to passage" was reconceived almost
exclusively as the right of the broader public to convenience, and, as a
corollary, marchers lost the special protection that it had afforded their
processions. By the end of the 1980s, participants in both processions
and meetings asserted a "right to demonstrate" that was subordinate to
the predominant right of the public to proceed along the street without
inconvenience. The formal categories persisted but ceased to have much
practical significance. A new functional test-one implicit in the
judicial decisions, government reports, and parliamentary enactments of
the period--had subtly but profoundly altered the doctrinal resolution of
the 1880s.
1. The Rhetoric of Balanced Rights: Intellectual
Precursors in the 1970s
The seminal ideas governing the reconceptualization of the "right to
passage" first appeared in the mid-1970s. The catalyst for the intellectu-
al reassessment was the riot in Red Lion Square in 1974, which
inaugurated a new troubling new period of "aggressive street politics"
in Britain. 7' The Red Lion Square incident, the decade's worst
episode of public violence, resulted from the predilection of socialist and
right-wing groups for scheduling simultaneous demonstrations at the
same location.372 In June 1974 the Fascist National Front marched
through London to Red Lion Square to protest the government's decision
to grant amnesty to illegal immigrants. An opposition march by left-
wing opponents, in particular the London Area Council of Liberation and
the International Marxist Group, culminated in a riot in which one
person died and numerous demonstrators and police officers were
injured.373
371. 1 HOME AFFAIRS COMMITEE REPORT, supra note 312, 1. Sir David
McKnee, the Police Commissioner, testified before the Committee that the increase in
disorder in the 1970s was "substantial and disturbing." 2 id. at 75.
372. EwING & GEARTY, supra note 370, at 84.
373. David G. Barnum, Freedom of Assembly and the Hostile Audience in Anglo-
American Law, 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 59, 61 (1981). The marches had not been banned,
reflecting the continuing police practice of noninterference with processions. Police
chiefs resisted bans even in the worst periods of the 1970s. See Bevan, supra note 142,
at 167-68; Williams, supra note 370, at 174. The Home Secretary, William Whitelaw,
reported to the House of Commons that in the entire decade of the 1970s there were
only seven banning orders: three in 1974, one in 1977, and three in 1978. 6 PARL.
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In the incident's aftermath the government asked Lord Scarman to
review the adequacy of legal mechanisms for securing public order. His
influential and widely circulated report 74 refreshingly advocated a
place in the legal regime for "rights of peaceful assembly and public
protest,"'375 and it encouraged a developing movement in favor of de
jure recognition of a right to demonstrate.376 Equally notably, though
attracting less attention, the report emphasized the priority of passage,
a right that Lord Scarman viewed as antithetical and superior to the right
of protest. The report laid out the fundamental dilemma:
There is a conflict of interest between those who seek to use the streets for the
purpose of passage and those who seek to use them for the purpose of
demonstration. English law recognises as paramount the right of passage: a
demonstration which obstructs passage along the highway is unlawful.3
In this formulation, the protesting marcher was not using the streets for
the "purpose of passage" but rather for the "purpose of demonstration."
While supporting the right to protest, the analysis wholly transferred the
protection of passage from the marcher to the public domain. In Lord
Scarman's view the priority of passage, thus redefined, was sound.
"Free movement between place and place and access to premises may
DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 532 (June 11, 1981).
374. REPORT OF INQUIRY BY THE RT. HON. LORD JUsTICE SCARMAN INTO THE RED
LION SQUARE DIsORDERS OF 15 JUNE 1974, 1975, Cmnd. 5919 [hereinafter SCARMAN
REPORT].
375. Id. 5.
376. Beginning after World War II and accelerating in the 1970s and 1980s, there
was increasing support for formal recognition of freedom of assembly and other civil
liberties. In the post-war period several international human rights treaties provided for
a "right to freedom of peaceful assembly." See, e.g., Universal Proclamation of Human
Rights, art. 20(1) (1948); European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 11 (1950). The English movement for a positive right to assemble began
seriously in 1968 with the publication of Anthony Lester's Fabian pamphlet, Democracy
and Individual Rights, and it gained momentum from the publication of Lord Scarman's
Hamlyn Lectures in 1974. See, e.g., M. Glenn Abernathy, Should the United Kingdom
Adopt a Bill of Rights?, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 431, 431-32 (1983); Peter L. Fitzgerald, An
English Bill of Rights? Some Observations from Her Majesty's Former Colonies in
America, 70 GEO. L.J. 1229, 1230 (1982). The debate focused on whether to incorporate
by legislation into domestic law the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, which the United Kingdom had ratified in 1951. See
Christopher McCrudden & Gerald Chambers, Human Rights in British Law, in
INDIvIDUAL RiGirrs AND THE LAW 1, 7-8 (Christopher McCrudden & Gerald Chambers
eds., 1994); see also Sir John Laws, Judicial Remedies and the Constitution, 57 MOD.
L. REv. 213, 225 (1994); Williams, Freedom of Assembly, supra note 320, at 118. See
generally Cyril Adjei, Human Rights Theory and the Bill of Rights Debate, 58 MOD. L.
REv. 17 (1995); Andrew J. Cunningham, The European Convention on Human Rights,
Customary International Law and the Constitution, 43 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 537 (1994).
377. SCARMAN REPORT, supra note 374, T1 122. He thought that enactment of a
positive right to demonstrate was unnecessary. "The right of course exists, subject only
to limits required by the need for good order and the passage of traffic." Id. 134(6).
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seem workaday matters when compared with such rights as those of
demonstration and protest," he observed, "but society could grind to a
halt if the law adopted any other priority."378  It was necessary to
accommodate protest, but only in a framework that would "allow non-
protesting citizens to go about their business or pleasure without
obstruction or inconvenience." 379  Lord Scarman in effect recast
"reasonable use" of the highway as a test balancing rights of protest
against rights of passage,380 and although he gave new recognition to
"rights of protest," he also firmly weighted the scales against them.
On the specific question of meetings and processions, the report
articulated a traditional approach toward the former but subtly reoriented
the law on the latter. It was "open to question," Lord Scarman declared,
"whether a public meeting held on a highway could ever be lawful, for
it is not in any way incidental to the exercise of the right of pas-
sage., 38 l This was wholly unexceptionable as a statement of highways
law, though somewhat peculiar in a document purporting to support a
right to demonstrate. His view of processions, however, was slightly
novel, as he required that they "allow room for others to go on their
way" without obstruction or inconvenience. 38" Again, this framework
treated "passage" only as the right of the public rather than also that of
the marcher, who lost the right to cause obstruction or inconvenience.
It thus departed significantly from the view prevalent for almost a
century that a procession, though inevitably obstructive and inconve-
378. Id. 123.
379. Id. 9 5. The streets were not the appropriate place for the discussion necessary
for democratic government, though demonstrations were permissible "provided public
order and the right of passage are not endangered." Id. T 155.
380. Lord Scarman approved the existing balance that the law struck between
freedom, public order, and the right of passage, and he did not recommend any
fundamental reform. Id. T 124. His main recommendations were to amend the Race
Relations Act and give the senior police officer on the spot the power to route
processions. Id. 99 182, 184. He also preferred voluntary cooperation between
demonstrators and police to changes in the statutory law:
It cannot be said too often that our law assumes that people will be tolerant,
self-disciplined, and willing to cooperate with the police. The assumption is
still sound: that is why the police go unarmed, and also why, with no legal
requirement of notice, the police are in fact notified in at least 80 per cent of
the cases.
Id. 129. On that ground, he did not think that a formal notice requirement was
necessary. Id.
381. Id. T 122.
382. Id. 99 5, 34.
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nient, was nonetheless a reasonable use of the street.383 Despite
obeisance to "freedom of assembly," under Lord Scarman's analysis the
stationary demonstrator still unlawfully interfered with the "right to
passage," and the marcher no longer enjoyed its protection as an
independently assertable legal right.
Shortly after release of the report, Lord Scarman's approach was
endorsed, albeit in dictum and in dissent, in a Court of Appeal decision
involving the public nuisance of obstructing the highway. Hubbard v.
PitPs4 arose out of a protest launched by a group of social workers
against the "gentrification" of the Islington district in London. In 1974
the Islington Tenants' Campaign picketed a real estate firm allegedly
pressuring poor families to leave their homes. After enduring a few
weeks of Saturday morning picketing, the company sued in private
nuisance to restrain the protestors from assembling on the sidewalk
outside its premises. The trial court granted an interlocutory injunction,
Mr. Justice Forbes holding that picketing on the highway was inconsis-
tent with the right of passage and constituted a common law public
nuisance.38 Referring to both Lowdens and Lewis, he drew a distinc-
tion between a march or procession, which was lawful if conducted
reasonably, and a stationary picket, which was necessarily an illegitimate
use of the highway.386 He thus continued the tradition introduced in
the suffragette cases of treating a handful of picketers as an unlawful
stationary meeting. The decision adopted a narrow but, in light of the
precedents, hardly surprising view of the legality of a stationary
demonstration on the highway.
The Court of Appeal upheld the injunction on a different theory,387
383. For example, only a few years earlier the Home Secretary had stated that the
"natural result' of all processions was that "the peace of others would be disturbed."
770 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1601 (Oct. 24, 1968) (James Callaghan).
384. [1976] 1 Q.B. 142 (C.A.).
385. The defdndants relied on an immunity for picketing contained in the Trade
Disputes Act 1906 and subsequent labor legislation, but Mr. Justice Forbes concluded
that these statutes were inapplicable to consumer picketing and the case was thus
governed by the common law. The right to picket at common law had been the subject
of two earlier conflicting decisions of the Court of Appeal. Lyons v. Wilkins, [1899] 1
Ch. 255 (C.A.), held that picketing was automatically wrongful and a common law
nuisance, but a later case, Ward, Lock v. Operative Printers' Assistants'Soc "y, 22 T.L.R.
327 (C.A. 1906), found that picketing was only a nuisance if combined with "indepen-
dently unlawful" conduct. Forbes, relying on Lyons, held that picketing was an
unreasonable use of the highway and a nuisance. See, e.g., Comment, 1975 CAMBRIDoE
L.J. 191, 191-92.
386. Hubbard, [1976] 1 Q.B. at 156-57.
387. The Court of Appeal affirmed on the ground that the defendants might be
committing a private nuisance and the equities lay with the plaintiff. The majority
decision primarily addressed the principles governing interlocutory injunctions rather
than the merits of the nuisance claim, although it disapproved Forbes' analysis of the
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but the case is primarily noteworthy for the strong dissent by Lord
Denning, Master of the Rolls, who vigorously rejected the trial court's
conclusions on the merits of the nuisance claim. Relying on both the
Scarman Report and Nagy v. Weston, Lord Denning explicitly advocated
a positive right to freedom of assembly. He concluded that "reasonable
use" of the highway included a right "to protest on matters of public
concern";388 the limited picketing at issue, moreover, was neither an
unreasonable use of the street nor a common law nuisance.389 It was
time, Lord Denning proposed, that the courts recognize a positive right
to demonstrate.390 This supposedly strong affirmation of civil liberties,
however, exhibited the same limitations as the Scarman Report. Lord
Denning followed Lord Scarman in insisting that the "right to demon-
strate" was secondary to the "need for good order and the passage of
traffic,, 39' and he too construed "passage" as an activity inconsistent
with protest. This analytical perspective-ostensibly embracing a right
to protest but subordinating it to the "right to passage," redefined as a
general public right antithetical to that of the marching demonstra-
tor-would become dominant in the coming decade.
2. The 1980s: Reconceiving the Resolution of the 1880s
The intellectual reassessment of the right to passage formulated by
Lords Scarman and Denning became widespread in the 1980s, reflecting
the new wave of violence that threatened to engulf English society.
Although in the late 1970s there were further episodes of domestic
tumult, especially involving industrial picketing and clashes between
nuisance claim as a matter of public rather than private nuisance. The court found that
the balance of convenience weighed in favor of the employer over the demonstrators, id.
at 184-85, 188, thus echoing nineteenth-century cases such as Duke of Rutland and
Hickman in elevating the rights of adjacent owners over those of competing highway
users.
388. Id. at 178.
389. Id. Lord Denning followed Ward, Locke rather than Lyons. Id. at 175.
390. Id. at 179. Interestingly, Lord Denning relied on Beatty to support his
argument about the legality of stationary demonstrations, apparently attempting-as had
defendants such as Cunninghame Graham, Duncan, and Arrowsmith---to extend its
protection over meetings as well as processions. For another judicial statement from
Lord Denning supporting freedom of assembly, see Verrall v. Great Yarmouth, [1980]
I All E.R. 839, 845 (C.A.) ("Freedom of assembly is another of our precious
freedoms.").
391. Hubbard, [1976] 1 Q.B. at 179.
1017
fascist and socialist groups,3" they paled in contrast to the turmoil of
the succeeding decade. In the 1980s, indeed, the level of civil violence
more closely resembled that of the 1930s than any previous period.393
Racial strife and inner-city riots were ominous new features of the urban
landscape. The decade began with serious disturbances in the St. Paul's
District of Bristol and continued the following year with riots in Brixton,
Southall, Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham, and other cities.394 The
middle years of the decade saw additional urban uprisings,395 acrimoni-
ous labor disputes including the miners' strike of 1984-85,396 and
confrontational protest activity by antinuclear activists.397 Conflict
392. For a few years after Red Lion Square there was a comparative lull, but
between 1977 and 1979 violent clashes again occurred between the National Front and
various socialist groups. Particular incidents of disorder occurred at Lewisham and
Birmingham in 1977, Birmingham in 1978, and Southall in 1979. At the episode at
Southall Town Hall in April 1979, 345 people were arrested, 161 police officers and
other persons were injured, and one member of the public subsequently died. See 1
HOME AFFAIRS COMIaTrE REPORT, supra note 312, 66. In 1977 there were also
severe clashes between police and industrial picketers in Grunwick, North London. See
WADE & BRADLEY, supra note 300, at 528. According to the Commissioner of Police
for the Metropolis, the number of large demonstrations in London grew from 55 in 1972
to 119 over seven years later, and the total manpower employed in policing demonstra-
tions rose in the same period from 19,367 to 108,014. 1 HoME AFFAIRS COMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 312, 16.
393. THE ROOTs OF URBAN UNREST xi (John Benyon & John Solomos eds., 1987).
The authors commented that despite frequent civil disturbances throughout the twentieth
century and particular public anxiety in the 1970s about picketing and street crime, the
years 1945-80 were relatively tranquil in British cities compared with the domestic
violence of the 1930s and the 1980s. Id. at 3-4; see, e.g., Robert Reiner & Malcolm
Cross, Beyond Law and Order--Crime and Criminology into the 1990s, in BEYOND LAW
AND ORDER: CRIMINAL JUSnCE POLICY AND POLITICS INTO THE 1990S 1, 4 (Robert
Reiner & Malcolm Cross, eds., 1991) (similarly observing that the 1980s were
characterized by forms of violent disorder unprecedented in post-war England). By 1980
the London police were making special arrangements to police an average of two major
demonstrations a day. 1 HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 312, 16.
394. THE ROOTs OF URBAN UNREST, supra note 393, at 4; WADE & BRADLEY,
supra note 300, at 528. The most serious riots occurred in Brixton, where six hours of
violence, looting, and arson on April 11, 1981 injured 279 police and 45 members of the
public and damaged 145 premises, 28 by fire. THE ROOTS OF URBAN UNREST, supra
note 393, at 3.
395. In 1985 there were major disturbances in the West Midlands, Brixton,
Liverpool, and Tottenham, North London. In Tottenham a constable was stabbed to
death, the first police officer to be murdered in a riot since 1833. REINER, supra note
281, at 88. There were additional inner-city riots in Bristol in 1987 and Wolverhampton
and Notting Hill in 1989. WADDINGTON, supra note 278, at 79-94.
396. See, e.g., EWING & GEARTY, supra note 370, at 103-12; ROGER GEARY,
POLICING INDUsTRAL DIsPuTEs, 1893-1985, 134-45 (1985).
397. See, e.g., EWING & GEARTY, supra note 370, at 94-103; HINTON, supra note
320, at 182-88. There was also continuing violence in Northern Ireland. See
Christopher McCrudden & Gerald Chambers, Human Rights in British Law, in
INDrVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE LAW IN BRITAIN 1, 6 (Christopher McCrudden & Gerald
Chambers eds., 1994).
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between left and right-wing groups gave way to direct clashes between
demonstrators and police, and the latter resorted to increasingly
aggressive and militaristic tactics.398  Widespread anxiety about
economic, social, and cultural change contributed to a popular obsession,
fully encouraged and exploited by the Thatcher government, with "law
and order.' 3
99
As in the four earlier periods of severe turbulence, anxiety about
accelerating domestic discord had important repercussions for obstruction
law, which again adapted to meet changing historical circumstances. In
the 1980s the proliferation of different types of disorder fostered a
recognition that blanket distinctions between meetings and marches were
not the most appropriate framework for dealing with the myriad forms
that disturbances could take. Although the doctrinal distinction remained
theoretically intact-it was far too deeply ingrained to be discarded-the
law evolved to permit more refined discriminations between acceptable
and unacceptable assemblies regardless of their formal connection to
passage. Judges began to treat meetings as potentially "reasonable,"
applying the Nagy "all the circumstances" analysis and following Lords
Scarman and Denning in considering a "right to demonstrate" as part of
the calculus of "reasonableness." At the same time, the courts began to
implement more rigorously the rule against "unreasonable" processions.
Although these developments appeared to represent divergent trends-a
more liberal attitude to meetings and a more restrictive posture toward
processions--they were in fact complementary. Together they equalized
the status of meetings and processions, undermined the importance of
passage, and introduced a new functional approach into the application
of obstruction law.
398. See EWING & GEARTY, supra note 370, at 84; John Benyon, Policing in the
Limelight, in THE POLICE: POWERS, PROCEDURES AND PROPRIETIES 3, 24-25 (John
Benyon & Colin Bourn eds., 1986) (In the later 1970s and 1980s police equipment for
crowd control began to include shields, helmets, CS gas, plastic bullets, and water
canons.); Conor Gearty, Freedom ofAssembly and Public Order, in INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
AND THE LAW IN BRITAIN 39, 57-58 (Christopher McCrudden & Gerald Chambers eds.,
1994). Disruptions continued into the 1990s. For example, a protest at Trafalgar Square
in March 1990 against the poll tax, a new form of personal taxation, injured 300 police
officers-the worst violence since 1985. REINER, supra note 281, at 88-89.
399. Reiner & Cross, supra note 393, at 1.
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a. The New Reasonableness of Meetings
For the most part judges and magistrates continued to apply the
traditional rule that meetings were unreasonable per se,40' and high-
ways law remained a useful weapon against such groups as antinuclear
activists, student protestors, anti-apartheid demonstrators, and
Greenpeace supporters. 40 ' However, in the 1980s a more flexible
stance toward meetings was evident in judicial interpretations of both
"obstruction" and "reasonable use."
The Court of Appeal displayed an unusual approach to "obstruction"
in Hipperson v. Newbury District Electoral Registration Officer,40 2 a
case involving the "Greenham Common women," seven antinuclear
activists who in 1981 began to live on an encampment outside the RAF
base at Fulbeck Airfield.40 3 In 1984, using the peace camp as their
address, they sued to have their names placed on the electoral register.
400. Although most obstruction actions involved criminal proceedings, civil tort
actions, as in Hubbard, were occasionally of value to private owners in restraining
picketing or sit-down tactics. For example, in United Kingdom NIREX, Ltd. v. Barton,
see INDEPENDENT, Oct. 14, 1986, at 10, two local antinuclear groups, LAND(Lincolnshire and Nottinghamshire Against Nuclear Dumping) and HAND (Humberside
Against Nuclear Dumping) opposed NIREX's search for a site suitable for the land
disposal of low level radioactive waste. When the government attempted to explore two
sites at Fulham and Killingholme, local residents barricaded the area from the highway
and repulsed all attempts by the contractors to enter. After three weeks NIREX took
legal action, successfully suing for an interim injunction to obtain entry. In October the
court granted permanent individual injunctions against defendants who had committed
the torts of obstruction or trespass, warning that anyone who violated the injunction by
committing an obstruction, whether a party to the litigation or not, would be subject to
contempt charges.
401. For example, in November 1987, 26 Greenpeace supporters were arrested
outside a London conference on North Sea pollution for obstruction of the highway. See
EWING & GEARTY, supra note 370, at 116. Obstruction of the highway was also
charged against 171 anti-apartheid picketers outside South Africa House, see Perry v.
Markovitch, LEGAL ACTION, Sept. 1987, at 15 (Magis. Ct. 1987), against a student
protesting a visit of the Home Secretary to Manchester University, Thorpe v. Chief
Constable, [1989] 2 All E.R. 827 (C.A.), against poll tax demonstrators, see 72 in Court
on Protest Charges, TI!ms (London), Apr. 3, 1990 (NEXIS), and against an anti-
smoking protestor who regularly picketed Tory and Labour Party conferences, see No
Smoking, 141 NEW L.J. 191 (1991). According to Home Office figures, in 1985 a total
of 8973 persons were found guilty of obstruction of the highway other than by a vehicle,
and 9864 were found guilty of assault on or obstruction of a constable. SHERR, supra
note 18, at 125 & n.1 (noting that, as of 1989, the two offenses most commonly used
against demonstrators were obstruction of the highway and the related offense of
obstruction of a constable).
402. [1985] 1 Q.B. 1060 (C.A.).
403. See HINTON, supra note 320, at 183. The Greenham Common peace camp
became a site of international pilgrimage and was probably as important as large
demonstrations in publicizing opposition to cruise missiles. Id.
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Although the county court judge found that the women had violated the
Highways Act because part of their encampment was on a highway, he
concluded that the unlawfulness of their residence did not disqualify
them from voting. The Court of Appeal agreed per curiam that the
lawfulness or otherwise of the women's residence was irrelevant to their
qualifications for the franchise. In an intriguing dictum, Sir Donald
Donaldson, Master of the Rolls, observed that the women had not
necessarily violated the Highways Act. "The offence," he remarked,
"consists of obstructing free passage along a highway, and not of living
on highway land.'' 4 Applying the Nagy "all the circumstances" test,
he concluded that the existence of an obstruction was a complex factual
question requiring more than mere proof of "a tent on highway
land.' '4°  The statement that "living on highway land" might not
necessarily obstruct the highway was a substantial departure from the
precedents,416 and it seems explicable only as a result of sympathy for
the particular defendants; the dictum did not in any event significantly
influence future applications of the rule on "obstruction.' 4 7 The
importance of the case for obstruction law lay rather in its more tolerant
404. Hipperson, [1985] 1 Q.B. at 1075.
405. Id.
406. It was also inconsistent with cases involving gypsy encampments near the
highway. See infra note 421 and accompanying text.
407. Indeed, a few years later the Divisional Court hewed to the traditional line on
"obstruction" in Abdel-Rahim v. D.P.P., Crown Office List CO/1796/87 (Q.B. 1989)
available in LEXIS, Enggen Library, Cases File, a case arising out of demonstrations at
the Royal Air Force Station at Molesworth. In 1986 about a dozen people conducted
a sit-down action in a line across Cockbrook Lane, a private roadway near the base.
When Abdel-Rahim refused to comply with a constable's request to move, she was
arrested for obstruction under the Highways Act. Her defense was that the Act did not
apply to Cockbrook Lane, a private road owned by the Secretary of State for Defense.
The government, however, luckily discovered that in 1979 the Defense Secretary had
apparently dedicated a ten-foot portion of the road for use as a public bridleway. It
argued that Cockburn Lane included a "highway"-that is, the bridlepath-and that even
if the sit-down action did not occur on the bridlepath itself, the defendant had committed
obstruction by acting in concert with others to obstruct the whole roadway of which the
bridlepath was a part. Technical as this theory was, the government persuaded the court
of its merit. After years of litigation, in 1989 the Divisional Court finally concluded that
the government had indeed created a public bridleway somewhere within the private
road. The fact that the prosecution could not identify its precise location was not "of
significance or relevance." The court thus sanctioned a broad interpretation of both
"highway" and "obstruction," finding the presence of a highway based on a technicality
and extending the notion of obstruction to encompass the surrounding private land. The
definition of "obstruction" thus for the most part continued along its conventional path.
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stance toward protest activity and its explicit endorsement in the political
context of the Nagy test-a more refined and discriminating standard
that could circumvent inflexible rules about stationary and moving
assemblies.
The major reinterpretation of the law on street meetings related not to
"obstruction" but rather to "reasonableness." Prior to the 1980s the only
assertion in a judicial opinion that a stationary meeting might be
reasonable was that of Lord Denning in Hubbard v. Pitt. In a ground
breaking decision in 1987, Hirst and Agu v. Chief Constable of West
Yorkshire,4 the Divisional Court directly applied the Denning-
Scarman approach to a political meeting on the highway. Lorraine Agu
and Malcolm Hirst, animal rights activists in Bradford, were convicted
by the magistrates of violating the Highways Act 1980 by picketing a fur
store in a spacious pedestrian precinct. The Crown Court affirmed,
considering itself bound by Waite v. Taylor,4"9 a narrow decision of
the Divisional Court two years earlier that had found a solitary juggler
in a pedestrian mall to have unreasonably obstructed the highway.41
On further appeal, the Divisional Court reversed on the ground that the
court below had not considered whether the protestors had a "lawful
excuse," that is, whether their conduct was reasonable, thereby rejecting
the view that meetings were unreasonable per se.a", According to
Lord Justice Glidewell, the Nagy test enabled magistrates to find
activities unrelated to passage to be reasonable, and in his view a
stationary demonstration or picket could conceivably be a "reasonable
use" of the street. He relied not only on Nagy, approved in both
Hipperson and the Hubbard dissent, but also on Lowdens, thus for the
first time formally aligning the test for processions with that of meetings.
Mr. Justice Otton, echoing Lord Denning's plea that courts should
balance the right to demonstrate against the need for good order, further
supported Lord Glidewell's effort to give freedom of protest "the
408. 85 Crim. App. R. 143 (Q.B. 1987).
409. 149 J.P. 551 (Q.B. 1985).
410. The court understandably concluded that standing on the highway distributing
leaflets and holding banners was no less an obstruction to passage than solitary juggling.
Hirst and Agu, 85 Crim. App. R. at 146.
411. The decision disapproved Waite, decided by another panel of the same court.
Lord Justice Lloyd stated that in his judgment, Nagy v. Weston was the leading modem
authority and it did "not apply so rigid a test" as that found in Waite v. Taylor. Id. at
150. He noted that the sale of hot dogs could not possibly be considered incidental to
the right to pass, and yet the court in Nagy had taken the view that it was open to the
magistrates to consider whether it was reasonable or not. Id. This statement was
slightly disingenuous, however, because Lord Parker in Nagy bad indicated that the
magistrates could not conceivably find the actions of the hot dog vendor to be
reasonable.
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recognition it deserves."412 Hirst was unusual in explicitly grappling
with constitutional issues, in equating the test for meetings and
processions, and in suggesting that "reasonable use" of the highway
could include stationary political activities not only unrelated to passage
but patently obstructive of it.
That it took almost a century for the courts even to consider the
possibility that a street meeting might be reasonable testified to the
enduring power of the doctrinal distinction between meetings and
processions. Moreover, the ground covered in the evolution of
"reasonableness" from Carlile to Hirst should not be overstated. Under
Hirst, just as under Nagy and Lowdens, the judges left the determination
of "reasonableness" to the magistrates as a matter of fact, and magis-
trates were as a general matter not disposed to acquit political protes-
tors." 3 It was also not encouraging that the Divisional Court's
application of Nagy in the commercial context had for the most part led
to highly restrictive results.4" 4 Further, even the most expansive
412. Id. at 152.
413. See David G. Barnum, The Constitutional Status of Public Protest Activity in
Britain and the United States, 1977 PUB. L. 310, 339. The occasional appellate cases
that overturned a conviction generally involved simply a failure of the factfinder to
consider a critical tenn--'obstruction" (Papworth) or "reasonableness" (Hirst, Lowdens,
Clark)-rather than finding the decision below to be substantively in error. Until 1960,
moreover, there was no appeal from the decisions of the Divisional Court to the House
of Lords. See STREET, supra note 339, at 59.
414. There were many restrictive commercial decisions in the 1960s, both before
and after Nagy, and some were announced by the author of Nagy, Lord Parker himself.
See, e.g., Seekings v. Clarke, 59 L.G.R. 268 (Q.B. 1961) (Lord Parker) (holding a sun
blind on a shop projecting two and a half feet over a pavement 16 feet wide to be an
unlawful obstruction); Wolverton U.D.C. v. Willis, 126 J.P. 84 (Q.B. 1962) (Lord
Parker) (holding a display of vegetables projecting I 1 inches beyond the line of a
greengrocer's shop to be unlawful because any encroachment was deemed to obstruct
and incommode passage); Pitcher v. Lockett, [1966] Crim. L.R. 283 (Q.B.) (Lord Parker)
(upholding the conviction of a mobile hot dog vendor in Bournemouth under the
Highways Act for parking along the curb with other cars); Scarfe v. Wood, [1969] Crim.
L.R. 265 (Q.B.) (Lord Parker) (reiterating that a potential obstruction was sufficient to
convict where youths stood on the pavement and forced people to walk around them);
see also London Borough of Redbridge v. Jaques, [1970] 1 W.L.R. 1604 (Q.B.)
(upholding a trader's conviction for selling vegetables from a van with the local
council's approval because it temporarily prevented free passage of the public over every
part of the road); Cambridgeshire C.C. v. Rust, [1972] 2 Q.B. 426 (holding that a trader
could be convicted under the Highways Act even though local officials condoned his
vegetable stall); Cooper v. M.P.C., 82 Cr. App. R. 238 (Q.B. 1986) (upholding the
conviction of "club tout' under the Highways Act for stopping pedestrians for one
minute to advertise a nearby club); Dixon v. Atfield, [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1171 (Q.B.)
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interpretation of the "all the circumstances" test-one that included the
"right to protest" as a factor in the calibration of reasonableness-would
on the analysis of Lords Scarman and Denning yield priority to public
passage. No case held and few even suggested that a demonstration was
in fact a "reasonable use" of the highway.415 The doctrinal signifi-
cance of Hirst resided less in its apparent support for civil liberties than
in its alignment of the test for meetings and processions, subjecting both
to a malleable standard that could circumvent a rigid dichotomy based
on a marcher's "right" to pass along the road.
b. The New Unreasonableness of Processions
A departure from the traditional framework was also evident in greater
judicial readiness to define "legitimate passage" to exclude certain
processions. In Samuelson v. Bagnall,416 for example, the court upheld
a conviction under the Highways Act by rejecting a political marcher's
assertion of a "right to passage." The prosecution was prompted by a
series of "Stop the City" protest demonstrations in 1983 and 1984 aimed
at bringing the City of London to a halt by a variety of disruptive
activities. In one incident a large group broke through a police cordon
and proceeded down Cornwall Street. The police attempted to defuse
(finding it unreasonable for an antique dealer to erect a metal pole three inches in
diameter on the sidewalk to prevent heavy vehicles from damaging his 400-year-old
store); Durham C.C. v. Scott [1990] Crim. L.R. 726 (Q.B.) (holding it unreasonable for
a livestock dealer to put a gate across a bridlepath to prevent his livestock from
wandering onto the road). One particularly narrow case, Devon County Council v.
Gateway Foodmarket, Ltd., 154 J.P. 551 (Q.B. 1990), applying both Nagy and Hirst,
found that three parallel rows of shopping trolleys located in a pedestrian shopping
precinct for 11 years constituted a highway obstruction. In the view of the court, the
magistrates had placed too much emphasis on the service to shoppers that the trolleys
provided and the absence of any complaints. The court interpreted Hirst not to require
an actual obstruction and noted that the trolleys denied the public free access over the
whole of the highway. It remanded the case with a direction to convict. Id. at 564-65.
As evidence of the strictness of the Divisional Court's approach, in Seekings, Wolverton,
Rust, Dixon, and Scott, as well as in Gateway, it actually reversed dismissals of charges
by the magistrates.
415. There was helpful dicta, however, in North Her~fordshire D.C. v. Jones, Crown
Office List, CO/454/93 (Q.B. 1993) available in LEXIS, Enggen Library, Cases File,
which affirmed the magistrates' decision to allow the defendant to sell food and drink
from a trailer in a layby along the highway. Mr. Justice Buckley, relying on Hirst,
explicitly referred to the possible reasonableness of activities unrelated to passage and
stated that if the council's argument were sound, many harmless and commonly accepted
activities such as demonstrating, handing out leaflets, and canvassing would be criminal
because not ancillary to the use of the highway. The judge observed that in most cases,
however, he would expect a tribunal to conclude that selling goods on the highway was
unreasonable.
416. Crown Office List, CO/605/84 (Q.B. 1985) available in LEXIS, Enggen
Library, Cases File.
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the protest by segregating part of the procession and directing it back
along another street, but the defendant stopped and informed a constable
that she wished to rejoin the main body of the march. The Divisional
Court considered whether she had violated the Act by attempting to pass
in one direction while a police officer was directing her to move in the
opposite direction. Samuelson's position was that the police had
violated her right to pass along the highway. The court, h6wever,
applying the analysis in Nagy, found that although the "ordinary citizen"
had the right to pass along a thoroughfare, the constable was correct in
obliging her to go the opposite way to protect persons and property.417
Assertion of the right to pass by a protestor thus no longer carried the
presumptive reasonableness extended to the Salvation Army in the
1880s, nor did the Nagy test necessarily dictate a result in favor of
freedom to march.
A similar reorientation of the "right to passage," eliding the right of
a demonstrator to march and focusing almost exclusively on the larger
right of the public to convenient travel, was also evident in the
government's treatment of certain vehicular processions. Beginning in
the 1970s "New Age travellers" began journeying annually in convoy to
Stonehenge to celebrate the summer solstice.418  By 1985 their num-
bers had swelled to 30,000, and in that year the local authorities,
vigorously resisting the travellers' claim of a right to move along the
highway, used obstruction law to repel their passage. The Wiltshire
Council closed the highway around Stonehenge between mid-May and
mid-July, and when a convoy of 140 vehicles nonetheless tried to reach
the monument, the council prosecuted over 500 travellers for various
offenses including obstruction of the highway.419 The following year,
on the day before the solstice, the police arrested 230 travellers at
417. Lord Justice May revealed his antipathy to the demonstrators when he observed
that the facts of the case "are unfortunately becoming more common nowadays ....
Anyone who has had the misfortune to be in a crowd which is other than wholly
disciplined knows how terrifying it can be." Id.
418. The first free festival at Stonehenge was held in 1974, and it thereafter became
an annual event leading to frequent confrontations with the Wiltshire police. See EWING
& GEARTY, supra note 370, at 125. The usual practice was for travellers to live in their
vehicles in Stonehenge and then proceed in convoy to the next free festival. NCCL,
supra note 292, at 4.
419. Trapped between two police road blocks, the convoy moved into an adjacent
field and engaged the police in what became known as the "Battle of the Beanfield."
NCCL, supra note 292, at 4-5.
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Hanging Langford for obstruction, even though NCCL observers
reported that there was no actual blockage of the highway. The police
detained the travellers without a hearing for eighteen hours to ensure that
they remained in custody over the period of the solstice.40 Local
councils displayed the same attitude to travelling gypsies, whose claim
of a right to free movement was invariably rejected by the courts.421
The fate of the gypsies and New Age travellers demonstrated that the
courts could easily dismiss the claims of vulnerable groups to freedom
of movement on the theory that the broader public's passage rights were
infringed.4'
The reconceptualization of the "right to passage" was apparent not just
in obstruction law but in the implementation of public order legislation
as well. Reflecting the intense domestic unease of the decade, the
number of banning orders issued under the Public Order Act 1936
dramatically increased after 1980. While the entire decade of the 1970s
had witnessed only eleven banning orders, there were seventy-five in the
four-year period from 1981-84 alone.4u
420. See id. at 26-28. That same year, when the peace convoy traveled the country
and caused obstruction to traffic in Dorset and Hampshire, the local authorities ordered
it to move off the road. See 98 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 733 (June 3, 1986). In
addition, the Salisbury District Council issued an order under section 21 of the Town
Police Clauses Act 1847 banning hippies from the city center for two specified days to
prevent a protest march. See NCCL, supra note 292, at 25; THORNTON, supra note 4,
at 93. Commenting on the use of obstruction charges against members of the hippie
convoy, the Home Secretary observed that the law on highway obstruction was "wide"
and gave "substantial powers to the police." 98 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 736-37
(June 3, 1986).
421. The gypsies complained of constant police harassment under successive
Highways Acts from 1835 to 1980. County councils employed the statute to interfere
with the gypsies' roving life style by evicting them from camp grounds on or near the
highway. For example, in R. v. Avon County Council, 58 P. & C.R. 356 (Q.B. 1988),
the court upheld the eviction of a gypsy encampment on the ground that the council had
a duty under the Highways Act 1980 to prevent obstruction and protect the rights of the
public to use and enjoy the highway. Similarly, in R. v. Essex County Council, 24
H.L.R. 90 (Q.B. 1990), the court validated the council's determination that the gypsies'
occupation of a layby on the highway constituted an obstruction of the highway and a
nuisance to adjoining owners and occupiers. See Philip Thomas, Housing Gypsies, 142
NEW L.J. 1714 (1992).
422. The police also used road blocks to interfere with freedom of passage along
the road. They employed the road blocks to limit protestors' access to military bases
during the CND campaign of the 1980s, especially at R.A.F. Molesworth in 1985; to
prevent the movement of pickets during the miners' strike; and to block the movement
of New Age travellers. See EWING & GEARTY, supra note 370, at 98-99, 111-12, 125.
Despite complaints of interference with passage, the legality of road blocks was not
judicially tested. See id. at 98-99.
423. REviEw OF PUBLIC ORDER LAW, 1985, Cmnd. 9510, 4.7. There were 42
banning orders in 1981, 13 in 1982, 9 in 1983, 11 in 1984, and 6 in 1985. Id.; see
A.T.H. Smith, The Public Order Act 1986, Part : The New Offences, 1987 CRIM. L.
REV. 156, 174. Bans continued to be imposed throughout the decade, though less
1026
[VOL. 34: 921, 1997] Freedom of Assembly
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
That the courts applied minimal scrutiny in reviewing the validity of
these orders was demonstrated by Kent v. Metropolitan Police Commis-
sioner,424 which considered a banning order issued shortly after the
Brixton riots in April 1981. Sir David McNee, the Police Commission-
er, imposed the ban to prevent a CND march protesting police conduct
during the riots. Inasmuch as the Act did not permit him to single out
an individual march, he obtained the Home Secretary's consent for a
twenty-eight-day prohibition on all public processions within the
Metropolitan Police District, an area covering 786 square miles.'
The NCCL, representing the CND, argued that the ban was ultra vires
the Public Order Act because it encompassed an excessively wide area
and affected too many different organizations and events.
The Court of Appeal judges unanimously rejected the claim. Quoting
from his Hubbard opinion, Lord Denning declared that the passage
rights of the wider public, combined with the possibility of violence,
justified restrictions on freedom of assembly. Again conceiving the right
of passage as antithetical to the right to march, he noted that even at
common law a procession was unlawful if it produced "undue distur-
bance of the traffic" or prevented ordinary citizens from "going up or
down the roads." 426 This statement did not represent a formal depar-
ture from the law-an unreasonable procession had always been unlaw-
frequently than in the early 1980s. Examples included bans on marches by Protestants
and Catholics in Manchester in 1987, 176 PARL. DE1., H.C. (6th ser.) 204w (July 11,
1990), a nine-day ban on marches in Dewsbury, West Yorkshire, provoked by
controversy over Salmon Rushdie's Satanic Verses, see Gearty, supra note 398, at 55,
and a ban against all processions within a four-mile radius of Stonehenge in 1989, see
EWING & GEARTY, supra note 370, at 127.
424. TIMES (London), May 13, 1981 (C.A.) (a fuller report is contained in LEXIS,
Enggen Library, Cases File).
425. Id.
426. Id. He acknowledged that the ban would catch in its net a fair at Chiselhurst,
a carnival at Fulham, a student procession against cuts in student aid, and marches of
jobless people to see their M.P.s. But he found that recent instances of violence created
a sufficient risk of public disorder, even from a peaceful demonstration attacked by
hooligans, to justify a ban. Lord Justice Ackner similarly observed that although the
right to demonstrate was important, the police had discretion to suspend it temporarily
to prevent bloodshed. Sounding the familiar refrain that crowds invariably attracted
criminal elements, he also commented that the ban was an attempt to control "hooligans,
not the members of the peaceful march." Id. The references to "hooligans" indicated
that the court was willing to depart from Beatty's "hostile audience" ruling: although
the danger came not from marchers but from hooligans and others who might attack the
police, the judges upheld the ban nonetheless.
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ful-but it reflected a much more stringent definition of "reason-
ableness." Previously the cultural consensus that balanced individual
freedom and societal convenience had largely treated the "right to
passage" of the marcher as an acceptable obstruction of the public.
Under Lord Denning's analysis, however, it was difficult to imagine a
procession that would not interfere with citizens "going up and down the
roads." In addition, the judges displayed considerable readiness to defer
to the Police Commissioner's judgment, underscored by the fact that
McNee submitted only minimal evidence in support of the banning
decision. Sir Denys Bucldey, another of the judges, aclMowledged that
the evidence was "meagre" but nonetheless concluded that "this is a
matter for the Commissioner to decide in his discretion."427 By the
1980s the government had shed its reluctance to use the banning power
against processions and, as Kent revealed, had no reason to fear
interference by the courts.428
c. Legislative Functionalism: The Public Order Act 1986
Beginning in 1980 rising public alarm at the seemingly uncontrollable
tide of domestic violence prompted several official inquiries into the
effectiveness of existing public order controls. Collectively, the various
reports affirmed the importance of passage and-as did all formal
expositions of the law, whether cases, treatises, reports, or legisla-
tion--persisted in treating meetings and processions as different
conceptual categories. Nonetheless, the tone of these reports, their
recommendations, and even their very internal inconsistencies, suggested
a growing realization that the doctrinal resolution of the 1880s had
outlived its usefulness.
In 1980 the Conservative Government presented its preliminary
proposals in a Green Paper429 that in terms of overall approach relied
heavily on the Scarman Report. "The review has as its starting point,"
it proclaimed, "the need to safeguard certain fundamental human
rights-the rights of peaceful assembly and public protest and the right
to public order and tranquillity. ' 3" Reviewing the existing law, it
noted that "to be lawful, the use of the highway must be a use for the
427. Id.
428. See J.A. GRIFFITH, THE PoLincs OF THE JUDIcIARY 163 (4th ed. 1991) (stating
that the courts consistently lent support to the police over the individual); Bevan, supra
note 142, at 168 (claiming that the Home Secretary rubber stamped the decisions of the
police chiefs).
429. REVIEW OF PUBLIC ORDER AcT 1936, supra note 370.
430. Id. 12 (quoting SCARMAN REPORT, supra note 374, 5).
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purposes of passage along the highway., 431 While respecting the legal
convention of differentiating between meetings and processions, it
acknowledged that there were many different types of assembly and that
individual instances of each could be more or less disorderly. Marches
on occasion could cause "serious traffic congestion, disruption to
business and inconvenience to those who wish to go about their business
or pleasure without obstruction,'432 but the great majority did not cause
serious problems.433 In fact, much recent disorder had arisen in
relation to meetings, 434 and thus some restrictions on stationary
assemblies might be necessary.435 While making few concrete propos-
als, the report implied that general distinctions between stationary and
moving demonstrations were no longer adequate to resolve complex
problems of public order, and it also exhibited a new emphasis on
protecting the public from mere "inconvenience" as well as breaches of
the peace.436
Shortly thereafter, the House of Commons Select Committee on Home
Affairs released its own series of recommendations.4 37  Its second
43 1. Id. 17. It echoed the traditional wisdom with respect to the legality of public
assemblies, that there was no specific right to demonstrate but a person was free to do
so provided that the law was not contravened. Id. 24. It rejected recognition of a
statutory right:
It is sometimes said that the law gives undue prominence to the right of
passage along the highway, and that it should also recognise a right to stand
in the highway provided the rights of passage of others are not thereby
infringed. A statutory right to demonstrate might help in this... [but] would
be a novel and uncharted step.
Id. 99 25-26.
432. Id. 39.
433. Id. 35.
434. Id. 75. The report referred specifically to demonstrations against National
Front meetings in Birmingham in August 1977 and February 1978 and at Southall in
April 1979. Id. It also noted that stationary demonstrations could take many different
forms and be arranged for a variety of purposes, including rallies outside embassies,
demonstrations in support of industrial pickets, and nonpolitical gatherings such as street
carnivals, pop festivals, and sporting events. Some had a major impact on the
community, while others caused no disruption. Id. T 77. New legislation should
therefore "be directed to particular problems." Id. 78.
435. REVIEW OF PUBLIC ORDER ACT 1936, supra note 370, 99 75-76.
436. A Public Order Act was still necessary, it maintained, because disorder
continued to occur on a scale that "prevents other people from pursuing their own
activities." Id. 30.
437. HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 312. The first sentence of the
report explicitly dispensed with the need to pronounce on the "right" to demonstrate in
a public highway, because in English law such "freedoms" were no more and no less
1029
paragraph, quoting from the Scarman Report, issued a reminder that
English law recognized the right of passage as paramount. 38 Reflect-
ing a renewed anxiety about processions, the report noted that there had
been a very substantial increase in recent years of "demonstrations by
processing in the highway" that had disturbed normal residential and
business activity.439 This formulation again characterized processions
not as exercises of the right to pass but as "demonstrations by process-
ing" that interfered with "normal life." As for meetings, they "could
pose just as great a threat to public order as those that seek to make their
point while processing along the highway."'  Again, the report
acknowledged that individual instances of both types of assembly could
create unacceptable public burdens." Indeed, the evidence before the
Committee suggested that the demarcation between the two categories
was elusive," 2 and Sir David McKnee, the Police Commissioner,
advocated recognition of the fact that "groups of people often gather in
a manner and behave in a way covered by none of these concepts.""
43
While respecting the formal distinction between meetings and
processions, the Committee Report advocated a seventy-two-hour
advance notice requirement for both types of demonstrations. 4
Interestingly, it maintained that an identical notice provision would have
different legal consequences for meetings and processions. In the case
of a procession, a notice requirement would effectively recognize a
than the right to do anything that was lawful. The concern of the Committee was "more
practical," seeking to determine whether the Public Order Act "goes further than
necessary, or not far enough, in its extension of the legal restrictions upon the use of the
public highway." 1 id. 1.
438. Id. 2.
439. Id. 3. The Public Order Act 1936, it maintained, was proving inadequate to
keep disruptive processions in check. Id. The Report cited evidence by the Metropoli-
tan Police that with respect to a fairly average procession, "[i]magine the number of
aeroplanes and trains missed, business appointments spoilt and social arrangements
completely ruined." Id. 25.
440. Id. 67.
441. The report found that since 1974, 8 of 17 metropolitan events involving serious
disorder had been processions and the remainder stationary demonstrations; of 407
demonstrations occurring in the preceding year, 106 were processions and 301 were
meetings and assemblies. Id. 66.
442. Evidence from the Association of Chief Police Officers suggested that disorder
was often caused by large numbers of counter-demonstrators moving from road junction
to road junction to mount stationary demonstrations against a procession. 2 id. at 60.
Moreover, the eight processions causing major disorder the previous year had all been
either preceded or followed by a meeting. Id. at 234.
443. Id. at 42.
444. 1 id. 37-38, 72. The Report noted that according to the Home Office, there
had been at least 115 local enactments requiring notice of processions, id. 132, and that
in any event the great majority of organizers-85% in London-voluntarily notified the
police of their intentions. Id. 33.
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limited "right to march." 5 However, in the case of a "static demon-
stration," such a requirement "would not confer any statutory 'right' to
cause an obstruction on the highway, but would merely recognise certain
current practices and seek to regulate them in a consistent manner in the
interest of the public as a whole.' 6 This contorted statement reflect-
ed the report's effort to respect traditional doctrine affirming the
legitimacy of processions and the illegality of meetings while in fact
offering recommendations that treated them as functionally equiva-
lent. 47
In 1985 the government finally issued a White Paper presenting and
justifying the specific legislative proposals that it intended to introduce
into Parliament."8  Following the earlier reports, it considered the
situation of meetings and marches in separate sections while minimizing
the significance of general doctrinal categories in favor of focusing on
the specific characteristics of particular demonstrations. The White
Paper noted, for example, that "[s]tatic demonstrations may be thought
in general to be less disruptive than marches, but on occasion they can
445. Id. 36. The Report stated: "The NCCL pressed upon us the need for a
statutory right to march, assemble and demonstrate. No case has been made out for such
a wide measure, but we realise that a statutory notice requirement would in effect
recognise a limited right to march. In other words, legal standing is confirmed for a
march by the requirement and acceptance of notice." Id.
446. Id. 72.
447. It supported authorizing the police to impose limiting conditions on both types
of assemblies to prevent "serious disruption to the normal life of the community." Id.
26. This broader standard was necessary because "the public are entitled to a criterion
which takes into account their 'human right' to a normal life .... ." Id. The test for a
ban on processions would remain "reasonable apprehension of serious public disorder."
Id. 41. In the case of both meetings and processions, the Committee hoped that
enhanced coercive powers would facilitate informal arrangements: "In our view,
problems of public order are much more likely to be resolved by the greatest possible
degree of consultation and cooperation between demonstrators and the police... ." Id.
100.
448. REVIEW OF PUBLIC ORDER LAW, supra note 423. The White Paper also drew
on two earlier reports. In 1981 Lord Scarman conducted an inquiry into the Brixton
riots. THE BRIXTON DIsORDERS: REPORT OF AN INQUIRY BY THE RT. HON. THE LORD
SCARMAN, 1981, Cmnd. 8427. He supported amending the Public Order Act to require
advance notice of an intended procession, id. 7.45-a change of mind from the Red
Lion Square Report, see SCARMAN REPORT, supra note 374, 128-as well as a less
stringent test for triggering restrictions, THE BRIxrON DISORDERS, supra, 7A6. Two
years later the Law Commission issued a report recommending a codification of the
common law offenses, but it did not deal with the crimes of public nuisance or wilful
obstruction of the highway. LAW COMMISSION, REPORT No. 123, CRIMINAL
LAW-OFFENSES RELATING TO PUBLIC ORDER, 1983, H.C. 85.
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deliberately or inadvertently result in serious disruption. ... .", It
therefore advocated police authority to subject meetings as well as
processions to limiting conditions. It rejected bans on meetings,
however, presumably because existing law was more stringent in relation
to meetings and such a step would have radically departed from previous
practice.45 Echoing the new judicial attitude toward meetings, the
government observed that they were "a more important means of
exercising freedom of speech than are marches.""45  In a significant
change from the 1936 Act, it proposed adding the criterion of "serious
disruption to the life of the community" to the existing standard of
"serious public disorder" as a basis for imposing conditions on both
meetings and marches.452 As the examples set forth in the White
Paper made clear, such "serious disruption" could include relatively
ordinary traffic congestion and similar interferences with passage.'
The "convenience" rationale of obstruction doctrine had thus come to
invade the law of public order itself.
The Public Order Act 1986 substantially followed these lines. Its most
significant features were the authorization to impose restrictions on
meetings as well as processions" and its inclusion of "serious disrup-
tion to the life of the community" as a basis for so doing.4 5 In a
449. REvIEW OF PUBLIC ORDER LAW, supra note 423, 5.9; see id. 5.1. The
government was referring in particular to picketing activity, especially the exceptionally
violent miners' strike of 1984-85. See SARAH MCCABE & PETER WALLINOTON, THE
POLICE, PUBLIC ORDER AND CIviL LIBERTIES 116-17 (1988); Gearty, supra note 398,
at 62.
450. REvIEW OF PUBLIC ORDER LAW, supra note 423, 5.3.
451. Id. 5.3. This was presumably because meetings were theoretically a forum
for discussing ideas, and a power to ban was viewed as a "major infringement on
freedom of speech." Id. The White Paper also rejected a notice requirement for
meetings while proposing one for processions, suggesting that in the former case a
requirement would "inundate the police with notifications of perfectly peaceful
meetings." Id. 5.4 The government might also have been concerned, however, that
a notice requirement would confer some type of legal recognition on the right to meet.
452. Id. 5.5.
453. It suggested that serious disruption might include traffic congestion due to
marches held in shopping centers on Saturdays or in city centers in rush hour. Id.
4.22. "The proposed test would enable the police to re-route a march if they believed
it was likely to be seriously disruptive to the traffic, the shops or the shoppers." Id.
454. Public Order Act, 1986, ch. 64, §§ 12, 14. The police could impose whatever
restrictions appeared necessary on processions. d. § 12(1). However, in the case of
assemblies, defined as "twenty or more persons in a public place which is wholly or
partly open to the air," id. § 16, they could impose only conditions relating to place,
duration, and number. Id. § 14(1).
455. The other criteria were serious public disorder, serious damage to property,
and, in an obvious reference to mass picketing by trade unions, where the purpose of the
protest was intimidation of others. Id. § 12.
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telling statement in the House of Lords, Lord Denning explained why he
supported the phrase "serious disruption to the life of the community":
I can illustrate the point by referring to the sometimes long and tedious
processions which obstruct the traffic and life of the community. A little while
ago I hired a cab to take me from Lincoln's Inn to Victoria Station and allowed
25 minutes for the purpose. But, lo and behold, when we got towards
Whitehall there was going along a procession of indefinite length, and I missed
my train. Surely that is, "serious disruption to the life of the community."'
456
The new test thus shifted the standard for regulating assemblies away
from the criminal law test of violence or disorder and toward the
nuisance standard of convenience.457 Opposing this development, Lord
Scarman warned the House of Lords:
[Miany, particularly those who are as well-dressed as the noble Lords and noble
Baronesses of this House, will say that the life of the community is the ability
to walk down the street unmolested, go quietly into the supermarket, watch your
husband or your wife buy what you then have to pay for, and then come out
and go home. That is part of the life of the community but it is not all of
it.
458
In response, the Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, agreed to issue a
circular reminding the police to consider the rights of the people to
assemble and demonstrate peacefully.4"9 This hardly assuaged liberal
concerns. As some critics objected, the provision threatened to permit
only demonstrations that were so convenient that they became invisi-
ble.460
456. 480 PARL. DEB., H.L. (6th ser.) 10-11 (October 6, 1986). Lord Hutchinson
responded that he would have missed his train equally had there been a royal procession
or a visiting head of government on that day. Id. at 11.
457. Douglas Hurd, in moving the second reading of the bill, stressed the need for
"[q]uiet streets and a peaceful framework for our individual lives." 89 PARL. DEB., H.C.
(6th ser.) 792 (Jan. 13, 1986).
458. 476 PARL. DEB., H.L. (6th ser.) 540 (June 13, 1986). He also noted: "The
blocking of a pavement, the snarl-up of traffic, the shouting of slogans, the vigil outside
premises-all these may disrupt some part of a community's life, the shoppers or the
inhabitants. The judgment is purely subjective." He believed that the policy "very
seriously erodes the freedom of the citizen to meet or to march." Id. at 526.
459. 96 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 1065 (Apr. 30, 1986). Hurd insisted that if
there were a formal right to demonstrate or to march, the "presumption that the law
gives other rights"-presumably passage--would be undermined. 89 PARL. DEB., H.C.
(6th ser.) 860 (Jan. 13, 1986).
460. Two professors at the University of Leicester warned that the test of "serious
disruption of the life of the community" dangerously enhanced police powers because
some degree of nuisance was an almost inevitable consequence of any protest of
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Obstruction concepts had thus come to permeate the law of public
order, yet had themselves been transformed in the process. The "right
of passage" was now largely the public's right to move conveniently
down the street in pursuit of "normal life," and it seemingly could no
longer be asserted by a marching demonstrator who was literally passing
along the highway. Although the marcher had secured the protection of
the "right to passage" in the 1880s owing to historical contingency rather
than logical necessity, the concept had held the law in its tenacious grasp
for over a century. In the 1980s the Conservative government,
supported by public and judicial opinion, wrenched the "right of
passage" from its century-old meaning, recasting it almost exclusively
as the right to public convenience, and imprinted this nuisance concept
directly onto public order law.
Although critics despaired that the "breathtaking" assault launched
against civil liberties in the 1980s "strikes at the very heart of legitimate
protest,"461 Public Order Act restrictions were entirely discretionary,
and the police in any event already possessed extensive powers to
control street activity. For purposes of the right to passage, the
conceptual significance of the Act was that in augmenting the range of
available controls and in reorienting concepts of passage, it allowed the
police to treat assemblies on an individualized basis regardless of
whether they were moving or stationary. Ostensibly respecting the
dichotomy between meetings and processions, the Act went far toward
equalizing their status, thus oddly complementing the expanded judicial
concept of "reasonableness" in the context of meetings. Both develop-
ments, restrictive and expansive, maximized the discretion of magistrates
significant size, and freedom of assembly was now dependent on the wise exercise of
discretion by the police with virtually no effective external control. David Bonner &
Richard Stone, The Public Order Act 1986: Steps in the Wrong Direction?, 1987 PUB.
L. 202, 213, 226; see, e.g., ST. JOHN ROBILLIARD & JENNY MCEwvAN, POLICE POWERS
AND THE INDIVIDUAL 259-60 (1986) (commenting that the new Act was no longer linked
with preservation of the peace and that a right that could be exercised only when it did
not inconvenience the majority was not worth having); PETER THORNTON, DECADE OF
DECLINE 36 (1989) (explaining that the test meant that the police could accept the fears
of local shopkeepers that pavements would be crowded and of local motorists that streets
would be blocked); Phil Scraton, 'If You Want a Riot, Change the Law': The
Implications of the 1985 White Paper on Public Order, 12 J. LAW & Soc'y 385, 387
(1985).
461. See THORNTON, supra note 460, at 1, 35-36. Thornton, as others, was
concerned that the imposition of conditions could be as effective as an outright ban.
See, e.g., Bonner & Stone, supra note 460, at 222; Gearty, supra note 398, at 52. In
addition to extending police controls over processions and creating new statutory controls
over open-air meetings, the Act created new public order offenses such as violent
conduct and criminal trespass, codified the common law crimes of riot, rout, and
unlawful assembly, and extended the "threatening, abuse and insulting" provision of the
Public Order Act 1936. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 423, at 156.
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and police to discriminate between what they perceived as benign and
objectionable assemblies. By thus reconceiving the "right to passage,"
the government and the courts undermined the functional significance of
formal doctrine. The new pragmatic approach to public assemblies may
have benefitted meetings--though this was dubious given the primacy
of passage in the "reasonableness" analysis-but it certainly eroded the
importance of passage as a protestor's tool. The marcher was now, as
the stationary demonstrator had always been, subservient to the
convenience of the public.
V. HIGHWAY OBSTRUCTION AND FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
In focusing on the use of obstruction law against particular groups in
critical periods of disorder, the previous sections have not conveyed the
full story. The larger picture, extending beyond the statutes, regulations,
law reports, and other formal documents of the law, was one of
widespread police toleration of "technical" obstructions. This dominant
police practice of nonenforcement had significant implications for
evolving concepts of freedom of assembly.
In both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the police possessed
unparalleled discretion in deciding whether to tolerate, constrain,
disperse, arrest, or prosecute street activity. One chief constable
proclaimed that, in the vast majority of cases, the police "exercise their
own discretion, unsupervised, in the enforcement or non-enforcement of
the law."'4 2  According to another student of police behavior, the
462. JOHN ALDERSON, LAW AND DIsORDER 68 (1984). Alderson, who was Chief
Constable of Down and Cornwall, noted that the police decided not only whether or not
to report an offense but in over ninety percent of criminal cases whether to prosecute.
Id. at 61; see, e.g., EMSLEY, supra note 65, at 139; GRIITH, supra note 428, at 158.
The disinclination of the courts to review police discretion was revealed in R. v. Chief
Constable of the Devon and Cornwall Constabulary, [1981] 3 All E.R. 826 (C.A.), a
case involving Alderson. Although the Court of Appeal declared criminal the protestors'
conduct in obstructing the Central Electricity Generating Board's efforts to survey land
for the construction of power stations in Cornwall, it nonetheless refused to issue an
order of mandamus against Alderson that would require him to remove the protestors.
Alderson had refused to arrest the demonstrators because he did not apprehend a breach
of the peace. Lord Denning stated that although he did not share this view--and if he
were wrong every passive resister in the land would have license "to cock a snook at the
law" and hold up works of national importance-he would not issue an order because
it was "of the first importance that the police should decide on their own responsibility
what action should be taken in a particular situation." Id. at 833; see ALDERSON, supra,
at 181-89.
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police in England "are subject to fewer constitutional, legal and political
restraints than in virtually any other Western democracy.'" This
discretion was particularly evident in the area of obstruction, as the
police could always choose to ignore political gatherings or "move
people along" without instituting formal arrests and prosecutions.4
The magnitude of the constables' discretion was underscored by the fact
that even the "centralized" restrictions on civil liberties contained in the
Public Order Acts of 1936 and 1986 only enhanced the potential controls
available to local law enforcement officials.4 65 In the 1980s, as a
century earlier, the regime of public order was dominated by police
discretion.
Although this systemic discretion led to considerable uncertainty for
individual protestors regarding the legal consequences of any single
politically expressive act in the street, the authorities generally enforced
the law in predictable ways. A prosecution usually produced a
conviction-invariably, of course, in the case of meetings-and in
periods of domestic turmoil the police applied the law strictly against
organizations whose activities they considered politically objectionable.
In most periods and against most groups, however, they were broadly
tolerant. The Solicitors 'Journal observed in 1867 that "it is well known
that if the law of public meetings were put into force, or were morally
in force in this country with strictness, scarce a public meeting could be
innocently held." 6 Twenty years later Mr. Justice Charles maintained
463. LAURENCE LUSTGARTEN, THE GOVERNANCE OF POLICE 9 (1936); see, e.g.,
REINER, supra note 281, at 210-11 (noting that the police inevitably have discretion in
enforcement because they lack adequate resources for full enforcement and because the
logically open texture of rules makes interpretive discretion inevitable).
464. David Williams commented in 1967 that in "few areas of the criminal law is
the exercise of the discretion to prosecute of greater importance." WILLIAMS, supra note
3, at 211; see, e.g., EMSLEY, supra note 65, at 139 (arrests for street offenses depended
on the discretion of the individual police officer, who could always let someone off with
a warning); Jennifer Davis, Prosecutions and Their Context, in POLICING AND PROSECU-
TION IN BRITAIN, 1750-1850, at 397, 425 (Douglas Hay & Francis Snyder eds., 1989)
(the police made constant use of informal sanctions in addition to arrest and prosecu-
tion); Leslie Stein, Municipal Controls over Freedom of Assembly in Canada and the
United States, 1971 PuB. L. 115, 123-24.
465. Both acts left conditions on demonstrations to the discretion of the police, and
although the local council and Home Office had to approve a ban on processions, in the
first instance the chief police officer had to determine that it was necessary. THORNTON,
supra note 4, at 146; see Bevan, supra note 142, at 168 (local councillors and the Home
Secretary deferred to the judgment of the local chiefs of police). Moreover, Parliament
intended the powers to be used primarily as a police lever to achieve informal regulation
by means of negotiated agreements with organizers. See supra note 447 and
accompanying text.
466. 11 SoLiC. J. & REP. 891 (1867). The journal also later noted that "practically
speaking," the obstruction caused by processions and demonstrations was not generally
sufficient to induce anyone to take proceedings. Note, supra note 126, at 689.
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in Cunninghame Graham that although members of the public had no
right to discuss social, political, or religious questions in the street, they
often did so without objection.467  Even in the 1930s the general
practice of nonenforcement of obstruction law was evident 4 68 a pattern
that persisted in the post-war period.469 As a commentator noted in
1981, the police normally permitted all groups to hold orderly demon-
strations despite the strain that the practice imposed on law enforcement:
"Quite possibly, London is the site of more parades and demonstrations
than any other city in the world. 470
Underenforcement was, of course, inevitable as a matter of general
police practice, especially in the case of obstruction, which was an
offense that most demonstrators unavoidably committed. The pattern of
underenforcement, however, also enjoyed broad institutional support.
The courts explicitly sanctioned the policy because they were uncomfort-
able enforcing technical rules against obstruction, even though they did
so strictly when confronted with a given prosecution. For example, the
case of Llandudno Urban District Council v. Woods,471 in which the
467. R. v. Cunninghame Graham & Bums, 16 Cox C.C. 420, 429-30 (Cent Crim.
Ct. 1888); see, e.g., 186 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 1964 (May 3, 1867) (M.P.
commenting that although the police in 1864 permitted weekly meetings in Trafalgar
Square, nobody who had ever talked with a lawyer "could suppose that there was any
legal right to meet there"); 192 Parl. Deb., H.C. (4th ser.) 49 (July 9, 1908) (Herbert
Gladstone observing that the police would generally not intervene in temperance
meetings); 314 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 1759-60 (May 12, 1887) (Matthews insisting
that meetings that did not obstruct traffic were not interfered with by the police);
RICHTER, supra note 59, at 15.
468. See, e.g., Goodhardt, supra note 274, at 165 (remarking that the number of
meetings "which are not technical nuisances" was very limited, but "it may not be the
practice to prohibit them"); Jennings, supra note 305, at 17 (observing that the law on
highway obstruction was usually not rigidly enforced, and street comer meetings were
frequently permitted); Wade, supra note 297, at 180-81 (commenting that the police in
the exercise of their discretion did not usually enforce the law of obstruction).
469. In 1976 Mr. Justice Forbes stated in Hubbard v. Pitt, [1976] 1 Q.B. 142, that
stationary demonstrations on the highway were often permitted because available legal
remedies were not put into operation. Id. at 157. According to John Dellow, the
Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, "the essential legal entitlement is to
have passage of the highway," but in normal circumstances "nobody is going to take that
particular nice piece of law." 2 HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 312,
at 53; see M. GLENN ABERNqATHY, THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY AND AssOcIATION 63 (2d
ed. 1981) (pointing out that the usual practice both in the United States and England was
not to take official action against meetings that constituted a technical obstruction only).
470. See Barnum, supra note 413, at 89 (estimating that one thousand parades and
demonstrations occurred in London in 1979).
471. [1899] 2 Ch. 705.
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local council sued an Anglican clergyman for delivering sermons on the
beach, exasperated the court. Although the judges decided the case in
the council's favor, as they were compelled to do under the law, one
judge considered the action "wholly unnecessary, and one which ought
not to have been brought."4' The audience enjoyed the defendant's
speeches, he noted, and he could not understand "why they should be
deprived of this innocent pleasure" when no one was obliged to
listen.473 Similarly, even as Mr. Justice Wills in Ex parte Lewis
pronounced the absence of a right of public meeting, he anticipated no
difficulties with assemblies "when the only and legitimate object is
public discussion, and no ulterior and injurious results are likely to
happen." "Things are done every day," he continued, "in every part of
the kingdom, without let or hindrance, which there is not and cannot be
a legal right to do, and not unfrequently are submitted to with a good
grace because they are in their nature incapable, by whatever amount of
user, of growing into a right."'474
This pattern of underenforcing obstruction violations encouraged the
emergence of a popular belief in freedom of assembly despite the fact
that street meetings were unquestionably impermissible under the law.
The nineteenth century witnessed a burgeoning of notions of a constitu-
tional right to assemble,4 75 and by the early twentieth century such
472. Id. at 709 (Cozens-Hardy, J.).
473. Id.
474. Exparte Lewis, 21 Q.B.D. 191, 197 (1888). In R. v. Londondeny, the court
similarly observed that many "undertakings that soften the asperities of gregarious life"
depended not upon the law but upon "mutual forbearance and good will." 28 L.R. Ir.
440, 463 (Q.B. 1891); see also, e.g., Deakin v. Milne, 20 Sc. L.R. 30, 32 (H.C.J. 1883)
(insisting that use of the streets of a town "cannot admit of any very stem or rigid rules
to be enforced in all cases" and that there was "a good deal of discretion and even
forbearance to be exercised in regard to the use of the streets"); Harrison v. Duke of
Rutland, [1893] 1 Q.B. 142 (observing that many violations of passage were too trivial
to justify an action); Seekings v. Clarke, 59 L.G.R. 268 (Q.B. 1961) (Lord Parker
remarking that although the ordinary citizen generally regarded strict enforcement of the
Highways Act as "unneighbourly and unnecessary," when a matter was brought to his
attention, he must pronounce on the legal position). J.R. Spencer has remarked on the
English judicial preference for broad criminal offenses tempered by the discretion not
to prosecute; there was a tradition, he noted, of "laying down rules that, in the usual
case, no one is really expected to comply with or seriously expected to be prosecuted
for breaking." J.R. Spencer, Cannibalism and the Common Law, 51 U. Cmii. L. REv.
1265, 1270-72 (1984) (book review).
475. According to William Holdsworth, in the eighteenth century the right of public
meeting was hardly viewed as a constitutional right of the subject; indeed, Blackstone
did not even mention it. However, the "constant agitation-political, religious, social,
and economic--which has characterized the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, has been
the cause which has made the right of public meeting an important topic of constitutional
law." WILUAM HOLDSWORTH, supra note 59, at 702; see Handley, supra note 59, at
134-35.
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beliefs were widely held.4 76 In light of the absence of a positive right
of public meeting and the actual illegality of assemblies under obstruc-
tion law, such a development was only possible because of widespread
police condonation of obstruction offenses. That is, the norm of failing
to enforce obstruction law permitted a belief in freedom of assembly as
a practical political right regardless of its formal legal status.
Although there were many diverse theories of rights in popular
currency,4"7 most proponents of a right to public meeting--certainly
the leaders of popular political movements-knew full well that meetings
unlawfully violated the "right to passage." They nonetheless claimed the
right to public meeting as a practical right created by customary
nonenforcement of patently unlawful conduct. Regarding a proposed
reform meeting in Hyde Park in 1867, John Bright stated that "although
technically and legally the Government may have the right to close the
Park, yet practically it has no such right in regard to the ordinary and
common enjoyment of it. 478 Similarly, Cunninghame Graham insisted
during the Trafalgar Square controversy that "great and undue impor-
476. The litigants in public order cases, for example, all claimed a "right of public
meeting." See, e.g., Bailey v. Williamson, 8 L.R.-Q.B. 118, 125 (1873) (claiming a right
to deliver addresses in the park); De Morgan v. Metro. Bd. of Works, 5 Q.B.D. 155,
157-58 (1880) (claiming a right of public meeting on the common); Lewis, 21 Q.B.D.
at 197 (claiming a right to hold public meetings in Trafalgar Square); Llandudno Urban
Dist. Council, [1899] 2 Ch. at 707 (claiming a right to preach on the seashore as on an
ordinary highway); Brighton Corp. v. Packham, 72 J.P. 318 (Ch. 1908) (claiming an
immemorial right to hold meetings); M'ara v. Magistrates of Edinburgh, [1913] Sess.
Cas. (J.) 1059, 1061 (claiming a right to hold meetings "in accordance with the
constitutional law of the country"); Aldred v. Miller, [1924] J.C. 117, 119 (claiming a
right to deliver political addresses in the street).
477. For example, some believed-or at least claimed to believe-that meetings
were not prohibited or "unlawful," but that a right to meet was simply not legally
enforceable. The Radical Sir Charles Russell, for example, commented on the right of
public meeting: "I do not assert that it is a legal right in itself in the same sense as a
private legal right which is enforceable by action at law, but I do say it is a Constitution-
al right on the part of the community.... ." 333 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 1002 (Mar.
5, 1889); see also 323 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 118-19 (Mar. 2, 1888) (M.P. asserting
that the right was not an enforceable legal right, but a practice that could not arbitrarily
be dealt with and that approached a legal right). The argument of this Article is
somewhat different that many political leaders acknowledged the unlawfulness of
meetings under highway law but considered this irrelevant in light of the customary
expectations created by patterns of nonenforcement.
478. 186 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 1956 (May 3, 1867). He continued that "the
right, if there be such a right, to close the Park absolutely any day is a right practically
of no effect. It is incomplete, is not intended to be exercised and never has been
exercised." Id.
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tance has been attached to the mere legal side of the question," and that
"the popular side has been altogether forgotten."479  Those who
tramped the streets in search of employment, he pointed out, were not
concerned with "legal niceties."4 According to another M.P., "there
are many rights which possibly one could not vindicate in a Court of
Law, and yet rights, properly so-called, which a Government ought not
to take away, which no wise Government would ever dream of taking
away."4 "1 Charles Bradlaugh effectively conceded the unlawfulness of
meetings as technical obstructions when he requested "a generosity of
construction with regard to what may be the right to hold public
meetings," insisting that the right "should not be tied down by exact
legal technicality."'4 The fact that meetings were not for the most
part "tied down by legal technicality" nourished a belief in a customary
right to assemble premised on the expectation that the authorities would
continue to tolerate violations of obstruction law. 483 This phenomenon
suggests that popular conceptions of "rights" were based more on de
facto patterns of police enforcement and non-enforcement than on de
jure pronouncements of legal authorities.
For its part, the government exploited the disjunction between the
popular belief in freedom of assembly and its actual legal status by
acknowledging the customary practice of permitting meetings while
denying their formal legality. This posture allowed it both to avoid
unnecessary repression and to retain the ability to constrict the practice
of toleration whenever necessary.4 4  William Harcourt, the Liberal
479. 333 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 1017 (Mar. 5, 1889).
480. Id. He added that if the Government thought that it could get rid of the
Trafalgar Square question by simply stating that certain clauses of the Metropolitan
Police Act prohibited a use of the Square that had been "enjoyed by the people for a
long series of years, let me tell you, you entirely fail to satisfy us and a very large
number of persons outside." Id. at 1026. The people of London, he had earlier
remarked, did not attach the same importance to legal argument as did members of
Parliament. 323 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 125 (Mar. 2, 1888).
481. 333 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 995 (Mar. 5, 1889).
482. 314 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 1765 (May 12, 1887). Similarly, William
Harcourt described the right of public meeting as a "political right" or a "right of use,"
even though it was not a legal right. 323 PAL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 63-64 (Mar. 2,
1888).
483. This belief of course underlay Arrowsmith's argument that the customary
practice of police forbearance conferred lawful authority on her meeting. See
Arrowsmith v. Jenkins, [1963] 2 Q.B. 561. Although the court rejected her claim that
toleration could not be suspended against particular groups, the expectation of
forbearance consistently informed popular attitudes nonetheless.
434. The government was well aware that suppressing meetings was politically
inexpedient. William Harcourt admitted that he was solicitous of assemblies because the
English were "habituated" to them and would resent unnecessary interference: "The
people of this country have been used to these privileges, and unnecessary repression
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Home Secretary, described the right to assemble as being not "technical-
ly legal" but rather a "political right" of usage,48 and William Ewart
Gladstone similarly differentiated between a "permanent cession of a
right and an occasional waiver under circumstances that would justify
such an exercise of discretion on the part of the Government."486 The
Conservatives followed the Liberals in asserting that supporters of a right
of meeting claimed not "a legal right" but only "something that rests
upon custom, ' '487 and that therefore the government could enforce the
law on passage whenever circumstances warranted. The Attorney
General insisted in 1889:
The right of access for passage negatives the right to occupy the whole space
for a public meeting .... [A]cquiescence in an unlicensed user by a certain
number of the public, in contravention of the public rights, may be permitted
so long as no evil consequences are likely to follow; but when the Executive
find that the result is to involve any section of the public in danger, or to tend
to the public inconvenience, it is the duty of the Executive to step in and put
an end to that which has been previously acquiesced in. 88
Similarly, Matthews acknowledged that although in the "spirit of
forbearance" the authorities closed their eyes to the use of Trafalgar
Square for public meetings, the supposed right to meet in any thorough-
fare was a right "totally unknown to the law, and cannot be established
by custom, however prolonged."48 9 It was irresponsible, he continued,
for popular leaders to "din into the ears of the working classes that they
creates discontent and disturbance." BRIT. PAPL. PAPERS, PUBLIC MEETINGS IN METRO-
POLITAN OPEN SPACES: CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE HOME DEPARTMENT AND THE
METROPOLITAN BOARD OF WORKS, 1878-1888, H.C., 1889; see, e.g, 205 PARL. DEB.,
H.C. (3d ser.) 574-75 (Mar. 24, 1871) (William Gladstone stating that the preferred
policy except in cases of danger to the public peace was not to interfere with expressions
of opinion); 18 PARL. DEB. H.C. (4th ser.) 889-90 (Nov. 14, 1893) (Herbert Asquith
claiming that meetings acted as a safety valve to principles only dangerous if
suppressed).
485. 323 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 63-64 (Mar. 2, 1888).
486. 186 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 1974 (May 3, 1867).
487. 333 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 1048 (Mar. 5, 1889).
488. Id. at 1048-49. Webster also stated that although undoubtedly meetings were
permitted at times, this was not because they were claimed as of right but only because
the government, as previous governments, did not wish to interfere with such an illegal
use unless it was necessary for the public interest 323 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 47,
53-54 (Mar. 2, 1888).
489. 333 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 1008 (Mar. 5, 1889). He added that the
government had "every sympathy with public meetings," but the events of 1886 and
1887 suggested that "[t]he acquiescence of which I have spoken has been twice most
grossly abused." Id.
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have a right of meeting in these places."'"90 The government thus took
the position that in its discretion it could invoke the rules against
meetings and retract the "policy of acquiescence." '491
A practical political corollary of the de facto right to freedom of
assembly created by customary nonenforcement of obstruction law was
that the prosecution of members of specific groups-predominantly those
on the left-inevitably led to heated charges of discrimination.
Ironically, it was precisely the norm of toleration that made episodes of
enforcement so objectionable, and after World War II there was growing
momentum to establish formal legal protections for freedom of
assembly.492 It is important to recognize, however, that such proposals
merely sought to superimpose positive law status on a customary right
to assemble that had developed in the nineteenth century as a result of
the prevalent official practice of condoning unlawful public meetings.
It was precisely the perception in the twentieth century that the police
were departing from the customary practice of forbearance that produced
increasing pressure to bring the formal law into compliance with popular
constitutionalism.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article suggests, on the broadest level, that the history of the
"right to passage" in the past two centuries is explicable only in terms
of the complex interaction between formal legal doctrine on the one
hand and social and political pressures on the other. Specific challenges
to public order significantly shaped the evolution of legal rules, but these
rules, once established, constrained official action and compelled the
490. Id. at 1007.
491. The government could also "recognize" the right while imposing conditions
on it; that is, it could distinguish the abstract right from the right "to exercise it in a
particular place" such as the street. As Sir George Grey stated in 1867: "There is no
question now as to the legality of meetings held for the discussion of questions
connected with Reform, and the only question is as to where these meetings should take
place." 186 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 1980 (May 3, 1867). Similarly, the Attorney
General, Sir Richard Webster, remarked in 1889: "This is not a question of the right of
public meeting or of public discussion; it is simply a question of the place in which you
are entitled to have discussion." 333 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) 1048 (Mar. 5, 1889);
see M'ara v. Magistrates, [1913] Sess. Cas. (J.) 1059, 1073 ("[T]he right of free speech
is a perfectly separate thing from the question of the place where that right is to be
exercised.").
492. See, e.g., SUPPERSTONE, supra note 3, at 334; Lord Browne-Wilkinson, The
Infiltration of a Bill of Rights, 1992 PuB. L. 397, 397-98; Francesca Klug & John
Wadham, The "Democratic" Entrenchment of a Bill of Rights: Liberty's Proposals,
1993 PuB. L. 579, 579; Sir John Laws, Judicial Remedies and the Constitution, 57 MOD.
L. REv. 213, 224-25 (1994); McCrudden & Chambers, supra note 397, at 7-8; Williams,
Freedom of Assembly, supra note 320, at 118; see also sources cited supra note 376.
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authorities at critical junctures to develop countervailing strategies. This
exploration confirms that neither an externalist nor internalist approach
to legal history by itself adequately explains historical change and,
moreover, that the relative significance of contextual and doctrinal
factors at any particular point in time is itself historically contingent.
In terms of the instrumental applications of nuisance law, obstruction
of the highway was an important and often underestimated device to
control political street demonstrations in five major periods of public
disorder. The government sought recourse in this particular doctrine
primarily because it offered the advantages of reliability, malleability,
and ostensible neutrality. Its reliability lay in the broad judicial
construction of "obstruction" and the generally limited interpretation of
"reasonableness," which meant that virtually all street meetings and most
processions were technically unlawful. Its malleability derived from the
fact that it was potentially applicable to any form of activity in the street
and could be appropriately modified to meet any given circumstance.
Obstruction was a plausible charge in any situation, and the police
doubtless relied on it to disperse political demonstrations to an extent
scarcely revealed by the formal legal record.
In addition to being universally serviceable, obstruction law was also
ostensibly more neutral and nonpolitical than traditional criminal
offenses. Although the government in fact selectively targeted certain
groups, it consistently maintained that it impartially applied the law only
against perpetrators of an obvious physical offense and that enforcement
decisions were appropriately left to the independent judgment of the
police. The assumed connection between street obstruction and more
serious criminal behavior assisted in the depoliticizing effort. It allowed
the government to present technical prosecutions as a mechanism for
preventing greater societal harms and to claim that enforcement actions
were directed not against bona fide participants in street assemblies but
only against the disreputable elements that such meetings invariably
attracted.
Another critical advantage of obstruction law was that it circumvented
constitutional issues of "freedom of assembly" while commanding its
own rhetoric of rights. The courts transformed questions of civil
liberties into seemingly uncomplicated factual issues regarding the
commission of physical acts. Judges did not, however, eschew the
discourse of rights. On the contrary, they asserted that they were
vindicating a fundamental public right, the "right to passage." They thus
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framed what were in fact restrictions on a right of assembly as protection
for the general right of the citizenry to be free from certain types of
annoyance and inconvenience. Even when some judges claimed to
recognize a "right to protest" in the later twentieth century, they
maintained that it was subordinate to the long-established positive right
of public passage.
This Article further argues that the central concept in obstruction law
was the distinction between meetings and processions, the shifting
fortunes of which reveal the historically contingent relationship between
formal rules and political exigencies. In the early nineteenth century an
inchoate dichotomy emerged between two types of assembly that was
partially based on literal concepts of "passage" but also served to protect
customary civic processions from the impact of obstruction law. Five
periods of crisis in public order then formalized, modified, and
eventually transformed the distinction.
The doctrine crystallized in the 1880s, when it legitimized the
relatively innocuous processions of the Salvationists while invalidating
the street meetings of the socialists. The resolution achieved in the
1880s remained congruent with the political needs of the government in
the early twentieth century, when it strengthened the hand of officials in
dealing with suffragette picketing. In the 1930s, however, as marches
came to constitute the major threat to public order, Parliament intervened
through public order legislation to redress the imbalance between the two
categories of assembly. The bifurcation between meetings and
processions nonetheless again proved compatible with governmental
interests in the 1960s, when "sit-down" demonstrations moved to the
forefront of public attention.
Developments in the late 1970s and 1980s, however, compelled a
profound if subtle restructuring of the obstruction regime. Such factors
as the reappearance of disruptive processions, increasing rhetoric about
the right of public assembly, and escalating domestic disorder collective-
ly undermined the utility of the two formal categories. Parliament and
the courts both increased potential constraints and conferred potential
legitimacy on all types of demonstrations, thereby enhancing police
discretion to tolerate, regulate, or suppress street activity without
reference to considerations of passage. Meetings enjoyed more reputable
status under an expanded notion of "reasonableness," and governmental
regulation even afforded them a certain degree of legal recognition. The
importance of passage in the calibration of "reasonableness," however,
still meant that protest would inevitably yield priority to passage.
Concomitantly, marching demonstrators lost the protection of the "right
of passage," which was reoriented from a right that allowed them to
obstruct the public to a generalized public right of social convenience.
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The emphasis on convenience derived from classic nuisance theory,
and the persistent influence of the private law origins of obstruction
further exemplified the tenacity of formal legal rules and concepts.
Theories of passage initially developed under the rubrics of trespass and
private nuisance, legal categories oriented toward protecting the rights
of private "owners" of the street from inconvenience or annoyance.
Nineteenth-century trespass cases such as Duke ofRutland and Hickman
remained authoritative precedents for the law on outdoor meetings
because all streets in England continued to be "privately" owned. This
private law legacy fostered a broad construction of "obstruction" and a
narrow definition of "reasonable use," even as ownership passed to the
local authority and nuisance law expanded to encompass public law
applications. The conflation of public and private law concepts was
further reflected in the potent precedential force of commercial decisions
such as Nagy v. Weston in the area of public order obstructions.
Theoretically, the flexibility of the Nagy test could benefit political
protestors, but judges and magistrates adopted a restrictive approach to
permissible street activity in the commercial context, which had a
constricting influence on magistrates deciding street demonstration cases.
The formal legacy of private law premises and doctrines consistently
disposed the courts in obstruction cases to elevate convenience over
considerations of "freedom of assembly." Eventually, in the Public
Order Act 1986, common law nuisance concepts invaded the statutory
law of public order itself.
In both its statutory and common law applications, obstruction law
continuously revealed the immense and ever-broadening discretion that
the English criminal justice system reposed in actors at all levels of the
hierarchy. Judges had considerable discretion to interpret the law, and
in some cases-by expansively defining "obstruction" and holding that
meetings were per se unreasonable uses of the street-they developed
relatively clear rules. Appellate decisions were infrequent, however, and
for the most part judges transformed issues of public law into simple
questions of fact to be resolved by magistrates. The latter, in turn, were
virtually unconstrained in deciding individual cases. The "all the
circumstances" tests of Lowdens and Nagy, in particular, relegated
ultimate decisionmaking to magistrates whose factual determinations
were rarely disturbed on appeal. As has been shown, the most
significant and comprehensive discretion permeating the English criminal
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justice system rested with the police, who made the fundamental
decision whether or not to enforce the rules on obstruction at all.
This systemic discretion, as has been suggested, was frequently
exercised selectively against particular groups and, since the 1960s, has
prompted growing criticism and increasing calls for formal recognition
of "freedom of assembly." Given the character of much contemporary
discourse about the "right to passage," however, a positive right to
assemble would not necessarily supersede the powerful and tenacious
right of the public to pass along the highway without obstruction.
Insofar as the primacy of passage continues to have an inhibiting effect
on civil liberties, the history of the "right to passage" is not simply an
antiquarian inquiry but a cautionary tale for the present.
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